Knox v. United States

• Decision Date: 16 October 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:12–cv–0299–MEF.
• Citation: 978 F.Supp.2d 1203
• Parties: Martha KNOX, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Eloise Knox, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

978 F.Supp.2d 1203

Martha KNOX, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Eloise Knox, Deceased, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:12–cv–0299–MEF.

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Northern Division.

Oct. 16, 2013.

William S. Morris, Morris Cary Andrews Talmadge & Driggers, LLC, Dothan, AL, for Plaintiff.

Deanne M. Calhoon, United States Attorney's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Martha Knox, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Eloise Knox (“Plaintiff”), brings this premises liability action against the United States of America (“Defendant”) ¹ to recover for injuries Eloise Knox (the “Decedent”) suffered when she slipped and fell in the meat section of the Maxwell Air Force Base commissary in Montgomery, Alabama. Now pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 17.) The Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties and finds that, for the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is due to be GRANTED.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA grants district courts original jurisdiction over civil suits against the United States as if it were a private person for, among other things, personal injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of government employees committed in the scope of their employment. Id. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations supporting both.

III. Legal Standard

A motion for summary judgment looks to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A court should grant summary judgment when the pleadings and supporting materials show that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and the moving party deserves judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying” the relevant documents that “it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (alteration to original). To shoulder this burden, the moving party can present evidence to this effect. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Or it can show that the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it ultimately bears the burden of proof. Id.

If the moving party meets its burden, the non-movant must then designate, by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories, specific facts showing the existence of a genuine dispute for trial. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir.1995). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in his or her favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.2001). Thus, summary judgment requires the non-moving party to “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Indeed, a plaintiff must present evidence demonstrating that she can establish the basic elements of her claim, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, because “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value” at the summary judgment stage. Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir.1985).

A court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the non-movant's evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. It also must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Id. After the non-moving party has responded to the motion, the court must grant summary judgment if there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party deserves judgment as a matter of law. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

IV. Facts

The Court has carefully considered all the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, establish the following facts:

On October 1, 2010, at approximately 3:00 p.m., the Decedent and her daughter, Martha Knox, drove to the commissary at Maxwell Air Force Base to purchase cubed ham. Upon arriving at the commissary, the Decedent and her daughter selected a shopping cart, collected several items from the produce department, and then proceeded to the meat department where the cubed ham was located. The Decedent's daughter testified that, upon entering the meat department, she did not notice anything on the floor. (M. Knox Dep., Doc. # 31–3.) Not able to find what they were looking for, the Decedent and her daughter went to the dairy section to pick up milk and eggs. While walking back from the dairy section to the meat department to look for cubed ham again, the Decedent slipped and fell. She was in front of a chill display case holding the commissary's pre-packaged ham selection at the time of her fall. Both the Decedent and her daughter testified that they did not notice anything on the floor when they returned to the meat department from the dairy department. (E. Knox Dep., Doc. # 32–1; M. Knox Dep., Doc. # 33–1.)

At the time the Decedent fell, William Howard (“Howard”), the Meatcutter Helper on duty, was fronting ² the meat counter adjacent to the location of the fall. Attending to his duties, Howard did not see the accident because his back was to the Decedent when she fell. He was approximately two feet from her at the time. Upon hearing the commotion, Howard turned around and saw the Decedent lying on the floor. He contacted the grocery department manager on duty, Felicia Howe (“Howe”),³ who arrived on the scene shortly thereafter. Howard then helped the Decedent up from the floor to a chair by the edge of the meat counter.

It was not until after Howard helped the Decedent to her feet that anyone noticed the foreign substance on the floor. The Decedent testified that she did not know what the substance was, but that it was “kind of gushy looking.” (E. Knox Dep., Doc. # 32–1.) The Decedent's daughter testified that the substance was “like a streak,” “dark in color” and approximately a foot and a half long and eight inches wide. (M. Knox Dep., Doc. # 33–1.) The Decedent's daughter did not take any pictures of the substance, nor did she notice any odor emanating from it. (M. Knox Dep., Doc. # 33–1.) Both the Decedent and her daughter testified that they did not know what the substance was, how long it had been on the floor, or how it got there. (E. Knox Dep., Doc. # 32–1; M. Knox Dep., Doc # 31–1.) Howard did not dispute the testimony given by the Decedent or her daughter, nor did he provide any additional information as to the size, color, consistency, location, or source of the substance. (Howard Dep., Doc. # 31–5; Howard Dec. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Shortly after arriving, Howe was shown the dark substance on which the Decedent allegedly slipped and fell. Howe directed Howard to clean up the substance, which he did with a towel.

According to his testimony, Howard inspected the area around the counter containing the pre-packaged hams “just prior” to the Decedent's fall and before he began fronting the meat. Howard's inspection revealed nothing spilled on the floor. (Howard Dec. ¶ 5.) Furthermore, no one had made any complaints about foreign substances on the floor of the meat department before the Decedent fell. (Howard Dec. ¶ 6.) Howard, however, conceded in his deposition that his primary purpose for being in the area of the Decedent's fall was only to front the meat; in other words, he was not actively checking for spills. (Howard Dep., Doc. # 31–5.) Thus, Howard may not have seen the spill before the Decedent's fall if the substance was not in the path he used to walk to the meat counter. (Howard Dep., Doc. # 31–5.)

After her fall, the Decedent was transported by wheelchair from the meat department to her daughter's car. At 7:00 p.m. that night, the Decedent was taken to the hospital where she was diagnosed with a fractured pelvis.

Eloise Knox filed suit against the United States for negligence, wantonness, failure to warn, and failure to hire, train, or supervise. (Doc. # 1.) When Eloise Knox passed away on September 12, 2012, her estate was substituted as the proper party plaintiff, with her daughter acting as her personal representative. (Doc. # 34.) Plaintiff does not claim that the fall caused or contributed to the Decedent's death. The United States filed its Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on April 4, 2013 (Doc. # 17), which the Court will address below.

V. Discussion

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has stipulated that her wantonness claim is due to be dismissed. Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to Defendant on Plaintiff's wantonness claim as alleged in Count One of the Complaint.

That leaves the Court to address Plaintiff's negligence, failure to warn, and failure to hire, train, or supervise claims, all of which are brought under the FTCA. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was negligent in failing to clean up the substance on which the Decedent fell, to warn customers about the substance, and to properly hire, train, or supervise commissary employees. In response, Defendant argues that it is entitled to...