Knudson v. Nagel, 35793

CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)
Citation238 Minn. 186,56 N.W.2d 420
Docket NumberNo. 35793,35793
PartiesKNUDSON v. NAGEL.
Decision Date26 December 1952

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A statutory violation constituting prima facie evidence of negligence prevails as a controlling evidentiary factor against the violator only so long as there is an absence of evidence tending to show a reasonable ground for such violation.

2. A jury may disregard the positive testimony of a witness, although he is not contradicted by other witnesses, if his testimony is impeached and made improbable by reasonable inferences drawn from the surrounding physical facts and circumstances as disclosed by the record. Nichols & Tuveson, Albert Lea, for appellant.

Ostrander, Fullerton & Olson, Albert Lea, for respondent.

MATSON, Justice.

Appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial.

This action for damages for wrongful death arises out of a head-on collision between two trucks driven by defendant and the plaintiff's decedent. The accident occurred July 3, 1950, about 9:15 a.m., several miles south of Albert Lea, Minnesota, at a point where a north and south town road forms a Y connection with county aid road No. 16 which is a gravel road running east and west within a roadbed 18 feet wide from grass to grass. At the place where the collision occurred there is a three-foot drainage ditch along the south side of county road 16 with a 'heavy' embankment against the adjacent fence. On the north side of the road there is a grassy area consisting of a triangular island formed by the Y connection of the town road. There was no rain and the roadbed was dry.

The colliding trucks were traveling in opposite directions on county road 16. Defendant was driving west with his 1950, 1 1/2-ton Chevrolet truck which was loaded with lumber weighing about 500 pounds. Decedent was traveling east with a 1937, 1 1/2-ton Ford truck which was loaded with scrap iron weighing nearly 1 1/2 tons. Defendant's truck was eight feet wide at its widest point and the rear platform was equipped with a grain rack which extended eight or ten inches above the cab. Decedent's truck was seven feet eight inches wide and its back platform was enclosed with wood sides two feet high so as to form a box in which the scrap iron was loaded.

The point of impact was approximately at the crest of a steep hill which defendant ascended in coming from the east. The road to the west of the hill crest is relatively level. Defendant admits that he drove in the middle of the road at a speed of about 30 miles per hour and that it was not until he reached the crest of the hill that he first saw decedent's truck approaching from the opposite direction at a distance of only 30 or 40 feet. Defendant testified that decedent was also traveling in the middle of the road and was going between 35 or 40 miles per hour. Defendant at all times maintained his course of travel without turning to the right or the left. The trucks collided head on and apparently stopped substantially at the point of impact. Defendant is the only eyewitness since decedent died in the collision. There were no skid marks of evidentiary value.

The jury awarded plaintiff a verdict of $10,427.50. Defendant appeals from the order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding or a new trial. We are concerned with the following issues:

(1) Was decedent guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law?

(2) Under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence could the jury disregard defendant's testimony as the only surviving witness?

(3) Did prejudicial error result from the cross-examination of the defendant which disclosed that he was insured?

1. Was decedent guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law? Any finding to that effect must rest primarily on defendant's positive testimony that decedent was traveling down the middle of the road and not within his own travel lane. Taking the view of the entire evidence most favorable to the verdict the jury could reasonably find the following additional facts: At the time of impact, as disclosed by the position of the truck after the collision, defendant was encroaching with his truck upon decedent's lane of travel to the extent of seven feet beyond the center line. Since both trucks met squarely head on and stopped substantially at the point of impact the position of one truck is reasonably indicative of the position of the other. It follows therefore that decedent's truck at the moment of collision projected into the opposing traffic lane a distance of about one foot. We also have the significant circumstances that decedent's truck after the collision stood headed slightly toward the northeast. The position of decedent's truck is shown by the further fact that the load of scrap iron, as it broke out through the right front corner of the truck box, was scattered principally--although not entirely--on the south side of the road.

In the face of these physical facts we come to defendant's testimony that when he first saw decedent's truck only 30 or 40 feet away it was traveling down the center of the road at a speed of about 35 or 40 miles an hour. Is such testimony controlling on the issue of contributory negligence as a matter of law? Although decedent's truck had the heavier load both trucks stopped at the point of impact indicating that decedent was at least not traveling any faster than the defendant. If decedent had been...

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11 cases
  • Backman v. Fitch, s. 39482
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • 20 Agosto 1965
    ...surrounding physical facts and circumstances disclosed by the record. Nelson v. Ackermann, 249 Minn. 582, 83 N.W.2d 500; Knudson v. Nagel, 238 Minn. 186, 56 N.W.2d 420; Maas v. Midway Chevrolet Co., 219 Minn. 461, 18 N.W.2d 233, 158 A.L.R. 215. Even though the testimony of a witness is with......
  • Cleveland v. Rice County
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • 26 Diciembre 1952
  • Nelson v. Ackermann
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • 24 Mayo 1957
    ...by reasonable inferences drawn from the surrounding physical facts and circumstances as disclosed by the record.' Knudson v. Nagel, 238 Minn. 186, 191, 56 N.W.2d 420, 423. That rule is particularly applicable to opinion evidence. Where the jury may disbelieve the evidence upon which the opi......
  • Anderson v. Enfield
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • 6 Mayo 1955
    ...damages, the information would seem to be without prejudice.' See, Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 242 Minn. ---, 65 N.W.2d 185; Knudson v. Nagel, 238 Minn. 186, 56 N.W.2d 420; Sander v. Dieseth, 230 Minn. 125, 40 N.W.2d 844; Martin v. Schiska, 183 Minn. 256, 236 N.W. 312. Here the single reference......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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