Knox v. Municipal Court of City of Des Moines, Polk County

• Decision Date: 09 April 1971
• Docket Number: No. 54564,54564
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles KNOX, Plaintiff, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the CITY OF DES MOINES, POLK COUNTY, Iowa, and Honorable Ray Harrison, Judge, Defendant.

Page 705

185 N.W.2d 705

Charles KNOX, Plaintiff, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the CITY OF DES MOINES, POLK COUNTY, Iowa, and Honorable Ray Harrison, Judge, Defendant.

No. 54564.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 9, 1971.

Charles F. Glenn, West Des Moines, for plaintiff.

John H. King, Asst. County Atty., for defendant.

STUART, Justice.

At about 12:30 p.m., November 5, 1970, Charles Knox appeared in the Des Moines Municipal Court before Judge Howard Brooks in response to a summons charging him with operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension. It is not necessary to describe the events that took place at that time in detail as Knox does not contend his conduct was not contemptuous. It is sufficient to state he was uncooperative, insolent, insulting and disrespectful toward the court throughout the proceedings. After the patrolman had testified Knox was asked if he had anything to say. He said: 'I am guilty of nothing but helping the people.'

Judge Brooks then stated he had no alternative but to find Knox guilty and sentenced him to five days in the county jail. The violation carries a mandatory jail sentence of not less than two nor more than thirty days. Section 321.218, Code 1971. Knox looked toward one of his friends in the courtroom, turned and spit on the judge. A disturbance developed in the courtroom which resulted in the confinement of Knox and some of his friends. The judge left the courtroom immediately after the spitting incident.

Knox was 'arraigned' on a 'county attorney's information' before Judge Harrison about 6:00 p.m. the same evening. His conduct at that time was such that he was summarily found guilty of contempt before Judge Harrison and sentenced to six months in the county jail. Hearing on the contempt matter occurring in Judge Brooks' court was set for the next morning. The next morning Mr. Glenn was appointed to defend Mr. Knox and trial was reset for Tuesday, November 10, 1970. At the conclusion of the hearing Knox was sentenced to a second six months term in the county jail.

We granted Writs of Certiorari to review the proceedings in both contempt matters. In this opinion we are concerned only with the contempt proceeding which arose out of the incidents that took place before Judge Brooks.

I. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court. It is not derived from statute, but is implied as it is necessary to the exercise of the other powers of the courts. Without it, the administration of the law would be in continual danger of being thwarted by the lawless. Ex parte Terry (1888), 128 U.S. 289, 303, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405, 408. It is indispensable to the protection of due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court. 'But its exercise is a delicate one, and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.' Cooke v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 517, 539, 45 S.Ct. 390, 396, 69 L.Ed. 767, 775. See Haines v. District Court (1925), 199 Iowa 476, 480, 202 N.W. 268, 270; State ex rel. Arthaud v. District Court (1904), 124 Iowa 187, 190, 99 N.W. 712, 713.

Contempt is classified in two ways: Criminal or civil and direct or indirect (constructive). Offenses against the dignity or process of the court, whether committed in or out of the presence of the court are criminal contempts. Offenses against the party for whose benefit a court order was made are civil contempts. As we treat all contempts as quasi-criminal in Iowa, Brown v. District Court (Iowa, 1968), 158 N.W.2d 744, 748; Huston v. Huston (1963), 255 Iowa 543, 549, 122 N.W.2d 892, 896; Brody v. District Court (1959), 250 Iowa 1217, 1221, 98 N.W.2d 726, 729, this sometimes nebulous distinction is no longer of significance. 20 Iowa Law Review 121--128; But see Bloom v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 194, 201 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522, 528. Chapter 665 makes no such distinction. Drady v. Given (1905), 129 Iowa 345, 348, 102 N.W. 115, 116.

'An indirect or constructive contempt is an act committed, not in the presence of the court, but at a distance from it, which tends to degrade the court or obstruct, interrupt, prevent or embarrass administration of justice.' Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 3, page 703, § 1330.

A direct contempt consists of words spoken or acts committed in the presence of the court which tend to have the same effect.

The 'presence of the court' extends beyond those places within the sight and hearing of the presiding judge. A court 'at least when in session, is present in every part of place set apart for its own use, and for the use of its officers, jurors, and witnesses; and misbehavior anywhere in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the court.' Ex parte Savin (1888), 131 U.S. 267, 277, 9 S.Ct. 699, 702, 33 L.Ed. 150, 153; Cooke v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 535--536, 45 S.Ct. at 394--395, 69 L.Ed. at 773--774; Harding v. McCullough (1945), 236 Iowa 556, 561, 19 N.W.2d 613, 617; People v. Skar (1964), 30 Ill.2d 491, 198 N.E.2d 101, 102. In re Neff (1969), 20 Ohio App.2d 213, 254 N.E.2d 25, 33.

The nature of the contempt is determined at the time the offensive act occurs. If it occurs in the presence of the court, as in this instance, it is a direct contempt. It is not converted into indirect contempt because the court chooses Procedurely, to have the matter heard by a judge other than the one before whom the contempt was committed. However, procedural requirements vary depending upon whether the judge presiding at the contempt hearing can act upon his own personal knowledge or must rely on evidence.

'The mode of proceeding for contempt is not the same in every case of such misbehavior. Where the contempt is committed directly under the eye or within the view of the court, it may proceed 'upon its own knowledge of the facts, and punish the offender, without further proof and without issue or trial in any form,' (Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 309, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed.2d 405); whereas, in cases of misbehavior of which the judge cannot have such personal knowledge, and is informed thereof only by the confession of the party, or by testimony under oath of others, the proper practice is, by rule or other process, to require the offender to appear and show cause why he should not be punished. * * * But this difference in procedure does not affect the question as to whether particular acts do not, within the meaning of the statute, constitute misbehavior in the presence of the court.' Ex parte Savin, supra, 131 U.S. at 277, 9 S.Ct. at 702, 33 L.Ed. at 153; Bloom v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at 204, 88 S.Ct. at 1483, 20 L.Ed.2d at 530.

'The narrow exception to these due process requirements includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent 'demoralization of the court's authority' * * * before the public.' In Re Oliver (1948), 333 U.S. 257, 275, 68 S.Ct. 499, 509, 92 L.Ed. 682, 695.

Judge Brooks could properly have acted instantly and held petitioner guilty of contempt without violating his constitutional rights. Mayberry v. State of Pennsylvania, filed January 20, 1971, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532; Illinois v. Allen (1970), 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353; Harris v. United States (1965), 382 U.S. 162, 164, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240, 242; In Re Oliver, supra; Harding v. McCullough, supra, 236 Iowa at 562, 19 N.W.2d at 617. However, as only a short trial was involved, he was well advised to proceed to a conclusion in the face of vicious and unjustified verbal attacks on the court and the judge. When the ultimate contemptuous act took place, action had been completed on the matter before him and summary proceeding to preserve the order and dignity of court proceedings was no longer necessary. Judge Brooks commendably declined to consider the contempt matter himself but observed the admonitions of the United States Supreme Court and our own cases to substitute another judge whenever possible. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra; Cooke v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 539, 45 S.Ct. at 395, 69 L.Ed. at 775; Brown v. District Court, supra, 158 N.W.2d at 749; Newby v. District Court (1967), 259 Iowa 1330, 1342, 147 N.W.2d 886, 894; Bisignano v. Municipal Court (1946), 237 Iowa 895, 910, 23 N.W.2d 523, 532; Drady v. Given, supra, 126 Iowa at 353, 102 N.W. at 118. Failure to do so can under appropriate circumstances require a remand for hearing before another judge. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra; Offutt v. United States (1954), 348 U.S. 11, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11; Cooke v. United States, supra.

However, by substituting a different judge, the misconduct was no longer within the sight and hearing of the presiding judge. Judge Harrison could not act on his own knowledge. Evidence was necessary and petitioner was entitled to '(B)e advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf either by way of defense or explanation.' In Re Oliver, supra, 333 U.S. at 275, 68 S.Ct. at 508, 92 L.Ed. at 695; Cooke v. United States, supra.

Did the proceedings here afford Knox the due process required above? We hold that it did. He was notified of the charges against him by the information and arraignment. He was represented by counsel and afforded a full hearing. Counsel announced in open court that petitioner was not going to introduce evidence and rested. Petitioner obviously had no wish to attempt to purge himself from contempt. His parting remarks to Judge Harrison were: 'You are still a Fascist and your swastika (indicating) Heil Harrison, Heil Harrison and...