Knox v. Brnovich
Decision Date | 24 August 2018 |
Docket Number | No. CV-18-02089-PHX-DLR,CV-18-02089-PHX-DLR |
Citation | 336 F.Supp.3d 1063 |
Parties | Rivko KNOX, Plaintiff, v. Mark BRNOVICH, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Roopali H. Desai, Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Spencer Garrett Scharff, Scharff PLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.
Joseph Eugene LaRue, Kara Karlson, Andrew George Pappas, Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiff Rivko Knox challenges the constitutionality of Arizona Revised Statute ("A.R.S.") § 16-1005(H), as amended in 2016 by Arizona House Bill 2023 (hereinafter referred to as "H.B. 2023"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Knox contends that H.B. 2023—which makes it a felony for anyone other than the voter to possess that voter's early ballot, unless the possessor falls within a statutorily enumerated exception—is preempted by federal laws regulating the carriage and delivery of mail, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and is unconstitutionally vague. She seeks an order enjoining Defendant Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich from implementing or enforcing H.B. 2023.
Knox initiated this action on July 3, 2018, concurrently filing a complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction. (Docs. 1-2.) In her preliminary injunction motion, Knox requested both expedited relief and consolidation of the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). After conferencing with the parties telephonically on July 11, 2018, the Court granted Knox's request to expedite and consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits because this case presents pure questions of law and no factual disputes. In lieu of standard case management procedures, the Court set a briefing and hearing schedule on Knox's preliminary injunction motion, which functionally became an opening trial brief. (Doc. 10.)
On August 10, 2018, the Court conducted a consolidated preliminary injunction hearing and bench trial (hereinafter "consolidated hearing"). (Doc. 22.) Having considered the parties' briefs and presentations during the consolidated hearing, and for the following reasons, the Court finds in favor of Brnovich and against Knox on all claims.2
In addition to traditional, in-person voting on Election Day, Arizona permits no-excuse early voting, both in-person and via mail, during the 27 days before an election. A.R.S. § 16-541. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Reagan , 329 F.Supp.3d 824, 2018 WL 2191664, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2018) (citing A.R.S. §§ 16-542, -544) (hereinafter " DNC "). To be counted, however, an early ballot must be received by the county recorder by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day. A.R.S. § 16-548(A). DNC , 2018 WL 2191664, at *7.
Knox is a Democratic Precinct Committeeperson ("PC") and a member of the League of Women Voters of Arizona ("LWVAZ"). (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) A substantial part of Knox's community involvement is door-to-door canvassing. (¶ 18.) When Knox canvasses, she often encourages voters to complete and mail their early ballots. (¶ 20.) Before the 2016 election cycle, Knox collected and delivered ballots on behalf of voters she met while canvassing and who requested such service. (¶¶ 21-22.)
In 2016, however, Arizona enacted H.B. 2023, which limits who may collect a voter's voted or unvoted early ballot as follows:
A.R.S. § 16-1005(H)-(I). "Voters therefore may entrust a caregiver, family member, household member, mail carrier, or elections official to return their early ballots, but may not entrust other, unauthorized third parties to do so." DNC , 2018 WL 2191664, at *8. Knox actively opposed H.B. 2023, testifying against the measure on behalf of LWVAZ. (Doc. 26 at 71.)
Since H.B. 2023's enactment, Knox has not offered to collect or deliver another person's early ballot, even if someone asks her for such assistance, because she understands that she now is "prohibited from collecting and delivering another person's early ballot." (Doc. 1 ¶ 24; Doc. 1-1 ¶ 10.) Knox plans to canvass during the 2018 election cycle, but in the absence of a court order enjoining enforcement of H.B. 2023, she will not offer or engage in ballot collection services. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 32, 57.)
Although Knox's motion seeks a preliminary injunction, the standards governing the issuance of a permanent injunction now govern because the Court granted Knox's request to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits. Before the Court may grant a permanent injunction, Knox must succeed on the merits of at least one of her claims and also prove:
(1) that [she] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC , 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006).
"A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law." Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council , 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) ; U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. When presented with a preemption question, the Court's task "is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). "Congress' intent to preempt state and local law may be explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc. , 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
"Where the intent of a statutory provision that speaks expressly to the question of preemption is at issue," the Court does "not invoke any presumption against pre-emption but instead focus[es] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent." Atay v. Cty. of Maui , 842 F.3d 688, 699 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In the absence of an express preemption provision, however, "a state law is preempted if it actually conflicts with federal law or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field that it is unreasonable to infer that Congress intended for supplemental state or local regulation." Id. Field preemption occurs when Congress "create[s] a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson , 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards." Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 401, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). Thus, "[w]here Congress occupies an entire field ... even complementary state regulation is impermissible." Id. Conflict preemption occurs "where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, ... and in those instances where the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress[.]" Id. at 400, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Knox's preemption challenge derives from Congress' plenary power to establish post offices. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 7. "The power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire Postal System of the country," including "the designation of the routes over which the mail shall be carried," "the offices where letters and other documents shall be...
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...with the final bench trial on the merits, the standards for the issuance of a permanent injunction govern. See Knox v. Brnovich , 336 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1067 (D. Ariz. 2018). Before the Court may grant a permanent injunction, Plaintiffs must succeed on the merits of at least one of their cla......