Knox County v. Morton

• Decision Date: 17 June 1895
• Docket Number: 603.
• Parties: KNOX COUNTY v. MORTON.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

68 F. 787

KNOX COUNTY v. MORTON.

No. 603.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

June 17, 1895

Knox county, in the state of Missouri, the plaintiff in error sued out this writ to reverse a judgment against it upon a county warrant. In his complainant in this action, William H Morton, the defendant in error, alleged that on August 9 1879 on December 26, 1888, on January 6, 1892, and on October 9, 1894, he presented this warrant to the county treasurer of Knox county, and demanded its payment; that on each occasion payment was refused by the county treasurer, and the warrant was protested by the treasurer for want of funds to pay it, and that there never were any funds of the county set apart for, or applicable to, the payment of this warrant prior to January 1, 1892. He made the jurisdictional and the other necessary allegations in his complaint to entitle him to judgment if the defense of the statute of limitations, pleaded in the answer, cannot be sustained. The count, in its answer, pleaded for its fourth defense that the cause of action was barred by the general statute of limitations of 10 years found in section 6774 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889; and, for its sixth defense, that it was barred by the special statute of limitations found in section 3195 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889. The defendant in error demurred to these defensed and his demurrer was sustained. In this court the county has waived the sixth defense, but insists that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the fourth.

Charles D. Stewart, for plaintiff in error.

W. C. Hollister and F. L. Schofield filed brief for defendant in error.

Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge, after stating the facts as above, .

Is the time within which an action may be maintained upon a county warrant issued by a county in the state of Missouri limited by section 6774 or by section 3195 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889? This is the only question that requires consideration in this case. Section 6774 is a part of the general statute of limitations of the state of Missouri, and is found in chapter 103 of the revision of 1889, which is entitled 'Limitations of Actions.' The provisions of that chapter that are material to the decision of this question are:

'Sec. 6773. Period of Limitation Prescribed.-- Civil actions, other than those for the recovery of real property, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in the following sections, after the causes of action shall have accrued.

'Sec. 6774. What Actions shall be Commenced within Ten Years-- Within ten years: First, an action upon any writing, whether sealed or unsealed for the payment of money or property; * * * third, actions for relief, not herein otherwise provided for.'

'Sec. 6791. Actions Otherwise Limited.-- The provisions of this chapter shall not extend to any action which is or shall be otherwise limited by any statute but such action shall be brought within the time limited by such statute.'

Section 3195 is a part of chapter 45 of the revisions of 1889, which is entitled 'Counties,' and it is found under article 4 of that chapter, which is entitled 'County Treasurers and County Warrants.' The provisions of this section are pertinent to the question at issue are as follows:

'Sec. 3195. When Canceled-- barred by Lapse of Time, when. * * * And whenever any such warrant, being delivered, shall not be presented to the county treasurer for payment within five years after the date thereof, or being presented within that time and protested for want of funds to pay it, shall not be again presented for payment within five years after funds shall have been set apart for the payment thereof, such warrant shall be barred and shall not be paid, nor shall it be received in payment of any taxes or other dues.'

The legal effect of the provisions of chapter 103 is to limit the time within which actions can be maintained upon writings for the payment of money to 10 years, except in cases in which the time for the maintenance of such actions is limited by some other statute; and they expressly provide that in the latter cases the actions shall be brought within the time limited by such statute. The legal affect of section 3195 is to limit the time within which an action can be maintained upon a county warrant to five years after the date thereof, when it is not presented and protested within that time, and in the latter case to five years after funds have been set apart for the payment thereof, unless it is again presented. Attempted judicial construction of the unequivocal language of a statute serves only to create doubt and to confuse the judgment. Where the meaning of statutes is plain and clear on their face, arguments drawn from the history of the legislation and the possible motives of purposes of legislators are entitled to very little consideration. They often serve rather to obscure than to elucidate the meaning of the laws, and ordinarily be presumed to have meant what they have expressed. It is only when the terms of the statute are ambiguous, or their signification is doubtful, that the history of the laws and the probable purpose of the legislators can aid in their construction. The statutes we have quoted have been in force in the state of Missouri from a time anterior to the issue of the warrant in question, and their language seems to us so certain, and its signification so plain, that we are compelled to refuse to follow counsel for plaintiff in error into the consideration of matters that are not disclosed by their terms. There is no safer or better settled canon for the interpretation of a statute than that, when its language is plain and unambiguous, it should be held to mean what it plainly expresses, and no room is left for construction. U.S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 399; Railway Co. v. Phelps, 137 U.S. 528, 536, 11 Sup.Ct. 168; Bedsworth v. Bowman, 104 Mo. 44, 49, 15 S.W. 990; Warren v. Paving Co., 115 Mo. 572, 576, 22 S.W. 490; Davenport v. City of Hannibal, 120 Mo. 150, 25 S.W. 364.

In his discussion of the language of these statutes, counsel for the plaintiff in error insists that actions upon county warrants cannot be limited by section 3195, because the effect of such a holding would be to repeal by implication the limitation of 10 years, prescribed by chapter 103. But section 6791 expressly provides that the limitation of 10 years prescribed by section 6774 of that chapter shall not extend to any action limited by any other statute, but that in such a case the limitation prescribed by the...