Knutsen v. State
| Decision Date | 02 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 32386.,32386. |
| Citation | 163 P.3d 222,144 Idaho 433 |
| Parties | David KNUTSEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Law Office of Michael J. Wood, Twin Falls, for appellant. Michael J. Wood argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
David A. Knutsen appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.
Knutsen pled guilty to lewd conduct with his seven-year-old cousin. The district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with a minimum period of confinement of fifteen years, and retained jurisdiction. The district court then ordered a reduction of Knutsen's sentence to a unified term of thirty years, with a minimum period of confinement of seven and one-half years, and relinquished jurisdiction. Knutsen thereafter moved for reconsideration of the relinquishment of jurisdiction order and for further modification of the reduced sentence under I.C.R. 35. After a hearing, the district court suspended Knutsen's sentence and placed him on probation for ten years. Subsequently, at an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Knutsen violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The district court held a disposition hearing where it revoked Knutsen's probation and ordered into execution his sentence of thirty years, with a minimum period of confinement of seven and one-half years. Knutsen appealed, arguing the district court erred by revoking his probation and imposing an excessive sentence. This Court affirmed the revocation of Knutsen's probation and his sentence. State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 71 P.3d 1065 (Ct.App. 2003).
Knutsen filed an application for post-conviction relief asserting that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, that a neuropsychological evaluation demonstrated his sentence should be vacated, and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in the probation revocation proceedings. The district court summarily dismissed Knutsen's application. Knutsen appeals.1
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.App.1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1990). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. An application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. § 19-4903. In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App.1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App.1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App.1987). Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.App.1986).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, we determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file; moreover, the court liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct.App.1993).
Knutsen argues that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. On direct appeal from his judgment of conviction, Knutsen argued that the district court imposed an excessive sentence under state law reasonableness standards. In summarily dismissing Knutsen's cruel and unusual punishment claim in the present case, the district court ruled that Knutsen was foreclosed from bringing the claim in his post-conviction relief action because he had already challenged the length of his sentence on direct appeal.
The scope of post-conviction relief is limited. An application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal.
Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.
I.C. § 19-4901(b). This Court has considered challenges to the length of a sentence on cruel unusual punishment grounds in post-conviction proceedings. See Evans v. State, 127 Idaho 662, 665, 904 P.2d 574, 577 (Ct.App.1995); Gonzales, 120 Idaho at 763, 819 P.2d at 1163. More recently, however, this Court held that a challenge to the length of a sentence on cruel and unusual punishment grounds could be raised for the first time on direct appeal. See State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 946, 71 P.3d 1088, 1093 (Ct. App.2003). This Court reasoned that cruel and unusual punishment arguments are so similar to and interrelated with claims of excessiveness under state law reasonableness standards that there is no reason to treat the two types of arguments differently with respect to any requirement for raising the issue below. This Court also reasoned that refusing to hear the cruel and unusual punishment argument on direct appeal if it was not raised below would spur more litigation in the trial courts as defendants sought to raise it through a Rule 35 motion or an application for post-conviction relief.
In light of the decision in Jensen, we hold that I.C. § 19-4901(b) precludes consideration of a cruel and unusual punishment challenge to the length of a sentence in post-conviction proceedings because that challenge could be raised on direct appeal. A claim that the length of a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment does not itself raise a substantial doubt regarding the guilt of the applicant. We cannot think of any reason that a challenge to the length of a sentence on cruel and unusual punishment grounds cannot, in the exercise of due diligence, be presented on direct appeal. Moreover, permitting post-conviction applicants to challenge the length of their sentences on cruel and unusual punishment grounds would spur more litigation in the trial courts, undermining the rationale for allowing the issue to be raised on direct appeal. See Jensen, 138 Idaho at 945-46, 71 P.3d at 1092-93.2
Knutsen asserts that his direct appeal was argued and decided prior to this Court's decision in Jensen, and he should therefore be permitted to raise his cruel and unusual punishment challenge in post-conviction proceedings. As noted above, this Court had addressed such challenges in post-conviction relief actions before Jensen clarified that such claims could be raised on direct appeal, with the consequence that they were therefore prohibited in post-conviction relief actions pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b). See Evans, 127 Idaho at 665, 904 P.2d at 577; Gonzales, 120 Idaho at 763, 819 P.2d at 1163. We therefore hold that I.C. § 19-4901(b) procedurally bars cruel and unusual punishment challenges to the length of a sentence only in cases where, after Jensen, the defendant had an opportunity to bring a claim on direct appeal that the sentence was cruel and unusual. Specifically, cruel and unusual punishment claims challenging the length of a sentence are procedurally barred from being brought in post-conviction relief actions in any case where the direct appeal was remitted after the date of the Jensen decision. Such claims are also barred in any case where, even though the defendant did not file a direct appeal, the time for doing so expired after the date of the Jensen decision.
Our holding does not, however, provide Knutsen with any relief. Knutsen already challenged the length of his sentence on state law...
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