Knox v. Luke

• Decision Date: 11 May 2023
• Docket Number: 19-cv-00343
• Citation: Knox v. Luke, 19-cv-00343 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2023)
• Parties: MILAN KNOX, Plaintiff, v. GARY LUKE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

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MILAN KNOX, Plaintiff, v. GARY LUKE, Defendant.

No. 19-cv-00343

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

May 11, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN F. KNESS, United States District Judge

The genesis of this lawsuit occurred over a decade ago when Plaintiff Milan Knox was involved in a car accident that, as Plaintiff later admitted through a guilty plea in a criminal case, happened while he was driving drunk. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gary Luke, a Village of Sauk Village police officer, responded to the accident and, because of a personal vendetta, falsified evidence of Plaintiff's intoxication. Plaintiff alleges that this falsified evidence led to his being arrested, charged, released on bond, and, of relevance here, convicted in an Illinois court of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Plaintiff later violated his bond conditions and was detained for over three years before his criminal trial. Plaintiff asserts that this pretrial detention was unlawful because, if not for Defendant's fabrications, Plaintiff would not have been in the position to violate his bond conditions.

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings one Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful detention under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant moves to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and argues that, if Plaintiff's unlawful detention claim were to succeed, it would necessarily impugn the validity of Plaintiff's DUI conviction in violation of Heck v Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Dkt. 119 at 4-8.) Plaintiff responds that he is not attempting to relitigate the DUI conviction but instead seeks damages for alleged Fourth Amendment violations that occurred leading up to his being charged with DUI. (Dkt. 123 at 7.)

As explained below, Plaintiff's allegations would, if accepted, directly contradict an element of his DUI conviction: that Plaintiff's blood alcohol concentration was at least 0.08%. Because that result would negate a necessary fact underlying Plaintiff's settled criminal conviction, the unlawful detention claim presented in this case is barred under Heck. Defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 119) must therefore be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2009, Plaintiff was involved in a car accident at an intersection in the Village of Sauk Village, Illinois. (Dkt. 118 ¶ 5.) Sauk Village police officers, including Defendant, arrived at the scene in response to the accident. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 8.) Defendant's police report (which Plaintiff alleges contains several lies) documents the following sequence of events leading to Plaintiff's arrest for aggravated DUI.

At the scene, Plaintiff exited his vehicle and spoke with Defendant and other responding officers. (Id. ¶ 10.) When Defendant asked Plaintiff to provide a driver's license and proof of insurance, Plaintiff failed to provide adequate identification. (Id. ¶ 14.) Defendant then asked Plaintiff to perform a field sobriety test, which Plaintiff failed. (Id. ¶ 17.) After the field sobriety test, Defendant arrested Plaintiff and transported him to the Sauk Village police station. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) At the station, Defendant breathalyzed Plaintiff three times, but the results were inconclusive. (Id. ¶ 25-26.) Defendant then brought Plaintiff to a hospital to draw blood for the purpose of performing a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Plaintiff's BAC exceeded the legal limit. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff was driven back to the Sauk Village police station the next morning where he was processed and charged with aggravated DUI. (Id. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff was then transported to the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, where he remained detained until he posted bail on October 7, 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38.)

Although the events preceding Plaintiff's arrest are disputed, the events that followed it are not. Plaintiff was released on bond subject to certain conditions, including a prohibition against contacting any witnesses to the car accident. (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.) For years, Plaintiff remained released on bond without incident. But in February 2014, Plaintiff was arrested and detained for harassing a witness to the car accident. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40.) At a pretrial hearing in November 2015, the state court concluded that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for improperly communicating with a witness and denied his motion to quash the arrest. Knox v. Curtis, No. 18-2989, 771 Fed.Appx. 656, 657 (7th Cir. June 3, 2019). The court issued a no-bail order, and Plaintiff remained in Cook County Jail until August 2017. Id.

Plaintiff was later convicted of communicating with a witness and sentenced to two years in prison. Id. Plaintiff was paroled in March 2018. Id.

Later in 2018, Plaintiff finally resolved the aggravated DUI case that arose from the October 2, 2009 car accident. On July 9, 2018, Plaintiff appeared in state court for a change of plea hearing. (Dkt. 119-2 at 1.) As part of the proceeding, the court explained the charge against Plaintiff: “[O]n or about October 2nd, 2009, you drove or were in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within the State of Illinois while the alcohol concentration in your blood or breath was .08[%] or more.” (Id. at 3.) After acknowledging that he understood the charge, Plaintiff pleaded guilty. (Id.) Plaintiff also stipulated that “a sufficient factual basis exists in the charging instrument to form a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.”^[1] (Id. at 5.)

Despite pleading guilty to aggravated DUI, Plaintiff now contends in his Second Amended Complaint that Defendant fabricated the evidence supporting Plaintiff's DUI arrest. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made these fabrications because Defendant harbored a personal vendetta against Plaintiff over a person named Ashley. (Dkt. 118 ¶¶ 19-20.) According to Plaintiff, as Defendant was conducting Plaintiff's field sobriety test, Defendant asked Plaintiff his address and learned that Plaintiff lived near and knew Ashley. (Id. ¶¶ 15-18.) Defendant became “visibly agitated” and told Plaintiff, “[T]hat's my bitch as far as I am concerned,” and, “[Y]ou're intoxicated, and I will tase your ass.” (Id.) Defendant then tased and handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him in a patrol car. (Id. ¶¶ 22-24.)

At the police station, Defendant breathalyzed Plaintiff three times, but the results were inconclusive. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) Defendant then lied about Plaintiff experiencing back and neck pain as an excuse to transport Plaintiff to the hospital to draw his blood. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.) At the hospital, Defendant handcuffed Plaintiff to a gurney, tased him again, had a nurse draw Plaintiff's blood, and said, “I got your ass now . . . I will make sure Ashley knows you are going to jail.” (Id. ¶¶ 28-34.) In his police report, Defendant allegedly lied that Plaintiff failed the field sobriety test and “manufactured a false blood alcohol reading.” (Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 33, 45.)

Plaintiff's theory is that “if Defendant had not filed a false police report, Plaintiff would not have been arrested and placed on bond for an aggravated DUI, and therefore would not have been in a position to violate that bond by engaging in alleged inappropriate communication with the witness to the car accident.” (Id. ¶ 48.)

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's unlawful detention claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Plaintiff's claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In the alternative, Defendant contends that this case is untimely. (Dkt. 119 at 9.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Each complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put another way, the complaint must present a “short, plain, and plausible factual narrative that conveys a story that holds together.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2022). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the complaint's factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But even though factual allegations are entitled to the assumption of truth, mere legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678-79.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Is Not an Improper Successive Motion

Plaintiff contends at the outset that Defendant's motion to dismiss is an improper successive motion under Rule 12(g)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant previously moved to dismiss Plaintiff's original complaint, which included claims for false arrest, unlawful detention, excessive force, defamation, conspiracy, and violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. (Dkt. 8 at 5; Dkt. 14.) Judge John Z. Lee, to whom this case was assigned at the time, granted the motion in part, which left only the unlawful detention claim. (Dkt. 35 at 1.) Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (the operative complaint) asserts only this unlawful detention claim. (Dkt. 118 ¶¶ 42-48.) Defendant now moves to dismiss this claim under Heck, but Plaintiff contends that the Heck argument was available to Defendant and should have been raised in his first motion to dismiss.

Rule 12(g)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that:

Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under this rule

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