Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Iancu
Decision Date | 06 April 2018 |
Docket Number | 2016-1954 |
Citation | 886 F.3d 1369 |
Parties | KNOWLES ELECTRONICS LLC, Appellant v. Andrei IANCU, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Intervenor |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit |
Richard L. Rainey, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by Brian Gerard Bieluch, Michael S. Sawyer, Cyril Djoukeng.
Molly R. Silfen, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for intervenor. Also represented by Nathan K. Kelley, Thomas W. Krause, Meredith Hope Schoenfeld ; Mark R. Freeman, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
Before Newman, Clevenger, and Wallach, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Knowles Electronics LLC ("Knowles") appeals the inter partes reexamination decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's ("USPTO") Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB") that affirmed an examiner's findings that (1) claims 1–2, 5–6, 9, 11–12, 15–16, and 19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,018,049 ("the '049 patent") are unpatentable as anticipated; and (2) claims 21–23 and 25–26 of the '049 patent would have been obvious over various prior art references. Analog Devices, Inc. v. Knowles Elecs. LLC (Analog Devices I ), No. 2015-004989, 2015 WL 5144183, at *7, *9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2015) ; see Analog Devices, Inc. v. Knowles Elecs. LLC (Analog Devices II ), No. 2015-004989, 2016 WL 675856, at *7 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 17, 2016) ( ).1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012).2 We affirm.
I. The '049 Patent
The '049 patent, entitled "Silicon Condenser Microphone and Manufacturing Method," generally discloses a silicon condenser microphone apparatus, including a housing for shielding a transducer, used in certain types of hearing aids to protect the transducer from outside interferences. See '049 patent, Abstract; id. col. 1 ll. 17–19, 26–30, 46–51. The components of the microphone apparatus, i.e., "package," may specifically be processed "in panel form" that can be separated later into individual units. See id. col. 3 ll. 10–19. As a result, the invention purportedly improves over the prior art's "drawbacks associated with manufacturing these housings, such as lead time, cost, and tooling." Id. col. 1 ll. 39–41.
Independent claim 1 is representative of the apparatus claims and discloses:
Id. col. 12 ll. 16–31. Independent claim 21 is representative of the method claims and discloses:
Knowles argues that the PTAB erred in two respects. First, Knowles argues that the PTAB improperly construed "package," including by failing to consider this court's construction of package for a related patent. See Appellant's Br. 58–73. Second, Knowles argues that the PTAB improperly relied on a new ground of rejection to sustain the Examiner's obviousness findings. See id. at 74–80. After stating the applicable standard of review and legal framework, we address these arguments in turn.3
"We review the [PTAB]'s ultimate claim construction in a reexamination de novo." In re CSB-Sys. Int'l, Inc. , 832 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing, inter alia, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 831, 840–41, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2015) ). A patent's specification, together with its prosecution history,4 constitutes intrinsic evidence to which the PTAB gives priority when it construes claims. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc. , 789 F.3d 1292, 1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal , 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc). We review the PTAB's assessment of intrinsic evidence de novo. See id . When the PTAB "look[s] beyond the patent's intrinsic evidence and ... consult[s] extrinsic evidence," Teva , 135 S.Ct. at 841, such as expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises, those underlying findings amount to factual determinations that we review for "substantial evidence," Microsoft Corp. , 789 F.3d at 1297. Substantial evidence means "relevant evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (citations omitted). "If two inconsistent conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in record, the PTAB's decision to favor one conclusion over the other is the epitome of a decision that must be sustained upon review for substantial evidence." Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc. , 881 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
"During reexamination proceedings of unexpired patents ... the [PTAB] uses the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification’ standard, or BRI." In re CSB-Sys. , 832 F.3d at 1340 (citation omitted); cf. Cuozzo , 136 S.Ct. at 2145 ( ). "Accordingly, this court reviews the reasonableness of the [US]PTO's disputed claim term interpretations." In re Bigio , 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, "[e]ven under the [BRI], the [PTAB]'s construction cannot be divorced from the specification and the record evidence ... and must be consistent with the one that those skilled in the art [ (‘PHOSITA’) ] would reach." Microsoft Corp. , 789 F.3d at 1298 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
On appeal, Knowles maintains that the PTAB has "failed to resolve critical claim construction disputes regarding the meaning of the term ‘package.’ "5 Appellant's Br. 58; see id. at 58–62. Specifically, Knowles avers that we "should direct the [PTAB] to adopt the definition of ‘package’ in MEMS Technology and follow the analysis therein, construing ‘package’ to require a second-level connection with a mounting mechanism ."6 Id. at 62 (emphasis added) (citing MEMS Tech. Berhad v. Int'l Trade Comm'n , 447 Fed.Appx. 142, 159 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ); see id. at 62–72.
The PTAB construed "package" as "a structure consisting of a semiconductor device, a first-level interconnect system, a wiring structure, a second-level interconnection platform, and an enclosure that protects the system and provides the mechanical platform for the sublevel." Analog Devices II , 2016 WL 675856, at *3 ; see id. (); Analog Devices I , 2015 WL 5144183, at *4 ( ). This definition does not require any specific mounting mechanism or use of mounting in the second-level connection. The PTAB also specifically rejected Knowles's proffered claim construction that "a package is mechanically and electrically connected to a printed circuit board by either through-hole or surface mounting." Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with the PTAB's construction of "package."
We begin with the words of the claims themselves. See Phillips , 415 F.3d at 1314–15. The claims of the '049 patent do not disclose any particular type of required second-level interconnection. See '049 patent col. 12 ll. 16–31 (claim 1), col. 13 l. 21–col. 14 l. 18 (claim 21). While dependent claim 15 contains additional limitations that "include an element" that could be used for mounting, such as "circuitry, ground planes, solder pads, ... capacitors[,] and through hole pads," id. col. 13 ll. 9–13, these limitations, by the doctrine of claim differentiation, cannot apply to limit independent claims 1 or 21, see Phillips , 415 F.3d at 1315 ().
The '049 patent's...
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