Knowles v. Knowles, Civil No. 396-1971

• Decision Date: 15 February 1973
• Docket Number: Civil No. 396-1971
• Citation: 9 V.I. 360
• Parties: EGLANTINE KNOWLES, Plaintiff v. DUPONT KNOWLES, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

9 V.I. 360

EGLANTINE KNOWLES, Plaintiff v. DUPONT KNOWLES, Defendant

Civil No. 396-1971

District Court of the Virgin Islands Div. of St. Croix

February 15, 1973

Divorce action. District Court, Young, J., held that provision of property tax homestead exemption statute to effect that a court granting a divorce shall dispose of the homestead in accordance with the equity of the case constitutes explicit authority for a court, in a divorce action, to make a property settlement and transfer interests in property.YOUNG, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE

This action was heard on November 6, 1972. At the conclusion of the hearing, both parties were granted divorces on the ground of incompatibility of temperament by a decree dated as of November 7, 1972. In that decree, I reserved decision as to the property rights of the parties and requested memoranda from counsel as to the jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate any property rights in real property. More particularly, this case presents the question of whether the court can order the husband to transfer to his ex-wife all or part of the real property which he currently possesses in his own name. There were memoranda filed and I did hear argument of counsel on that issue. I now hold that the court can enter such a decree, although in deciding whether to do so, it will beguided by the equitable considerations which are usually considered in a divorce action. However, to ensure the validity of a decree that makes a disposition of real property in a divorce action, I will first order the husband to pay, within a period of time, a single sum as alimony in gross. At his option, this payment may be fully satisfied by a transfer and conveyance to the wife of a legal share in the subject property.

I

In this first section, I will examine the equities of the case. These indicate that a property division would be the most appropriate method of settlement. This in turn indicates that a power to transfer real property is, in at least some cases, a desirable incident of divorce jurisdiction; and thus if a statutory construction can reasonably justify this result, it should be favored. But to begin with the equities, the parties here were married for approximately ten years and there have been four children born of the marriage ranging from two years of age to nine years of age. Plaintiff (wife and mother) and defendant (husband and father) were a working couple. She worked for the Government and a hospital and he worked for a heavy equipment and construction firm. His income was approximately half again as much as hers, perhaps double if we consider overtime pay which he received from time to time.

After they had been married for approximately five years they purchased a lot in a subdivision of Estate Peter's Rest. The lot cost $2,750. Thereafter they constructed a home on the lot and lived in the home until the spring of 1971 when they separated for the third and final time. Plaintiff moved out of the house and is living in a rental home with the four children of this marriage and one child which she had with another man prior tothis marriage. The husband also moved out of the house and has rented the house on a month-to-month tenancy for the sum of $425.00 per month.

During the trial, plaintiff asked for pendente lite relief for support and for return of certain household equipment which she needed in order to maintain the home for herself and the five children. Pursuant to that request, which was supported by testimony and an affidavit, the court ordered defendant to turn over to her the washing machine, dining room set, refrigerator and phonograph, and to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $40 per week for the support of the children.

There was testimony and documentary evidence such as receipts in support of plaintiff's contention that she paid for the refrigerator, washing machine and other equipment ordered to be turned over to her. There was also some evidence that she paid some of the installments on the land and on the construction and mortgage for the house. However, defendant testified that whatever monies she paid on the house and on the personal property was given to her by defendant and that she never actually used her own money in acquiring either the personal property or the real estate.

In my consideration of the equities involved in this case I do not feel that it is important to have an exact accounting between husband and wife and to try to determine just who paid for what and how much. I regard this husband and wife relationship as a working team where they both contributed in supporting and keeping up the family and in acquiring certain properties, including the homestead. The husband had a greater income, so naturally he contributed more money to the home. On the other hand, the wife contributed perhaps more time to the care and maintenance of the home and of the children.

It is obvious from plaintiff's complaint that she and her attorney assumed that the property had been purchased jointly and that it was in the names of the parties as tenants by the entirety. It was only when plaintiff read the answer that she learned that the property was conveyed solely to the defendant as his sole property. According to the defendant's answers to interrogatories, his appraisal of the present value of the property is $40,000. However, the property is subject to an outstanding unpaid mortgage balance of approximately $18,000. Defendant pays $206.00 per month in equal monthly amortization payments of the mortgage, principal and interest. Therefore, the rent from the house more than covers the mortgage payments, as well as taxes, insurance and maintenance.

[1] The equities in this case with four children of the marriage, ten years of marriage, both parties working and contributing to the family expenses and acquisitions, dictate that I divide the real property for them to share and share alike. The property should probably have been acquired by them as tenants by the entirety, at least plaintiff thought it was so being acquired, and had it been so acquired, the divorce decree would automatically change the tenancy by the entirety to that of tenants in common, each with an undivided one-half interest. By this Supplemental Decree, I may accomplish what I think should in justice be done when two people dissolve their marriage after having lived and worked together and sharing the responsibilities of a family, i.e., either that each has an undivided one-half interest in the marital home or failing that, that the equities be apportioned equally by the payment of a lump sum from the title owner spouse to the other in lieu of any transfer of an interest in the homestead.

It is my opinion that defendant should convey to plaintiff a one-half undivided interest in Plot No. 112 of Subdivision of Parcel 9 of Estate Peter's Rest, subject to the present mortgage encumbrance thereon. The parties should then be jointly and equally responsible for the mortgage payments, taxes, insurance and maintenance and they will share the rental income from which to do this. With regard to the personal property and furniture, it shall be my order that defendant shall turn over to plaintiff the washing machine, refrigerator, phonograph and dining room set. However, if the refrigerator and dining room set are being used by the tenants as part of a furnished house rental, plaintiff should then leave such equipment in the house for such use, but she may take from the house the phonograph and washing machine which are pieces of equipment normally not included in a furnished house inventory. Defendant shall have the ownership of the 1970 Ford Torino.

II

[2] While the foregoing appears to be the most desirable outcome for this case, it remains to be examined whether it is within the powers of this court. Initially, it seems clear that a power to transfer real property is not an automatic incident to divorce jurisdiction. Monetary grants of alimony, which are recognized in the Virgin Islands, might be deemed a sufficient guarantee that a divorced wife will not be left destitute. A further power over real property may therefore be conferred only by statute; it should not be implied by the court. See Lopez v. Lopez, 112 A.2d 466, 206 Md. 509 (1955); Emery v. Emery, 200 P.2d 251 (Mont. 1948); 24 Am.Jur.2d § 926; cf. Cross v. Cross, 125 N.E.2d 488 (1955); Miller v. Miller, 126 P.2d 357 (1942).

[3, 4] I find, however, that there is such an explicit statutory authority in the Virgin Islands. 33 V.I.C. 2305 discusses the concept of the "homestead". Subsection (a) defines the term to mean an abode actually owned and occupied by a person or his family. Subsection (d) then provides in pertinent part that—

. . . in the case of a divorce, the court which grants it shall make disposition of the homestead in accordance with the equity of the case.

The method of property settlement is a remedy distinct from, and supplemental to, the alimony powers conferred by 16 V.I.C. § 109(3). Unlike alimony, it proceeds on the basis of "the equities" rather than under the somewhat less flexible standard of recovery from "the party in fault". It is also unlike alimony in that it represents a limited and one-time obligation. It should, therefore, be seen as an additional procedure available in divorce actions.

[5] I believe this provision will apply to all residential property which meets its terms. It is true that section 2305...