Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida

• Decision Date: 16 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC00-1910.,SC00-1910.
• Citation: 898 So.2d 1
• Parties: Maggie KNOWLES, etc., Petitioner, v. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES-FLORIDA, INC., etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

898 So.2d 1

Maggie KNOWLES, etc., Petitioner, v. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES-FLORIDA, INC., etc., Respondent.

No. SC00-1910.

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 16, 2004.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 2005.

Jane Kreusler-Walsh and Rebecca J. Mercier of Jane Kreusler-Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, and Jeffrey M. Fenster of Fenster and Faerber, P.A., Plantation, FL, for Petitioner.

Scott Mager and Gary Gaffney of Mager and Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, George Quintairos and Edward Prieto of Quintairos, Prieto, Wood and Boyer, P.A., Miami, FL, for Respondent.

Joel S. Perwin of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meahow, Olin and Perwin, P.A., Miami, FL, and Ford and Sinclair, P.A., Miami, FL, for amicus curiae, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.

Edward J. Lyons of Milcowitz and Lyons, P.A., Clearwater, FL, for amicus curiae, the Coalition to Protect America's Elders.

M. Stephen Turner, David K. Miller and Kelly A. O'Keefe of Broad and Cassel, Tallahassee, FL, for amici curiae, Florida Health Care Association and the Florida Association of Homes for the Aging

G. Bart Billbrough, Geoffrey B. Marks and Daniella S. Kreiner of Cole, White and Billbrough, P.A., Miami, FL, for amicus curiae, the Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, a foreign corporation d/b/a Heartland Health Care and Rehabilitation Center — Sunrise.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Beverly Enterprises — Florida, Inc. v. Knowles, 766 So.2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (en banc). The district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:

MAY A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE BRING A STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 400.023(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), ON BEHALF OF A DECEASED RESIDENT OF A NURSING HOME FOR ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT OF THE RESIDENT'S STATUTORY RIGHTS PROVIDED BY SECTION 400.022, FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), WHERE THE INFRINGEMENT HAS NOT CAUSED THE RESIDENT'S DEATH?

Beverly Enterprises — Florida, Inc. v. Knowles, 763 So.2d 1285, 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we answer the question in the negative and approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS

The personal representative of the estate of Gladstone Knowles, deceased, filed an action against Beverly Enterprises seeking damages under the provisions of section 400.023(1), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides:

Any resident whose rights as specified in this part are deprived or infringed upon shall have a cause of action against any licensee responsible for the violation.

The action may be brought by the resident or his or her guardian, by a person or organization acting on behalf of a resident with the consent of the resident or his or her guardian, or by the personal representative of the estate of the deceased resident when the cause of death resulted from the deprivation or infringement of the decedent's rights.

(Emphasis supplied.) The facts that gave rise to the personal representative's action are set out in the Fourth District's opinion:

Gladstone Knowles, an elderly gentleman, was a resident of Washington Manor Nursing Home and Rehabilitation Center for approximately 67 days while he convalesced from hip-replacement surgery. While at Washington Manor, Knowles developed severe bedsores and other serious ailments allegedly because of neglectful and improper treatment and care provided by Washington Manor. Knowles was transferred to a medical hospital where he later died. Maggie Knowles, the personal representative for Gladstone Knowles, sued Washington Manor for violation of the Patient's Bill of Rights under sections 400.022 and 400.023, Florida Statutes (1997). Washington Manor moved for summary judgment because the complaint did not allege that any violation of the statute caused Gladstone's death. Appellee conceded that Gladstone's death did not result from any of the alleged violations of the Patient's Bill of Rights. Interpreting section 400.023(1) to preclude actions by a personal representative when the patient's death is not caused by a deprivation of rights under the statute, the trial court granted appellant's motion for summary judgment. After the trial court disposed of the statutory negligence claims, the case went to trial on a common law negligence theory. The jury returned a verdict for Washington Manor.

Beverly Enterprises — Florida, Inc. v. Knowles, 766 So.2d 335, 335-36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (en banc). However, after the return of the jury verdict, the trial court concluded that it had erred in granting a summary judgment on the statutory claim and ordered a new trial. The new trial order relied upon a newly rendered decision from the Fourth District.

Prior to its en banc decision in Knowles, the Fourth District had held in Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc., 705 So.2d 926, 933-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), that section 400.023(1) permitted a personal representative to bring a cause of action for damages arising out of violations of section 400.022 regardless of whether the violations caused the death of the resident. See Knowles, 766 So.2d at 336

. When the Fourth District's decision in Greenfield was called to its attention, the trial court granted petitioner's motion for a new trial.

Upon subsequent review, however, the Fourth District receded from its earlier decision in Greenfield and reversed the trial court's order for a new trial. The district court, sitting en banc, held that "the language of section 400.023 unambiguously provides that a personal representative of a deceased, nursing home resident may bring a cause of action against the nursing home for violation of the Patient's Bill of Rights only when the deprivation or infringement of the resident's rights caused the patient's death." Knowles, 766 So.2d at 336. Accordingly, the Fourth District held that the trial court was correct in initially dismissing the statutory negligence claims. See id.

In Greenfield, the personal representative of the estate of a deceased resident who died from causes unrelated to the alleged statutory violations filed suit against the nursing home for its failure to adequately advise residents of the costs of services. See Greenfield, 705 So.2d at 933

. The trial court dismissed the action because the personal representative had failed to demonstrate that the decedent died as a result of the statutory violations. Id. On appeal, the Fourth District reversed. It reasoned:

The trial court dismissed count VII on the basis that appellant did not allege that her husband's death resulted from the deprivation or infringement of his rights under Chapter 400. We do not agree with that interpretation of the statute.

On one level, section 400.023 lends itself to the interpretation espoused by the trial court, that is, that suits by personal representatives on behalf of deceased residents are allowed only when the nursing home's alleged negligence caused the resident's death. On the other hand, we do not think that such an interpretation was intended by the Legislature in light of section 46.021, Florida Statutes (1993), which provides that "no cause of action dies with the person." To construe section 400.023 as foreclosing all causes of actions for nursing home negligence which does not cause the resident's death is to nullify section 46.021. See generally Beverly Enterprises — Florida, Inc. v. Estate of Maggiacomo, 651 So.2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA),

quashed on other grounds, 661 So.2d 1215 (Fla.1995) (personal representative sued on behalf of deceased resident under section 400.023 for deprivation of nursing home rights for theft of diamond ring which was allegedly forced from finger of resident causing bruises; resident died of unrelated causes); Arthur v. Unicare Facilities, Inc., 602 So.2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA),

rev. denied, 613 So.2d 4 (Fla.1992) (when death results from complained-of injuries, The Wrongful Death Act applies; when death results from an independent cause, claim is preserved by section 46.021, the survival of actions statute). As such, we hold that section 400.023, Florida Statutes (1993), must be read in pari materia with section 46.021, Florida Statutes (1993) in order to reach a logical result. See generally Inciarrano v. State, 447 So.2d 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984),

quashed on other grounds, 473 So.2d 1272 (Fla.1985) (the Legislature is presumed to know the state of the law in passing statutes and consequently the legislation is to be construed on the premise that the particular statute in question is to be applied relative to other statutes affecting the same subject matter). We therefore reverse the trial court's dismissal of appellant's statutory cause of action, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Greenfield, 705 So.2d at 933-34.

In the en banc Knowles opinion, the district court relied upon and adopted the reasoning of Judge Warner's partial dissent in Greenfield, which provided:

The rights protected under section 400.022 are rights that are largely personal to the resident of the facility, such as the right to religious liberty, see § 400.022(1)(a), the right to organize and participate in groups in the facility, see § 400.022(1)(e), and the right to manage one's personal affairs, see § 400.022(1)(h) to name a few. The resident also has the right to adequate medical care and proper treatment, see § 400.022(1)(l) and under section 400.023(1), if the violation of these rights results in a death then, the personal representative of the estate of the deceased resident has a cause of action. However, as to the other personal rights, I can conceive of valid policy reasons why the legislature would not want such actions to survive, as post-death vindication would not bring any personal satisfaction to the resident. Considering the fact that attorney's fees are available for successful suits proving infringements of these statutory rights, it may have been part of the

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