Knutson v. Sioux Tools, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. C 95-4130-MWB.,C 95-4130-MWB. |
| Citation | 990 F.Supp. 1114 |
| Parties | Jane E. KNUTSON, Plaintiff, v. SIOUX TOOLS, INC., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Snap-On, Inc., Arlyn Wilson, and Milton Brown, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Kendra M. Zirbel Olsen, Dean L. Meine, Souix City, IA, for Plaintiff.
Margaret M. Prahl of Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Plaza & Dykstra, L.L.P., Souix City, IA, for Defendants.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1116
II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .......................................... 1117
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ...................................................... 1118
A. Undisputed Facts ..................................................... 1118
B. Disputed Facts ....................................................... 1118
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS .......................................................... 1119
A. Statute Of Limitations ............................................... 1119
B. Exclusivity Of Statutory Remedies .................................... 1120
1. Exclusivity of ICRA remedies ...................................... 1120
2. Exclusivity of workers' compensation remedies ..................... 1121
3. The "breach-of-contract" claim and exclusivity of statutory remedies
.................................................................. 1122
C. Intentional Interference With Contract ............................... 1125
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................. 1127
On a motion for partial summary judgment in this lawsuit arising from the plaintiff's employment, the defendants — the plaintiff's employer and co-workers — assert a variety of overlapping grounds, legal and factual, for judgment in their favor on all four of the plaintiff's state-law claims. The defendants assert expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, exclusivity of statutory remedies, and lack of genuine issues of material fact on essential elements of claims. Thus, the resourcefulness of the plaintiff in pressing several different claims to assert the wrongfulness of essentially the same conduct is matched only by the resourcefulness of the defendants in pressing several different ways to dispose of all of the plaintiff's state-law claims in their favor. The court must sort the wheat from the chaff and determine whether any of the plaintiff's state-law claims may proceed to trial with her federal claims.
Plaintiff Jane E. Knutson filed this lawsuit on December 8, 1995, alleging a sexually hostile environment and other claims against her current employer, defendant Sioux Tools, Inc.,1 a co-worker, defendant Arlyn Wilson, and her immediate supervisor, defendant Milton Brown. Knutson, who has been an employee of Sioux Tools since 1979, is employed in the company's Engineering Department, where she performs drafting and related work. However, she alleges that, from 1979 at least until 1992, she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment and other workplace torts, and that, from 1990 to the present, she was subjected to unequal pay based on her sex.
More specifically, Knutson has brought the following six claims — two federal and four state — against her current employer and the other defendants arising from her employment. In Count I, Knutson alleges against all defendants creation of a sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Count II alleges that Sioux Tools violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), by paying Knutson less than male employees for performing work requiring equal skills, effort, and responsibility, and performed under the same or similar working conditions. The remaining four claims are supplemental state-law claims. Count III alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress by all defendants individually and as agents of Sioux Tools. Count IV alleges breach of an oral contract by Sioux Tools for an alleged failure to provide Knutson with a physically safe and non-discriminatory work environment. Count V is an assault claim against defendants Arlyn Wilson and Sioux Tools. Finally, Count VI alleges intentional interference with Knutson's contractual relationship with Sioux Tools by defendants Wilson and Brown.
On November 7, 1997, the defendants moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that they are entitled to judgment, on various grounds, on Knutson's four supplemental state-law claims. The defendants contend that Knutson's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and interference with contract are all "preempted" by the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code Ch. 216, that is, that the ICRA is the exclusive remedy for the discriminatory conduct upon which these claims are based. Defendants Wilson and Sioux Tools assert that Knutson's exclusive remedy for her assault claim is under Iowa's workers' compensation act, Iowa Code Ch. 85. The defendants also seek summary judgment on Knutson's breach-of-contract claim, if the ICRA does not provide the exclusive remedy for the wrong alleged, on the alternative ground that the claim in reality alleges breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and thus asserts a claim never recognized by the Iowa Supreme Court in the employment context. As an alternative ground for summary judgment on Knutson's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault, the defendants contend that these claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, because these claims are based on allegations of wrongdoing prior to June of 1992, but Knutson did not file suit until December of 1995. Finally, as an alternative ground for summary judgment on Knutson's claim of interference with her contract by Wilson and Brown, those defendants contend that there is no evidence that any interference was intentional, and furthermore, Knutson's employment has not been terminated or otherwise interfered with.
Knutson resists summary judgment on any of her state-law claims. She contends that there are genuine issues of material fact on the statute-of-limitations question, because wrongful conduct continued after May of 1992. She also argues that the Iowa Civil Rights Act does not provide the exclusive remedy for any of her tort claims, because those claims do not depend upon a finding of discrimination, even if they are based on conduct also alleged to be discriminatory. She also appears to reject the notion that her breach-of-contract claim alleges breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and hence does not assert a claim the Iowa Supreme Court has never recognized. Finally, Knutson contends that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Brown and Wilson interfered with her opportunities for promotions at Sioux Tools.
Neither party requested oral arguments on the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. Consequently, with a jury trial scheduled to begin on February 23, 1998, the court turns to resolution of the motion for summary judgment based on the record and written arguments submitted by the parties. Before considering the undisputed and disputed facts upon which the parties rely, the court will discuss briefly the standards for summary judgment, because it is through the lens created by those standards that the facts in the record must be viewed.
This court has considered in some detail the standards applicable to motions for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 in a number of recent decisions. See, e.g., Dirks v. J.C. Robinson Seed Co., 980 F.Supp. 1303 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Laird v. Stilwill, 969 F.Supp. 1167, 1172-74 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Rural Water Sys. # 1 v. City of Sioux Center, 967 F.Supp. 1483, 1499-1501 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Tralon Corp. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 812, 817-18 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Security State Bank v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A., 965 F.Supp. 1237, 1239-40 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 963 F.Supp. 805 (N.D.Iowa 1997). Thus, the court will not consider those standards in detail here.
Suffice it to say that Rule 56 itself provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Rule 56. Summary Judgment
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon.... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b) & (c) (emphasis added). Applying these standards, the trial judge's function at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir.1996); Johnson v. Enron Corp., 906 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.1990). "An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the [summary judgment] record." Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). As to whether a factual dispute is "material," the Supreme Court has explained, "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91...
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