Knox v. Collins
| Decision Date | 28 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-2693,90-2693 |
| Citation | 928 F.2d 657 |
| Parties | James Roy KNOX, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James A. COLLINS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div., Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Layne E. Kruse, Richard N. Carrell (Court-appointed), Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Tex., for petitioner-appellant.
William C. Zapalac, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern Dsitrict of Texas.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, SMITH and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner James Roy Knox was convicted of capital murder in the 56th Judicial District Court of Galveston County, Texas, regarding the robbery of a pharmacy and the murder of its proprietor. After a penalty hearing, the jury answered in the affirmative to the three special issues submitted pursuant to Texas law, and the court sentenced Knox to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Knox v. State, 744 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Knox v. Texas, 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 2834, 100 L.Ed.2d 934 (1988). Knox's state habeas petition was denied by the trial court and by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Knox filed his federal habeas petition with the district court, asserting 24 separate points of error. Finding no error, the district court granted the state's motion for summary judgment. The district court dismissed Knox's petition in its entirety, and lifted the stay of execution.
On appeal here, Knox raises several points of error challenging only the propriety of his death sentence. He argues generally that (1) the state court erred in refusing his request for an instruction on the legal status of parole in light of the court's assurances during voir dire that such an instruction would be given; (2) the prosecution wrongfully withheld Brady evidence; (3) the state court erred by allowing perjured testimony to be place before the jury; (4) the state court erred by denying him what amount to Penry instructions.
We find Knox's argument regarding his requested parole instruction meritorious. On this ground, we reverse the district court and remand with directions to grant the writ of habeas corpus, unless the State of Texas conducts a new penalty phase determination within a reasonable time.
We pretermit rulings on Knox's other allegations of error since they are unlikely to recur on such redetermination. Because Knox now knows what he alleges the prosecution withheld, any Brady violation that might have occurred will of necessity be corrected upon resentencing. The purported perjured testimony admitted at the original sentencing hearing is susceptible to like reasoning. The Texas Attorney General informed us at oral argument that trial courts in Texas capital cases now give instructions on mitigating evidence beyond the scope of the three special issues. This procedure should eliminate any Penry claim.
During the course of voir dire, the trial judge permitted Knox's counsel to question the prospective jurors on their understanding of what a "life sentence" means in Texas. Counsel contends that several persons on the venire harbored misconceptions about the actual length of incarceration which would result from a sentence of life imprisonment.
The voir dire of Richard Jacques by Knox's counsel proceeded, in relevant part, as follows:
Q. You said in your statement you believe in capital punishment.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you explain to the Court why you believe in capital punishment?
A. I believe it's one of the few deterrents we have against that type of crime.
Q. How do you feel about options such as life imprisonment?
A. How do I feel about it?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, life imprisonment, to me, is not life imprisonment, when someone is out on the street in five, seven years. And I don't feel like that's a deterrent. That's my feeling. You asked.
Q. Yes, sir. And thank you for your answer. Now, if in this case, I would take that to be part of your reasoning, or potentially part of your reasoning, or would it?
A. For this reasoning?
Q. That's my point. Would you allow those feelings of yours on capital punishment to interject themselves in deliberation on these two questions here?
A. No. I don't think it would. At least I would try not to let it.
Knox's counsel did not exercise a peremptory challenge, thus allowing Jacques to be seated as the first member of the jury. Jacques was later chosen foreman of the jury.
The voir dire of Cheryl Smith by Knox's counsel proceeded, in relevant part, as follows:
Q. I notice on your form on the fourth page says, "How do you feel about capital punishment," and says, "I believe in it." Can you explain that for me?
A. Means if I feel the crime warrants, it should be executed. I have no misgivings about it.
Q. Have you felt any different way?
A. No.
Q. There's a debate in our country about whether or not it's proper, and Court activity, and stuff.
A. Right.
Q. How do you feel about that?
A. Everyone has your own opinion, and you shouldn't allow anyone else to sway your opinion about the way they feel.
Q. What factors are there to lead to your opinion? In other words, what good do you feel capital punishment does in society?
A. You hear about people getting out committing the same crimes, and I feel if it's a brutal murder that warrants that they shouldn't get off in ten years on probation, or get back out have a chance to do that again.
Q. Would the alternatives to death penalty have any bearing on your thinking as a subjective matter as to whether it should be imposed?
A. What do you mean?
Q. Whether or not a person was going to get out, or whether or not there were fixed periods of time in which a person couldn't get out, or fixed sentences.
A. That's fine, too. Just depends on the crime, like I said.
Knox's counsel again did not exercise a peremptory challenge, and Smith was seated as the third member of the jury.
The voir dire of Royal Williams by the court proceeded, in relevant part, as follows:
THE COURT: If the jury answers both of the questions yes, I assess his punishment at death.
If the jury answers either one of the questions no, I would assess his punishment at life.
Knox's counsel subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Williams from the panel.
Despite its colloquy during voir dire, 1 the trial court refused Knox's requested parole instruction that would have corrected juror misconceptions about the actual meaning of a life sentence. The requested instruction 2 stated:
Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to imprisonment for life, may not earn time off the sentence imposed through the award of good conduct time. Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for life, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served by him including time served in the Galveston County Jail equals 20 calendar years. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
Knox argues that when the trial judge refused to instruct on parole despite his assurances to the contrary, Knox's constitutional rights were violated in three ways: (1) the refusal impaired, in retrospect, Knox's right to the intelligent exercise of his peremptory challenges; (2) the refusal allowed Knox's sentence to be assessed by two jurors who did not understand their sentencing alternatives; and (3) the refusal prevented Knox's jurors from considering relevant mitigating evidence that could have caused them to decline to impose a death sentence.
Knox's second and third arguments are bottomed on the underlying premise that the Constitution mandates instruction on parole in capital cases. We have twice rejected this notion. O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 388-89 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013, 104 S.Ct. 1015, 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984); Andrade v. McCotter, 805 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 (5th Cir.1986). The decision whether to require such an instruction rests entirely with the state legislature. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that Texas law does not require such instruction in capital cases. Knox, supra, 744 S.W.2d at 63 (citing Andrade v. State, 700 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112, 106 S.Ct. 1524, 89 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986)). In King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 820, 102 L.Ed.2d 809 (1989), we concluded that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to question prospective jurors about their understanding of Texas parole law. Id. at 1056.
Precedent establishing that voir dire and instruction regarding parole are neither mandated by the Constitution nor required under Texas law...
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