Knox v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY BD. OF ELECTIONS COM'RS

• Decision Date: 17 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-C-2039.,83-C-2039.
• Citation: 581 F. Supp. 399
• Parties: Vincent K. KNOX, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

581 F. Supp. 399

Vincent K. KNOX, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants.

No. 83-C-2039.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

February 17, 1984.

Richard Congdon, Waukesha, Wis., for plaintiffs.

George E. Rice, Acting Corp. Counsel, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

WARREN, District Judge.

Background

On December 30, 1983, plaintiffs, four black and two Hispanic residents of Milwaukee County, filed their complaint in this action, alleging violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1983), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981), for deprivations of rights secured under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In their complaint, plaintiffs charge that a reapportionment plan adjusting the various boundaries of Milwaukee County supervisory districts consistent with 1980 census statistics unlawfully dilutes black and Hispanic voting strength, thus denying members of those minority groups an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice to public office.

In addition to their request for judgment declaring the redistricting plan unlawful, plaintiffs also seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, restraining the implementation and enforcement of the plan and enjoining all primary and general elections conducted pursuant to it. Finally, plaintiffs request that the Court "order into effect a plan for the election of members of the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors which provides plaintiffs and those similarly situated with a remedy for the violation of their rights as described ... in the complaint." Plaintiffs' Complaint at 5 (December 30, 1983).

Named as defendants in the complaint are the Milwaukee County Board of Elections Commissioners; Josephine E. Ervin, Jerome Morse, and William Seelow, as members of that Commission; William F. O'Donnell, as Milwaukee County Executive; and the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors. It was the action of the Board of Supervisors and the County Executive in passing and approving the reapportionment plan in late February and early March of 1982 that forms the basis of the present suit.

Filed with their complaint on December 30, 1983, was plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, pursuant to Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to restrain the defendants from conducting elections under the challenged redistricting plan. In support of that motion, plaintiffs have submitted a brief, describing, among other things, the nature of the irreparable injury they claim they will suffer if elections under the plan are not enjoined, and an affidavit of one of the plaintiffs, Vincent K. Knox, stating that the redistricting plan has the effect of diluting the voting strength of both the black and Hispanic communities in Milwaukee County.¹

On January 12, 1984, the defendants filed their response to plaintiffs' motion, outlining the reapportionment process currently prescribed by Wis.Stat. § 59.03(2)(a) (1982), and arguing, based on an extensive discussion of the case law in this area, that there has been no violation of either the Voting Rights Act or of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, in connection with the passage of Milwaukee County's 1982 redistricting plan. With respect to the applicability of the Voting Rights Act itself, the defendants argue against the constitutionality of the 1982 amendment under which this action is brought, suggest that plaintiffs must exhaust all administrative remedies before suing in federal court, and question whether Milwaukee County is among those jurisdictions and political subdivisions to which the Act was intended to apply.

Defendants further maintain that plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating an entitlement to injunctive relief under Rule 65(a), that the doctrine of laches stands as a considerable barrier to their petition for an injunction, regardless of its merits, and that the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors is not a proper defendant since the individual members of that Board have not been served personally.² In support of their various arguments, defendants have filed the affidavit of F. Thomas Ament, the Chairman of the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors. The thrust of that affidavit, which describes in detail the process through which the challenged reapportionment plan was developed, is that the boundaries of the 25 supervisory districts were not drawn to dilute the voting strength of any ethnic group but represent instead the best efforts of those involved to equalize the populations of the various districts to ensure that each includes approximately 38,600 residents.

On January 17, 1984, plaintiffs filed a reply brief, maintaining that the Voting Rights Act as amended plainly applies to the present case, that a violation of the Act has been made out, that the authority cited by opposing counsel with respect to the constitutional dimension of the complaint is distinguishable, and that the doctrine of laches does not prevent the Court from enjoining the county elections.

One day later, on January 18, 1984, the defendants filed their answer to the underlying complaint in this case, denying all substantive allegations against them and raising six affirmative defenses—among them, that the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors is not sui juris, that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as amended is unconstitutional and does not apply to the redistricting plan developed throughout 1981 and passed in early 1982, that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and that they are guilty of laches and thus undeserving of the equitable relief they seek.

On January 20, 1984, the Court began what developed into a three-day hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. During the course of those proceedings, the Court heard testimony from no fewer than eight witnesses, including plaintiff Vincent K. Knox and County Board Chairman F. Thomas Ament. It also received into evidence some fourteen exhibits, ranging in nature from detailed maps of the present and former supervisory districts to a copy of the 1980 census tracts for the metropolitan Milwaukee area. In addition, the Court entertained some rather extensive opening arguments from counsel on the various legal issues presented in their briefs previously filed.

In the two weeks since the conclusion of those proceedings, the parties have submitted post-hearing memoranda of law, in which they summarize the evidence in support of their respective positions and address again the principal legal issues raised by plaintiffs' petition for injunctive relief— namely, whether the Court has jurisdiction over the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors, whether the doctrine of laches is properly invoked here to deny the preliminary injunction motion, and whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as amended has any application to the present case. With respect to the third issue, defense counsel further articulates in his brief an argument he raised for the first time at the hearing—that is, that the amendment to Section 2 upon which plaintiffs' case proceeds cannot be applied retrospectively to invalidate a plan approved four months prior to the passage of the amendment. Plaintiffs, of course, disagree with this conclusion and cite some authority for the position that the Voting Rights Act as amended was intended to apply to pending cases.

The Court has painstakingly reviewed the considerable evidence adduced both in support of and in opposition to the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. It has also carefully considered the several arguments presented by the parties in their thorough briefs. Based on this analysis, the Court is now convinced that the motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65(a) must be denied on the basis that the defendants have established a valid defense of laches to plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief.

The Defense Of Laches To Plaintiffs' Request For Injunctive Relief

The doctrine of laches was developed by chancellors of equity to prevent the assertion of stale claims and to remedy an injustice that arose from the fact that a statute of limitations ordinarily applicable to a legal right did not apply to an equitable remedy. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 478, rehearing denied, 616 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919, 101 S.Ct. 316, 66 L.Ed.2d 146 (1980); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1201 (11th Cir.1982). In order for the doctrine of laches to apply today, the defendant must demonstrate both an inexcusable delay by the plaintiff in asserting his or her rights and some undue prejudice to the defendant as a result. Lingenfelter v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., 691 F.2d 339, 340 (7th Cir.1982); Rozen v. District of Columbia, 702 F.2d 1202, 1203 (D.C.Cir.1983).

One of the primary elements in determining when delay is excusable is whether the party against whom the doctrine of laches is being asserted had knowledge of the facts giving rise to his cause of action. Matthews v. United States, 526 F.Supp. 993, 999 (M.D.Ga.1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 713 F.2d 677 (11th Cir.1983); Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apartments, Ltd., 436 F.Supp. 1125, 1149 (N.D.Okl.1977), aff'd in part, 622 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901, 101 S.Ct. 271, 66 L.Ed.2d 131 (1980). In this context, a plaintiff confronted with the laches defense is chargeable with knowledge not only of those facts known to him at the time, but also of facts which he could have learned by means of an inquiry pursued with reasonable diligence. Anaconda Company v. Metric Tool & Die Company, 485 F.Supp. 410, 427 (E.D.Pa.1980); Ward v. Ackroyd, 344...