Knudsen v. Omanson

• Decision Date: 04 June 1894
• Docket Number: 442
• Citation: 10 Utah 124,37 P. 250
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: ANDREW KNUDSEN AND ANOTHER, RESPONDENTS, v. NIELS OMANSON, APPELLANT

37 P. 250

10 Utah 124

ANDREW KNUDSEN AND ANOTHER, RESPONDENTS, v. NIELS OMANSON, APPELLANT

No. 442

Supreme Court of Utah

June 4, 1894

APPEAL from the district court of the first judicial district, Hon John W. Blackburn, Judge.

Action by Andrew Knudsen and Herman Knudsen against Niels Omanson to quiet title. From a decree for plaintiffs defendant appeals.

[The transcript of the record in this case does not show any notice or undertaking on appeal, or any certificate of attorneys or of the clerk of the lower court. But no motion to dismiss on this account was filed by the respondents.--REP.]

Affirmed.

Mr John W. Judd, for appellant.

The title which passed from the United States was to the land described in the patent and nothing more. The land occupied by the defendant is public domain and he is entitled to it as against all persons subject to the paramount title of the United States. Revised Statutes United States, §§ 2396, 2476; McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Ia. 1; Barney v Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324; Haight v. Keokuk, 4 Ia. 199; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371.

Messrs. King & Houtz and Mr. George Sutherland, for respondents.

Land formed by alluvium belongs to the proprietor of the adjacent land, whether the waters are navigable or unnavigable. Warren v. Chambers, 4 Am. Rep. 24; Weber v. Boome Co., 62 Mich. 626; Schurmeir v. R. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82; The Magnolia v. Marshal, 39 Miss. 110; Jeffries v. Land Co., 134 U.S. 178. The meander line is not a boundary line, but the water, whose body is meandered is the true boundary. Lamprey v. State, 18 L. R. A. 675; S. C. 53 N.W. R. 1139. The common law definition of "navigability" has been departed from and the United States tribunals hold that the test of "navigability" is navigability in fact without reference to the ebb and flow of the tides. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, and cases cited. The courts in New York and New Jersey have held that lakes which answer to the test of navigability, were the subject of private ownership, and that persons owning to the meander line, owned to the center of the water. Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463; Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102; Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 369. The courts of Illinois and Mississippi hold that titles of riparian proprietors extend to the middle of the Mississippi river. Middleton v. Pritchard, 3 Scam. 510; Morgan v. Reading, 3 Sm. & Marsh, 366. The case of Poynter v. Chipman, 8 Utah, 442; 32 P. 690, is one which squares upon all sides and is decisive of the case at bar.

MERRITT, C. J. BARTCH and MINER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

MERRITT, C. J.:

This action was brought for the purpose of quieting title to about 160 acres of land on the borders of Utah lake, a navigable body of fresh water, in Utah county, Utah territory. The record does not disclose any serious conflict in the evidence. The facts are substantially as follows: That in 1856 the United States government surveyed the land adjoining the lake. Sections 4 and 9, township 7 S., range 2 E., Salt Lake meridian, including lots 3 and 4 of section 4, and lot 1 of section 9, are designated as fractional, owing to the fact that they adjoin and were partially covered by the lake; and all lying below and west of these lots is represented on the government plats and maps as water. In making the survey the water's edge was approached as nearly as possible, and the west line of these lots is shown by the government surveyors to be waters of the lake, and is what is called "a meander line." The lots in controversy, containing 148.50 acres, were entered as a homestead by one Hans Knudsen about the year 1876, and were subsequently patented to him. The plaintiffs succeeded to their title long prior to the commencement of this action. The lots were bounded on the north by Provo river, a stream of water which empties into the lake.

After the government survey of these lots, the waters of the lake gradually receded, and deposits of soil were made by the lake and the river below the meander line, and the lands in controversy were thus formed. In 1888 there was a strip of such land extending from the meander line of the lots above described, along the south side of Provo river, a distance of about a mile west to the then waters of the lake, varying in width from 20 to 40 rods. Extending south from the west end of this strip of land, almost at right angles, is a narrow sand bar, which divides the waters of the main lake from a smaller body sometimes called "Smith's Lake." Sometimes this sand bar extends a few inches above the water and sometimes it is submerged entirely. Between the meander line of the lots in question and the sand bar is a large body of marsh land, which is of no value except for pasturage. In 1888, the defendant (appellant) entered upon a portion of the lands in controversy under a lease from the plaintiffs (respondents), paying one year's rental for the same. Thereafter appellant repudiated the lease, and set up a claim to a part of the premises, as well as to other lands formed in the same manner. He committed various acts of trespass upon the lands, and this action was brought to determine the title, and to obtain injunctive relief against a repetition of threatened trespasses. The court below found in favor of the plaintiffs (respondents), and adjudged them to be owners of all the lands lying between the meander line of said lots and the waters of Utah Lake, and enjoined the defendant (appellant) from entering or trespassing thereon. The defendant (appellant) thereupon appealed to this court.

It is claimed by the appellant that the title which passed from the United States by the Knudsen patent was to the land described in the patent, and nothing more; that the land now in controversy is public domain, and the defendant (appellant) is entitled to it as against every one except the United States. We do not think this claim is well founded in law. In surveying fractional parts of the public lands bordering upon lakes or streams, meander lines are run, not for the purpose of establishing a boundary for the land, but in order to determine the quantity of upland to be paid for by the purchaser. A meander line is not a boundary, but the water whose body is meandered is the true boundary, whether it in fact coincides with the meander line or not. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 11 S.Ct. 808, 838, 35 L.Ed. 428; Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 11 S.Ct. 819, 840, 35 L.Ed. 442; Lamprey v. Metcalf (Minn.), 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139; Schurmeier v. Railroad Co., 10 Minn. 82 (Gil. 59); Jefferis v. Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 10 S.Ct. 518, 33 L.Ed. 872; Palmer v. Dodd, 64 Mich. 474, 31 N.W. 209. It is held by all the authorities, so far as our investigation has gone, that the water's edge, and not the meander line itself, is the real boundary of the land, and that the owner of the lands so bounded has a right to follow the water as it recedes, and that he is entitled to all lands which may be added by recession or accretion.

In the case of Hardin v. Jordan, the doctrine is clearly announced by the supreme court of the United States whose decision is absolutely conclusive on this court, that, whether the body of water is navigable or not, the practical result is the same, the only difference being that in the case of non-navigable waters the riparian owner takes the fee to the center of the lake or stream, while in the case of navigable waters the ownership in fee extends only to the water's edge, but in either case all the accretions and relictions belong to him as an incident of his riparian ownership. The reason generally given for this rule is that, as the riparian owner is likely to lose soil by encroachments of the water, he should also have the benefit of such as would be gained from the same source, and also because it falls within the maxim "de minimis non curat lex." The supreme court of Minnesota, in the...