Knussman v. State of Md., Civil No. B-95-1255.

Citation935 F. Supp. 659
Decision Date02 August 1996
Docket NumberCivil No. B-95-1255.
PartiesHoward Kevin KNUSSMAN and Kimberly Ann Knussman, on behalf of themselves and their infant daughter, Riley Paige Knussman v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Maryland State Police, Colonel David B. Mitchell, Captain David Czorapinski, First Sergeant Ronnie P. Creel, Jill D. Mullineaux.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland)

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robin R. Cockey, Salisbury, Maryland, and Deborah A. Jeon, Centreville, Maryland, for Plaintiffs.

Betty Stemley Sconion, Assistant Attorney General, Pikesville, Maryland, and Lucy A. Cardwell, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Defendants.

WALTER E. BLACK, Jr., Senior District Judge.

Presently pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint filed on behalf of defendants, State of Maryland, Maryland State Police ("MSP"), Colonel David B. Mitchell, Captain David Czorapinski, First Sergeant Ronnie P. Creel, and Jill D. Millineaux.

On April 28, 1995, plaintiffs Howard K. Knussman and his wife, Kimberly Ann Knussman, filed this three-count complaint on behalf of themselves and their infant daughter, Riley Knussman, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II) and the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment (Count III).1 Plaintiffs base these claims on allegations that Howard Knussman, an officer with the Maryland State Police, was unlawfully deprived of his right to parental leave immediately following the birth of his daughter expressly because of his gender. In addition to compensatory damages, costs and attorney's fees, plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. On October 16, 1995, defendants filed their motion seeking dismissal of Counts I and II on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the State of Maryland, the MSP, and the individually named defendants in their official capacities. Defendants further assert that Kimberly and Riley Knussman lack standing to bring suit under § 1983 and the FMLA. Defendants also challenge the availability of injunctive relief to plaintiffs under the FMLA.

In opposition, plaintiffs contend that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar plaintiffs' claims under the FMLA because Congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity is unmistakably clear from the statute's language. With respect to plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities, plaintiffs contend that because they are seeking only prospective equitable relief, their claims do not constitute suits against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. As to plaintiffs' FMLA claims, plaintiffs assert that the individual defendants in their individual capacities are proper defendants. Further, plaintiffs assert that Kimberly and Riley Knussman have standing to bring claims under the Constitution and § 1983, but concede that they are not suing under the FMLA. As to defendants' challenge to the availability of injunctive relief, plaintiffs contend that equitable relief is available to all private plaintiffs under the FMLA.

I. Eleventh Amendment

First, the Court will address defendants' challenges to plaintiffs' claims based on the Eleventh Amendment.2

The Eleventh Amendment grants states immunity from suit by private citizens in a federal court even where federal jurisdiction exists. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 10 S.Ct. 504, 505, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). "Absent a waiver of that immunity by the state, or an abrogation of that immunity by Congress, a federal court may not entertain a citizen's suit against a state." Reich v. State of New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1163, 114 S.Ct. 1187, 127 L.Ed.2d 537 (1994). In order to determine whether Congress has abrogated the States' sovereign immunity, the Court must address two issues: "first, whether Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity; and second, whether Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1123, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The Court addresses first the issue of congressional intent. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Seminole Tribe of Florida, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1128, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended that states be liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous-waste sites pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613. The Court analyzed CERCLA's language and found that Congress' explicit inclusion of states within the definition of two general terms describing who may be liable under the statute"persons" and "owners or operators""convey a message of unmistakable clarity" that "Congress intended that States be liable along with everyone else for cleanup costs recoverable under CERCLA." 491 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 2278.

Prior to Union Gas Co., the Court, in Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973), held that Congress did not intend to abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).3 However, in 1974, Congress amended the very section of the FLSA the Court focused on in Employees to include public agencies within the scope of employers subject to suit under the statute.4 Under the Act, a "public agency" includes "the government of a State or political subdivision thereof...." 29 U.S.C. § 203(x). In Reich v. State of New York, 3 F.3d at 590, relying on the 1974 amendment, the Second Circuit held that Congress intended to subject states and their political subdivisions to suit in federal court for FLSA violations.

In the instant case, while no court has expressly addressed the Eleventh Amendment's impact on suits against states under the FMLA, the language in the FMLA is identical to that found in the FLSA. The FMLA entitles any eligible employee to take leave "for medical reasons, the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition." 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). An employee who is denied his right to reasonable leave under the Act may maintain an action to recover damages or equitable relief "against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State Court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2).

Under the FMLA, the term "employer" "includes any `public agency,' as defined in section 203(x) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(iii). Section 203(x) refers to the definitions section of the FLSA which defines "public agency," in pertinent part, as: "the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of ... a State, or a political subdivision of a State." 29 U.S.C. § 203(x). This explicit inclusion of states and their political subdivisions in the statute's definition of "employer" constitutes "unequivocal and textual" evidence that Congress intended to subject states and their political subdivisions to suits by private citizens in federal court for violations of the FMLA.

Having so determined, the Court would ordinarily address whether Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power. However, the Court cannot do so here since the issue was raised neither in the briefs nor at oral argument. Accordingly, Count II as to the State of Maryland and the individual defendants in their official capacities for violations of the FMLA cannot be dismissed at this time as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

However, plaintiffs' claims under § 1983 against the State of Maryland and the individual defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the extent they seek money damages. Any "suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1356, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Accordingly, Count I as to the State of Maryland and the individual defendants in their official capacities is dismissed insofar as it seeks anything other than prospective injunctive relief.

II. Individual Capacity Suits Under the FMLA

The Court will next address Howard Knussman's FMLA claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities.5 Under the FMLA, the definition of "employer" includes "any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). According to plaintiffs, this statutory language authorizes suit against the named individual defendants in their individual capacities because each acts in the interest of the MSP. Defendants contend that by definition it is an official act that subjects individuals to liability; therefore, suits against individuals in their individual capacities are inappropriate.

The few courts that have addressed this issue have reached conflicting conclusions. In Freemon v. Foley, 911 F.Supp. 326, 330-331 (N.D.Ill.1995), the court looked to the FLSA for guidance and concluded that individual liability is permissible under the FMLA "provided the defendant had supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation." Id. (quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also, McKiernan v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., 1995 WL 311393 (E.D.Pa.1995). However, in Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 441, 449 (E.D.Tenn.1995), the court looked to...

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