Knowlton v. Johnson
Decision Date | 12 June 1877 |
Citation | 37 Mich. 47 |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Parties | Charles B. Knowlton and Daniel S. Dykeman v. William D. Johnson |
Argued June 6, 1877
Case made after judgment from St. Joseph. (Keightley. J.)
Judgment reversed and one entered here for defendant, with the costs of both courts.
Trover. Plaintiffs had judgment below. Reversed.
Carpenter & Clarke for plaintiffs urged that plaintiffs never parted with their title to the property, and that upon the refusal of the defendant to deliver it to them on demand trover lay for its conversion, Mott v. Palmer 1 N.Y. 564; Ford v. Cobb 20 N.Y. 344; Crippen v. Morrison 13 Mich. 23; Godard v. Gould 14 Barb. 662; Adams v. Lee 31 Mich. 442; Tifft v. Horton 53 N.Y. 377. The stipulation that the fixture might be detached and removed if not paid for was binding upon the contracting parties. Ewell on Fixtures, 68-9, 91-3. Defendant's vendors having never had any title, could convey none to the defendant. Story on Sales, §§ 188-201; Couse v. Tregent 11 Mich. 65; Johnston v. Whittemore 27 Mich. 463; Whitney v. McConnell 29 Mich. 12; Giddey v Altman 27 Mich. 206.
Jno. B Shipman for defendant. Three tests are usually applied to determine whether personalty is merged in realty, viz: actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant thereto; application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty with which it is connected, is appropriated; the intention of the parties making the annexation (Potter v. Cromwell 40 N.Y. 287; Voorhees v. McGinnis 48 N.Y. 278; Pierce v. George 108 Mass. 78), though the nature of the thing cannot be changed by stipulation. Rice v. Ruddiman 10 Mich. 125; Ford v. Cobb 20 N.Y. 351. Where the vendor of personalty intends it to be attached to the realty, he is estopped from claiming it as personalty after it is so attached, Manly v. Saunders 27 Mich. 347; Davis v. Bush 28 Mich. 432. Latent equities cannot be claimed in the property by parties responsible for the purchaser's want of notice. Adams v. Bradley 12 Mich. 346; Bloomer v. Henderson 8 Mich. 395; Dawson v. Danbury Bank 15 Mich. 489; Hull v. Swarthout 29 Mich. 252; Treadway v. Sharon 7 Nev. 37; Powers v. Dennison 30 Vt. 752; Davenport v. Shants 43 Vt. 546; Landon v. Platt 34 Conn. 517.
This is a case made after judgment.
The plaintiffs sued in trover for certain water-wheels in use in defendant's grist-mill. The court heard the evidence and made a special finding of facts and thereupon awarded judgment for the plaintiffs for $ 440.06 damages. The defendant contends that the judgment for the plaintiffs is not warranted by the facts.
The principal matters found appear to be these:
On the first of October, 1874, Benjamin F. Trimmer owned the mill. His son Edwin Trimmer, who was in partnership with one Thomas J. Staley, held a lease of it, and the firm were running it. The plaintiffs then bargained and delivered the wheels in question to the firm and with the express understanding that they were to be put in the mill and used there; as a part of the arrangement it was stipulated, however, on the part of the firm, that no property in the wheels should vest in them until acceptance and payment. The agreed price was $ 635, and no part of it has been paid.
The firm received the wheels and against objection by Benjamin Trimmer, the lessor, removed those already in and set up these in their stead.
They were attached to the building and the flume was built up around them in such manner as to prevent their being removed without injury to the building to the extent of from one to two hundred dollars.
After the wheels were so put in, the firm kept on running the mill until about March 11, 1875, at which time the lease was given up to the lessor, Benjamin Trimmer, and he shortly thereafter leased to one Lemuel Miller, who had been in the service of the firm, and Miller then ran the mill until it was sold to defendant.
On the 9th of August, 1875, Benjamin Trimmer sold and conveyed the mill to the defendant for $ 10,000, which the defendant paid. On this sale there was no reservation except of the old wheels, which were lying unused in the mill basement, and the defendant had no notice of any claim against or on account of the wheels. The defendant received possession of the mill, including the wheels, as grantee, and proceeded to use the property, and the plaintiffs in a short time thereafter required the defendant to pay for the wheels or surrender them. But the defendant insisted that he had bought the mill and the wheels and machinery connected with it without any notice of any claim on the part of the plaintiffs and that the title to the whole as real estate was vested in him, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim the wheels as against him.
This action was then brought.
The circuit judge was of opinion that the stipulation by the firm to the plaintiffs that the title should not pass until payment of the purchase price, had the effect to preserve the right of property in the plaintiffs and prevent the wheels from ceasing to be considered as personal chattels, and that defendant, although a bona fide purchaser, could not hold against the plaintiffs who were the real owners, and he relied on Crippen v. Morrison 13 Mich. 23, as sustaining this position.
That case is clearly distinguishable and is not pertinent to the question which is presented by the finding here. Crippen, who had become owner of the mill and who set up a claim to the machinery as being part of the realty, was not a purchaser without notice of the separate right to the machinery, and this circumstance was properly considered by the court as one of importance and was so mentioned. He was not a bona fide purchaser, and was not led by the course of the parties claiming the machinery to suppose that it was in fact a portion of the real estate and grantable accordingly.
Here, however, it is found expressly that the plaintiffs actually contemplated that the wheels should be incorporated with the building, and furnished them to Staley and young Trimmer with the design that they should be annexed as they were annexed, that is, so perfectly and firmly that they would work properly and afford and convey the power necessary for the running of the mill. And it is likewise found that Johnson bought after the wheels had been so put in and when they appeared to be as much a part of the realty as the building itself, and that he had no notice of any outside interest or claim.
Now, as between the plaintiffs and Staley and Trimmer. or between the plaintiffs and Benjamin Trimmer, or between them and any other person...
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