Knowlton v. State

• Decision Date: 06 October 1969
• Parties: Dianne KNOWLTON v. The STATE of Maine and Ward Murphy, Supt. Women's Correctional Center.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 409

257 A.2d 409

Dianne KNOWLTON v. The STATE of Maine and Ward Murphy, Supt. Women's Correctional Center.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 6, 1969.

R. John Wuesthoff, Saco, for plaintiff.

John W. Benoit, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, MARDEN, DUFRESNE and WEATHERBEE, JJ.

MARDEN, Justice.

On report, arising from a petition for post-conviction relief, to determine the constitutional validity of that portion of 17 M.R.S.A. § 3758 ¹ which purports to make an offense of being 'idle and disorderly persons having no visible means of support, neglecting all lawful calling or employment,' under which petitioner was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate period at the Women's Correctional Center. The facts from which the conviction resulted are not before us.

Specifically the validity of the quoted portion of the statute is questioned under the provisions of the 5th, 13th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States (prohibition of slavery or involuntary servitude, abridgement of privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States, guarantee of due process and equal protection of the laws) and companion provisions in the constitution of Maine.

It is a fundamental common law concept that crimes must be defined with appropriate definitude, and that concept is now held to be an essential element of due process of law. 'The underlying principle is that all are entitled to be informed as to what the state commands or forbids and no one should be required, at peril of life, liberty, or property, to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. Thus, fundamental fairness requires that no man be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. * * *.

'A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application lacks the first essential of due process of law. However, no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.' 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 17.

It is the alleged deficiency in these characteristics which has spawned an increasing number of attacks on that class of statute or ordinance which is known as a 'vagrancy' law. See Annot. 'Validity of Vagrancy Statutes and Oridinances' 25 A.L.R.3d 792.

The criticism of these laws is embodied in the contention that they are 'unconstitutionally vague' and that such vagueness violates due process, or exceeds police power, or is in violation of the involuntary servitude or equal protection clause of the Constitution, or that they deprive citizens of their natural rights and immunities,-as to which, it must be noted, there is widespread division of opinion. All of these criticisms are voiced at the statute under consideration.

Basically it is contended, as to vagrancy statutes, that the law imposes a penalty for non-action, for neutral passivity, or upon a person's condition 'status, mode of life, or reputation.' (See 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 5).

'All of these offenses are characterized by the fact that they are defined in terms of being rather than in terms of acting.' Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition. 66 Harvard L.R. 1203 (1952-53). ²

In the light of these general considerations we examine our statute which may be described as a 'straddle' between what may be termed the conventional vagrancy statute, such as discussed in Landry v. Daley, 280 F.Supp. 960 (N.D.Ill.1968); Ricks v. District of Columbia, 134 U.S.App.D.C. --, 414 F.2d 1097 (1968) and authorities and treatis analyses there cited; and Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F.Supp. 266 (U.S.D.C. So.Fla. (3 Judge) 6/9/69) (presently unreported) 5 Cr. Law Reporter 2233 (6/18/69), and the statute proscribing affirmative conduct defined with due process specificity.

But for the word 'disorderly' in our statute it would fall prey to constitutional attack. Does the word 'disorderly' which reflects affirmative conduct of disorderliness as recognized in State v. Allen, Me., 235 A.2d 529, (5) 531, and 12 Am.Jur.2d Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 30, save it? See also Annotation, 'Vagueness as Invalidating Statutes or Ordinances Dealing with Disorderly Persons or Conduct' 12 A.L.R.3d 1448.

In Chartrand v. Commonwealth sub nom Alegata v. Commonwealth (and four companion cases) 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201, 210 (1967) it was held that the phrase 'idle and disorderly persons' as ones of a class subject to criminal sanctions were sufficiently definite 'to withstand constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness' (10) page 211, but the Court seemed to equate the prohibition with 'acting' rather than with 'being.' In the companion case of Patch, page 205, charged as 'an idle person who not having any visible means of support has lived without lawful employment,' it was held that the statute lacked due process specificity, was an invalid exercise of police power and was unconstitutionally vague.

The rationale of Chartrand and Patch cannot be reconciled with a statute containing both the Chartrand phrase and the Patch phrase in one proscription under which proof of idleness, disorderliness, lack of visible means of support and neglect...