Knudson v. Linstrum

• Decision Date: 27 March 1943
• Docket Number: 46053.
• Citation: 8 N.W.2d 495,233 Iowa 709
• Parties: KNUDSON et al. v. LINSTRUM, Auditor of Polk County (POLK COUNTY et al., Intervenors).
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

8 N.W.2d 495

233 Iowa 709

KNUDSON et al. v. LINSTRUM, Auditor of Polk County (POLK COUNTY et al., Intervenors).

No. 46053.

Supreme Court of Iowa

March 27, 1943

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Ralph N. Lynch, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Francis J. Kuble, Co. Atty., and James P. Irish, Asst. Co. Atty both of Des Moines, for appellee.

Fred T. Van Liew, Bruce J. Flick, Carl J. Stephens, Ben C Buckingham, and Herrick, Sloan & Langdon, all of Des Moines, for intervenors-appellees.

GARFIELD Chief Justice.

Ch. 202, Laws 49th G.A., according to its title, is "An Act providing for the procedure for assessing real and personal property *** in cities having more than one hundred twenty-five thousand (125,000) population ***." Some of the provisions of the law are explained in Tusant v. Des Moines, 231 Iowa 116, 300 N.W. 690. Section 1 provides:

"Within thirty (30) days from the taking effect of this Act, in cities having more than one hundred twenty-five thousand (125,000) population, the city council, the school board and the county board of supervisors each shall appoint at a regular meeting by a majority vote of the members present, one qualified person to serve as a member of an examining board to give an examination for the positions of city assessor and deputy assessors. ***"

Subsequent sections provide for: terms of members of the examining board; examinations to be given by the board to applicants for assessor; selection of an assessor by members of the board of supervisors, school board and city council from among applicants who pass the examination; term of office and manner of removal of the assessor; selection of deputy assessors; compensation of the assessor and his deputies; appointment, terms, compensation and duties of members of a local board of review of assessments; manner of protesting before the board of review and taking appeals to the district court therefrom.

Plaintiffs are citizens, residents and taxpayers of Des Moines. They contend the law violates two sections of the Iowa Constitution, Section 6, Article I, providing that "laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation," and Section 30, Article III, prohibiting local or special laws for the assessment and collection of taxes (and certain other purposes) and requiring laws to be general and of uniform operation throughout the state.

Polk County, in which Des Moines is situated, the Independent School District of Des Moines and the City of Des Moines intervened in the action. They joined defendant county auditor in a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' petition, alleging, in substance, that it appears from the petition the law is not invalid in any of the respects claimed. The trial court sustained the motion. Plaintiffs refused to plead further and elected to stand upon their petition. A decree was thereupon entered dismissing the petition, from which plaintiffs have appealed.

I. We have said repeatedly that we will not declare legislation unconstitutional unless the violation is clear, palpable and free from reasonable doubt.

II. Does the act in question satisfy the constitutional requirement of a general law having a uniform operation, or is it local or special? It is clearly a law for the assessment and collection of taxes. To be constitutional a law need not operate uniformly upon all people of the state, nor, when pertaining to cities, upon all cities of the state. Even though the legislation at a given time operates as to only one city, if it is so drawn as to apply upon the same condition, when and where it arises, to other cities which subsequently fall within the designated class, the constitutional requirement is met, provided the classification is reasonable. State v. City of Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521, 526, 65 N.W. 818, 31 L.R.A. 186, 59 Am.St.Rep. 381; Cook v. Hannah, 230 Iowa 249, 253, 297 N.W. 262; 59 C.J., p. 760, sec. 353.

It is a matter of common knowledge of which we take judicial notice that Des Moines is the only city in the state with a population of more than 125,000. Of course, this was known to the legislature. It is apparent therefore that this measure was intended to and does have immediate application only to Des Moines. It does not follow, however, that it is a local or special law, unless, according to its terms it can never operate upon any other city. The vital question, therefore, is whether the act is applicable to cities which may subsequently attain a population of 125,000.

Plaintiffs-appellants emphasize the fact that the law, by the terms of both the title and section 1, applies to "cities having more than one hundred twenty-five thousand (125,000) population" and not to "cities now or hereafter having more than 125,000 population." It may be conceded that the language last quoted would have been preferable. However, we are not prepared to hold, as plaintiffs contend, that the wording of the law is the equivalent of "cities now having more than 125,000 population." If we are to adhere to what we have said in prior decisions, the language used is not fatal to the validity of the law.

Tuttle v. Polk & Hubbell, 92 Iowa 433, 443, 60 N.W. 733, involved legislation applicable to "all cities of the first class in this state, containing according to any legally authorized census or enumeration a population of over thirty thousand." Acts 21st Gen.Assem., c. 168. At that time Des Moines was the only city in that class. It was held that the act was general and not special because it was not restricted to cities having the required population at the date it became a law, but applied to all cities which should thereafter have more than thirty thousand inhabitants. Owen v. City of Sioux City, 91 Iowa 190, 59 N.W. 3; Haskel v. City of Burlington, 30 Iowa 232, 236; Iowa R. Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa 112, 115, were cited.

State v. City of Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521, 527, 65 N.W. 818, 820, 31 L.R.A. 186, 59 Am.St.Rep. 381, involved an act which extended "the boundaries of all cities in this state which had, by the state census of 1885, a population of thirty thousand or more." Acts 23d Gen.Assem., c. 1, § 1. Since Des Moines was the only city having such population, it is apparent the act by its terms could never apply to any other city. This court therefore properly held the law violated the constitutional provisions which these plaintiffs invoke. However, the following language of the opinion distinguishes that case from the present: "Had the act in question been made applicable to all cities of over 30,000 inhabitants, without a qualification that, under known facts, would exclude its operation as to any other such city, the case would be different."

In State v. Grefe, 139 Iowa 18, 30, 117 N.W. 13, a statute was considered which provided for the consolidation of school districts "in all cities of the first class containing a population of fifty thousand or over, according to any census taken." Acts 32d Gen.Assem., c. 155. Des Moines was the only city with the required population when the law took effect. The statute was held to be general and of uniform operation.

In State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa 553, 561, 562, 246 N.W. 390, 394, 88 A.L.R. 218, we upheld a statute "creating," according to its title, "a park board in cities having a population of one hundred twenty-five thousand (125,000) or more." Acts 44th Gen.Assem., c. 149. The court said, speaking through Stevens, J.: "It is suggested that the title to the enactment does not carry out the idea that it was designed to apply to cities subsequently acquiring the required population. We think the suggestion not well taken. The language of the title makes it applicable to all cities having a population of 125,000 or more, and provides the powers and duties thereof. The title is ample. Of course, direct provision might have been made for cities subsequently coming within the classification, but it would hardly do to place so narrow a construction thereon as to deny its practical application thereto."

We find the following in 12 Am.Jur., p. 170, § 489: "Although the authorities on the point are in conflict, it appears to be the better view that a statute which classifies cities or other localities to be governed by its provisions by a given or fixed population 'according to the last United States census' will be held to apply to all other cities or localities which under any Federal census may in the future pass into such class, and is valid."

See also 59 C.J., p. 760, sec. 352, n29.

The law in question here is in general terms. It refers to "cities having more than one hundred twenty-five thousand (125,000) population," not to cities now having the requisite population. Chapter 203, Acts 49th G.A. which amends Ch. 202, refers to the present assessors and their deputies who will be displaced by the assessors and deputies chosen pursuant to the act. Had the legislature intended the law to apply only to Des Moines, it could easily have so stated. Of course, it is possible for local or special legislation to be enacted under the guise or pretense of a general law. Where this is obvious it is our duty so to hold. That situation existed in State v. City of Des Moines, supra. However, this court should be slow to attribute to the legislature a purpose to deceive. It is our duty to construe the act, if possible, so as to avoid holding it unconstitutional. We think, therefore, it is entirely possible and well within the authorities to construe the act as applicable to cities now or hereafter having more than 125,000 population.

But plaintiffs argue, the law by its terms becomes operative in Des Moines within 30 days from the date it takes effect by publication but specifies no machinery by which it shall become operative in cities other than Des...