Knox v. City of Orland
| Decision Date | 10 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. S022080,S022080 |
| Citation | 841 P.2d 144,4 Cal.4th 132,14 Cal.Rptr.2d 159 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 841 P.2d 144 William F. KNOX et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF ORLAND et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Ronald A. Zumbrun, Anthony T. Caso, Richard M. Stephens and Meredith M. Chang, Sacramento, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jean Rumiano, Willows, McDonough, Holland & Allen, Harriet A. Steiner and Robert S. Fisher, Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.
B.C. Barmann, County Counsel, Mark L. Nations, Deputy County Counsel, Bakersfield, Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Robertson & Falk, Steven L. Mayer, San Francisco, Richards, Watson & Gershon, Marsha Jones Moutrie, Los Angeles, Robin D. Harris, Sturgis, Ness, Brunsell & Sperry and Samuel A. Sperry, Emeryville, as amici curiae, on behalf of defendants and respondents.
This case concerns a special assessment 1 for park maintenance levied by the City of Orland for fiscal year 1989-1990 under the Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972 () (Sts. & Hy.Code, § 22500 et seq.). 2 We granted review to determine whether the Act authorizes the imposition of special assessments for the maintenance of existing public parks, and to evaluate the validity of the City of Orland's assessment as measured against the special tax limitations found in article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution. We conclude that the maintenance of existing parks is clearly within the scope of improvements authorized by the Act, and that the assessment in question is a valid benefit assessment that is not subject to article XIII A, section 4.
Since 1972, the Landscaping and Lighting Act has authorized local legislative bodies 3 to establish benefit-related assessment districts and to levy assessments for the construction, installation and maintenance of certain public landscaping and lighting improvements.
To establish an assessment district under the Act, a local legislative body must first pass a resolution which proposes the formation of the district, describes the desired improvement and assessment district, and orders a city or county engineer to prepare and file a report detailing the plans and specifications for the improvement and estimating its costs. ( § 22585.) If the legislative body approves the engineer's report, it must then adopt a resolution declaring its intention to order formation of the assessment district and hold a properly noticed public hearing. ( §§ 22587, 22588.) At the public hearing, the legislative body is required to consider all oral statements and written protests. ( § 22590.) Subject to certain limitations, the legislative body may then order changes in any of the matters provided in the engineer's report, including changes in the improvement, district boundaries or proposed assessment. ( § 22591.) If the legislative body determines that a "majority protest," as defined by the Act, does not exist or is properly overruled, it may then adopt a resolution ordering the improvement and formation of the district. ( §§ 22592, 22593, 4 22594.)
An assessment district created pursuant to the Act "shall consist of all territory which, as determined by the legislative body, will be benefited by the improvements and is to be assessed to pay the costs thereof." ( § 22503.) Once an assessment district has been formed, each annual assessment levied thereafter requires its own engineer's report and noticed public hearing prior to imposition. ( §§ 22620-22631.)
In May 1989, the City Council of the City of Orland initiated proceedings to form a special assessment district under the Act. In the resolution proposing to form the district, the city council described the nature of the proposed improvements as "Maintenance and servicing of lights, playground equipment, landscaping, irrigation systems, public restrooms, bleachers, and other improvements at [five named city parks]." The boundaries of the district were described by listing four school districts, exclusive of lands within the boundaries of the Mendocino National Forest. 5 Based on statistics gathered by the parks and recreation commission and others, the City of Orland (hereafter the city) determined that residents living within the four school districts were equally benefited by the parks. 6
The engineer's report ordered by the city proposed that each parcel in the district be assessed $24 per dwelling unit for the 1989-1990 fiscal year. That figure was obtained by dividing the number of dwelling units (4,298) into the total costs of park maintenance and district formation ($103,152). Since assessments were calculated on a per dwelling basis, some parcels were assessed in multiples of $24, while commercial and undeveloped properties within the district were not assessed at all. After reviewing the engineer's report, the city council adopted a resolution declaring the intention to order the formation of the assessment district.
At a noticed public hearing, the city council entertained oral comments both from supporters and opponents of the proposal. Twenty written protests were received. After determining that a majority protest within the meaning of the Act did not exist, 7 the council adopted a resolution, by a vote of four to one, finding that the engineer's report fairly and properly apportioned the cost of the improvements to each parcel in the assessment district in proportion to the estimated benefits to be received by each parcel. The resolution ordered the improvements and the formation of the district.
Plaintiffs, four owners of residential property within the assessment district, sued the city and its council members for declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the $24 charge was invalid as a benefit assessment, and that instead it was a special tax which in turn was invalid for failure to receive a two-thirds vote of the electorate. 8
The city moved for summary judgment, contending there was no triable issue of material fact as to the validity of the assessment. The trial court granted the motion on the procedural ground that plaintiffs failed to respond to each of the facts identified by the city as undisputed, and on the ground that there was no triable issue of fact. Judgment was entered on May 11, 1990.
The Court of Appeal did not rule on the procedural aspect of the trial court's ruling, but affirmed the judgment on the basis that the 1989-1990 assessment was a valid special assessment.
The first issue in this case concerns the scope of improvements authorized under the Landscaping and Lighting Act. The city and its amici curiae contend the Act authorizes the imposition of assessments for the maintenance of existing parks. 9 Conversely, plaintiffs contend the Act permits assessments for the maintenance of only those parks constructed pursuant to the Act.
The types of improvements authorized under the Act are delineated in section 22525. That section provides in pertinent part: (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs contend that under section 22525, maintenance of a park is not an authorized improvement unless the park itself was installed pursuant to the Act. Relying on section 22525, subdivision (f), which specifies that one type of authorized improvement is the "maintenance or servicing, or both, of any of the foregoing," plaintiffs argue that every item which constitutes "the foregoing" is the "installation" of something, such as landscaping, statuary, fountains, ornamental structures, lights or parks. (Italics added.)
We disagree with plaintiffs' strained reading of section 22525. That section expressly states that for purposes of the Act, "improvement" means "one or any combination" of the improvements listed in its various subdivisions. (Italics added.) In turn, section 22525, subdivision (f) specifies "maintenance or servicing" as one such improvement. Given the language of section 22525, it is reasonably apparent that maintenance and servicing are improvements in their own right and are not dependent upon an installation under the Act. Fairly read, section 22525, subdivision (f) provides that a permissible improvement for purposes of the Act includes the maintenance or servicing of any of the categories of physical improvements which are listed in the preceding subdivisions, regardless of whether such physical improvements are originally installed pursuant to the Act.
While plaintiffs are unable to point to anything in the Act that casts doubt on our reading, we ascertain that one of its statutory provisions undermines theirs. Significantly, plaintiffs' attempt to construe section 22525 so as to disallow use of the Act for the formation of an assessment district to maintain physical improvements not initially installed pursuant to the Act is clearly at odds with section 22605, which explicitly allows local legislative bodies to flexibly utilize the Act to consolidate into a single assessment district any existing lighting, maintenance or tree planting districts that previously had been formed pursuant to other assessment schemes such as the Improvement Act of 1911 (commencing with § 5820) and the Tree Planting Act of 1931 (commencing with § 22000). ( § 22605, subd. (d)(2).)
Finally, our construction of the Act effectuates the Legislature's intent...
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