Knuckles v. Elliott

• Decision Date: 15 June 1967
• Docket Number: No. 20223,No. 1,20223,1
• Citation: 141 Ind.App. 232,227 N.E.2d 179
• Parties: Mildred KNUCKLES (McClurg), Appellant, v. Margaret ELLIOTT, Appellee
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 179

227 N.E.2d 179

141 Ind.App. 232

Mildred KNUCKLES (McClurg), Appellant, v. Margaret ELLIOTT, Appellee.

No. 20223.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

June 15, 1967.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1967.

Keith C. Reese, Indianapolis, Charles H. Foley, Martinsville, Rocap, Rocap, Reese & Robb, Indianapolis, for appellant.

H. William Irwin, Indianapolis, Murray, Stewart, Irwin & Gillion, Indianapolis, of counsel, for appellee.

PRIME, Judge.

This case is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the Appellee in which she recovered damages against the Appellant as a result of injuries sustained in an accident in which the automobile in which she was riding overturned. The car was driven by Mildred Knuckles and was owned by her.

Also riding in the car at the time were the Appellant's mother, who was killed in the accident, the Appellant's step- father, Thomas Sayler, and Margaret Elliott, the mother of Thomas Sayler. There was also another passenger, a small child who was the daughter of Mildred Knuckles, the Appellant.

Thus, we have a step-grandmother as Plaintiff and the step-grandchild as Defendant.

The important fact to be concerned with here is whether or not the grandmother was a guest or a paying passenger. The testimony showed that Sayler paid for some of the gasoline on the trip and provided the payment for food on the trip.

By reason of this arrangement, the Appellee contends that she was a paying passenger. The Appellant contends that she was merely a guest.

The Plaintiff-Appellee prevailed in the trial court and recovered a judgment for $10,000 after a jury verdict in that amount.

We have here the task of again interpreting the Guest Statute of Indiana. We set it out;

'The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest, while being transported without payment therefor, in or upon such motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wanton or wilful misconduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of such motor vehicle.' Acts 1929, Ch. 201, § 1, P. 679; 1937, Ch. 259, § 1, P. 1229, Burns' Indiana Statutes (1952) Repl. Sec. 47--1021.

This case contains a set of facts common to many lawsuits which involve the so-called Guest Law of Indiana. A group of people decide to take a car trip together and there is some mutual arrangement entered into concerning the payment of expenses. The case at bar is typical. One party drove the car--another party bought the gas and paid for the lunch. There is nothing disputed or confusing in the record on this score.

A condensed recital of the testimonial evidence touching upon the 'payment' phase of this matter is as follows:

Thomas Sayler:

'* * * I had a conversation with my step-daughter and she said if she could get her car fixed or trade for another car, she would take us down for expenses. We told her we had to go on the bus and she told us she would take us down there to get mother if we would pay the expenses there and back. * * * The first stop we made for gas was along towards Louisville and I bought the gasoline, I paid for $2.76; Mildred McClurg bought no gasoline beore I bought it; she didn't pay for any gasoline or oil; I paid for the gasoline and oil on this trip from the time we left Indianapolis until the time of the accident; no one else bought gasoline or oil; I believe to the best of my knowledge I spent $25.41 for eats and everything, gas and oil. When we stopped to eat, I paid for the food and paid for the food and gas; and that included Mrs. McClurg and her daughter. * * * After we left Pineville somewhere along the way we stopped to eat and we got gas at Pineville, 'filled her up;' I paid $5.00 for the gas; I gave the money to Mildred, as I was in the back seat; we stopped near Standford to get something to eat; Viola and Mildred went in and got their lunches, I gave them the money about $4.55. After we left Standford, we came to Louisville and Viola with her little boy got out there; we crossed the bridge and somewhere in Indiana stopped for gas again; I paid for the gas about $5.00. * * *'

Mildred McClurg:

'* * * I had a conversation with Mr. Sayler and my mother concerning the trip to Kentucky in September; it was about the first week just before the Friday when we went to Kentucky. We had the conversation in mother's apartment; it was on Friday, September 11th; my mother had been wanting to go to Kentucky. * * * Mr. Sayler wanted to go to see his folks and I wanted to go to see my brothers and sisters. Nothing was said in that conversation about going down and picking up Mrs. Elliott; nothing was said in that coversation that Mr. Sayler would pay the expenses of the gas and oil on the trip. * * * I stopped on my way home and filled up the tank with gasoline; we didn't stop until we got through Louisville, at Bardstown; we got gas there; Mr. Sayler paid for it; we ate there and he paid for the food. * * * Mrs. Elliott's daughter, Bertha, told me that Mrs. Elliott was coming back home with Mr. Sayler; that was the first time I knew Mrs. Elliott was going to come to Indianapolis to visit; I made no objection to that; we loaded up at Pineville, and Mrs. Elliott got in the car; I got gas at Pineville, Mr. Sayler paid for it; the first stop we made was at London, Kentucky, where we stopped and ate; Mr. Sayler paid for the food; he paid for everybody's meal; we were all sitting at the table together and he, Mr. Sayler, gave us the money to pay for our dinner; he paid the extra to the cashier. * * * We stopped again for gas and Mr. Sayler paid for it. * * *'

The appellee reasons that this evidence is sufficient to establish that she was being transported for pay.

The burden was upon the Appellee Elliott to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she was a 'fare-paying' passenger and not a guest within the meaning of the Statute. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Stitzle (1942) 220 Ind. 180, 41 N.E.2d 133.

Whether or not the kind of payment here alleged was such as was intended by the Legislature in § 47--1021, where it is said, 'while being transported without payment therefor,' is a matter of law to be decided by the court. Allison v. Ely (1960) 241 Ind. 248, 170 N.E.2d 371.

'The purchase of a few gallons of gasoline by appellee-Ely did not constitute 'payment' for his transportation * * * the payment * * * did not directly compensate either the driver or the owner of the automobile in a substantial or material manner.' Allison v. Ely, supra.

Other states have spoken on the subject:

'Appellant is not entitled to recover unless she can show payment for her transportation in respondent's automobile. She must show compensation to respondents in a business sense. There was no showing of an actual or potential benefit in a material or business sense resulting or to result to the respondents, and there is no evidence that the transportation of appellant was motivated by the expectation of such benefit.

The carriage of appellant and the accommodation to respondents were given by the parties to each other from hospitable, neighborly and friendly motives only. The automobile trip was not taken in expectation of material gain. No business advantage or material consideration accrued to the respondent hosts in the transportation resulting in the injury to appellant. The services rendered by appellant to respondents are not such tangible benefits as the statute contemplates in order to remove appellant from the status of a guest.' Fuller v. Tucker (1940) 4 Wash.2d 426, 103 P.2d 1086.

'The word 'guest' has more of social than business significance. The words 'without out payment for such transportation' imply some valuable consideration for the ride. The presence of the person injured must have directly compensated the owner or operator in a substantial and material way....