Knowles v. People
| Decision Date | 14 May 1867 |
| Citation | 15 Mich. 408 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | Brainard C. Knowles v. The People |
Heard May 4, 1867 [Syllabus Material]
Error to Lenawee circuit.
The defendant was convicted of larceny and sentenced to state prison.
The decision of the questions involved turns upon the charge of the court below, which, with the facts, are stated in the opinion.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted.
C. A Stacy, for plaintiff in error:
1. No credit should be given to any witness (much less to a witness standing in the position of accomplice, as McEvoy did in this case) who has committed willful and corrupt perjury in the very testimony which is relied on to convict the defendant.
The maxim, "Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," ought certainly to apply in such a case, if ever: 5 Cow. 253, 246.
So if his testimony be corruptly false in any particular, the whole must be rejected: 1 Dev. 508; 8 Conn. 323; 7 Wheaton 283, 338-9; 1 Cow. and Hill's Notes to Phillips Ev., 396.
2. The legislature have carefully protected the right of the husband to refuse to call his wife if he chooses.
If the effect of a neglect or refusal to call her as a witness is to raise a presumption of his guilt, then the provision of the statute, that she shall not be sworn against him without his consent, is nugatory.
W. L. Stoughton, Attorney-General, for the people:
1. The court did not err in refusing to charge the jury that if McEvoy swore willfully and knowingly false, in a material matter, his whole testimony must be rejected: 1 Stark. Ev., 520; Doug., 751; 7 Wheat. 2-3; 5 Cow. 243; 17 Me. 267.
2. The charge asked was an abstract question, not necessarily arising on the evidence; and a refusal to give a charge requested in such a case is no error: 1 Cranch 310; 1 Curtis's Dig., 415.
3. The omission by the defendant to call his wife as a witness, she being present in court, is a circumstance which the jury may take into consideration against him.
The Sess. L. of 1861 make the husband and wife competent witnesses for and against each other in all criminal cases: Sess. L. 1861, 168. But, neither the husband nor wife can be examined for or against the other, without his or her consent: Ibid., 169.
a. The general rule is that when a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against him: Broom's Legal Max., 843; 3 Stark. Ev., 937; 1 Greenleaf's Ev., § 37; 1 Whart. Am. C. L., § 722; 3 Phil. on Ev., 473, and cases there cited; Cowp., 65.
b. The testimony of the wife is placed by the act of 1861 upon the same footing as that of any other witness, with one exception: she cannot testify for or against the husband without his consent. The right to exclude her testimony is a personal privilege with him, and his refusal to offer such evidence naturally leads to the inference that if adduced it would operate unfavorably against him.
The common law disability is removed, and the wife stands in the same relation to her husband, when on trial, as any other witness, except his right to exclude her testimony.
It will be observed that this question grew out of the evidence offered by the defendant. He attempted to meet the case made by the prosecution by setting up an alibi, and for this purpose offered evidence tending to show that at the time of the commission of the offense he was at home, in company with his wife. It further appears that she was present in court. The jury were compelled to pass upon the evidence offered by him. They were entitled to a full and fair showing on his part. If it appeared from his own evidence that he had neglected or refused to call a competent witness who had superior means of information, and was within his reach, and actually in court, it would seem to be contrary to every principle of the law of evidence, and the ordinary rules for the investigation of truth, to exclude that fact from their consideration.
4. The rule at common law which excludes the husband or wife, as a witness for or against the other, was founded partly on the supposed identity of their legal interests, and partly on principles of public policy. Neither of the reasons for the old rule can aid the case of the plaintiff in error.
The legislature has made a material change, and the true reason of that change, undoubtedly, was to enlarge the field of investigation, and to enable all the facts and circumstances surrounding a criminal case to be submitted to the consideration of the jury.
Defendant was convicted in the circuit court for the county of Lenawee of a charge of larceny, in stealing cattle. The conviction was had upon the testimony of Matthew McEvoy, who swore that he and the defendant committed the crime.
There being testimony tending to show that McEvoy had made contradictory statements on points material to the issue, the defendant asked the court to charge the jury that, if the witness had, in any thing material, sworn willfully and knowingly to that which was false, his whole testimony must be disregarded by the jury. This request was refused, and the court charged, in substance, that any such falsehood would seriously affect all of the witness's testimony, and that no credit should be given to...
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...Rather, the Legislature made the spouse conditionally competent, that condition being the consent of the other spouse. Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408, 413 (1867); People v. Gordon, 100 Mich. 518, 59 N.W. 322 (1894). Thus, Sec. 2162 cannot be classified as a "true privilege"; the statute is......
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...by Wigmore, four only are direct authorities for holding that comment is reversible error, no statute being involved. They are: Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408; National Germ. Am. Bank v. Lawrence, 77 Minn. 282, 79 N.W. 1016 (but see State v. Kampert, supra); Johnson v. State, 1885, 63 Miss......
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