Knowles v. State

Decision Date21 February 2017
Docket NumberA16A1607
Parties KNOWLES v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Abigail Rachel Safford, Natalie Katherine Glaser, for Appellant.

Cheryl Banks Hightower, Louie Craig Fraser, Dublin, for Appellee.

Dillard, Presiding Judge.

In this interlocutory appeal, Elrico Knowles challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress drug evidence that was discovered on his person during a warrantless search incident to his arrest for disorderly conduct. On appeal, Knowles argues that the trial court erred in finding that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest him. For the reasons set forth infra , we agree, and thus, reverse the trial court's ruling.

The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed.1 On September 20, 2014, a police officer, while on patrol in Laurens County, Georgia, observed a vehicle with no tag light. And because the officer could not see the car's tag without the light, he initiated a traffic stop. Once the car was stopped, the driver exited the vehicle, and although he was instructed to stay inside the car, he continued to walk toward the officer. As the driver approached, the officer smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage and observed him talking with slurred speech. Shortly thereafter, two additional officers arrived on the scene and conducted field-sobriety tests on the driver.

Meanwhile, the officer who initiated the stop noticed movement in the car and went to ask its occupants for their identification. In doing so, the officer observed Knowles, who was in the backseat, "fidgeting and put[ting] his hand in and out of his pockets and looking in a bag." Based on Knowles's behavior of "fidgeting and looking around," the officer thought that he was acting nervous and suspicious, and therefore, requested that he exit the vehicle to be frisked for weapons. Once Knowles exited the car, he began "yelling and cursing," and in an apparent attempt to explain his fidgety behavior, he told the officer "I'm just trying to give you my damn ID." But despite Knowles's statements and rude behavior, the officer did not feel threatened, and ultimately, he determined that Knowles was unarmed. The officer then ran a check on Knowles's identification and discovered that he had no outstanding warrants or warnings.

When the officer returned to give Knowles back his identification, Knowles said "fuck you," and at that point, the officer arrested him for disorderly conduct. Later, during a search of Knowles incident to his arrest, the officer found a crack pipe and a substance that he suspected to be cocaine.

Ultimately, a grand jury charged Knowles with possession of cocaine and disorderly conduct. Knowles subsequently filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence discovered during the search incident to his arrest, arguing, inter alia , that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Knowles's motion to suppress evidence, but granted him a certificate of immediate review. This Court then granted Knowles's application for an interlocutory appeal, and this appeal follows.

In his sole enumeration of error, Knowles argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct. We agree.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court generally must "(1) accept a trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous, (2) construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court, and (3) limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court."2 However, we review de novo the trial court's "application of law to the undisputed facts."3 Bearing these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to Knowles's specific claim of error.

On appeal, Knowles contends that the trial court erroneously found that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct because his use of profanity during the traffic stop, without more, is insufficient to support an arrest for that offense. A warrantless arrest, like the one at issue here, "is constitutionally valid if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the accused has committed or is committing an offense."4 And probable cause exists if the arresting officer has "reasonably trustworthy information that would allow a reasonable person to believe the accused committed a crime."5

Relevant to the arrest in this case, OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (3) provides that

[a] person commits the offense of disorderly conduct when such person ... [w]ithout provocation, uses to or of another person in such other person's presence, opprobrious or abusive words which by their very utterance tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace, that is to say, words which as a matter of common knowledge and under ordinary circumstances will, when used to or of another person in such other person's presence, naturally tend to provoke violent resentment, that is, words commonly called ‘fighting words'....6

And "fighting words" are defined as "those words by which their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."7

Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, "profane, libelous, lewd, obscene, and fighting words ... have in common the characteristics of injuring or offending a particular audience and tending to provoke a retaliatory response ..."8 Moreover, the use of "fighting words" does not "constitute protected speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution or under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V of the Georgia Constitution."9 To the contrary, fighting words constitute "one of those narrow speech areas not constitutionally protected."10 Nevertheless, to ensure no abridgment of constitutional rights, "the application of OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (3)'s proscription on ‘fighting words' must necessarily be narrow and limited."11 Importantly, when determining whether words constitute fighting words, "the circumstances surrounding the words can be crucial, for only against the background of surrounding events can a judgment be made whether these words had ‘a direct tendency to cause acts of violence’ by others."12 Indeed, "[c]onstitutional enforcement of even facially valid laws applied to fighting words now appears to depend as much on the factual circumstances surrounding a word's utterance as on the character of the word uttered."13

Lastly, although the State argues that "there should not be a different standard when opprobrious and abusive language is directed toward a police officer,"14 the Supreme Court of the United States and other federal courts have indicated that the fighting-words exception to constitutionally protected speech "require[s] a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer[.]"15 This is because a "properly trained officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to ‘fighting words.’ "16 Additionally, as the Supreme Court has further explained, "the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers."17 Indeed, the freedom of individuals verbally to "oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state."18

Turning to the case sub judice , the only evidence cited by the trial court or set forth in the stipulated facts to show that the arresting officer had reason to believe that Knowles had engaged in disorderly conduct was that he yelled, cursed, referenced his "damn ID," and said "fuck you" once to the officer. And while the trial court also noted that Knowles acted "aggressive[ly] toward the officer," it did not cite any evidence regarding how Knowles did so other than by making the foregoing (and unsubstantiated) statement. Furthermore, the stipulated facts, which the trial court approved, gave no indication that Knowles exhibited any non-verbal aggressive behavior; and although the officer's subjective feelings are not directly relevant to our analysis,19 the fact that the officer did not feel threatened by Knowles strongly suggests that his disrespectful behavior and offensive statements were unaccompanied by physical aggression. Indeed, as previously mentioned, presuming that the officer was properly trained, he may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to react violently to Knowles's insolent statements.20

To support its position that the officer had probable cause to arrest Knowles for disorderly conduct, the State relies on two cases in which we upheld convictions for disorderly conduct when the defendant made obscene or profane statements to police officers. But in those cases, the offending statements appear to have been made amid more threatening circumstances than those at issue here (i.e. , a one-on-one encounter between Knowles and the arresting officer during a traffic stop in which other officers were nearby). For example, in Bolden v. State ,21 this Court upheld a conviction for disorderly conduct when the defendant directed a string of insults at the officer, calling him a "son of a bitch," a "mother fucker," a "pig," a "motherfucking pig," and a "bastard."22 And while this Court gave no further details regarding the circumstances in which those insults were made, it appears that, unlike in this case, the confrontation occurred in front of a potentially hostile crowd because, although the defendant was ultimately acquitted of the offense of inciting a riot , there was at least some evidence to charge and try her for that offense.23

The State also relies on Brooks...

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3 cases
  • Johnson v. Dekalb Cnty.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • June 7, 2019
    ...and directed at another person in a threatening manner that would likely provoke an immediate breach of the peace.141 In contrast, in Knowles v. State , the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct for yelling and cursing at a police officer, including referencing his "damn ID" and say......
  • Trammell v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 20, 2020
    ...words are defined as those which by their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Knowles v. State , 340 Ga. App. 274, 277, 797 S.E.2d 197 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). The issue here is whether Trammell directed fighting words toward the officers that ......
  • Mincey v. Vardman
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • March 27, 2023
    ... ... 44 & 59) are granted. The Court declines to exercise ... supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state" law ... claims, which are dismissed without prejudice ...          SUMMARY ... JUDGMENT STANDARD ...        \xC2" ... offensive speech directed at law enforcement officers rises ... to disorderly conduct in more narrow circumstances, ... Knowles v. State, 797 S.E.2d 197, 201 (Ga.Ct.App ... 2017), the totality of the circumstances here nonetheless ... supported probable cause to ... ...

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