Kober v. District Unemploy. Comp. Bd.
| Decision Date | 17 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 12255.,12255. |
| Citation | 384 A.2d 633 |
| Parties | Evelyn Poole KOBER, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD, Respondent. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Evelyn Poole Kober, pro se.
Russell L. Carter, Bill L. Smith, Robert J. Hallock, Washington, D. C. and Earl S. Vass, Jr., Richmond, Va., were on brief, for respondent.
Before NEBEKER and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges, and PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired.
Petitioner was denied unemployment compensation benefits for a two-week period commencing March 20, 1977, upon respondent's (the Board's) conclusion that she was not "available for work" during that period. D.C.Code 1973, § 46-309(d). Petitioner asserts that the Board's conclusion is not supported by the record, and we agree.
The record reveals1 that petitioner was last employed in the office of a United States Senator. When that employment was terminated due to office reorganization petitioner commenced an active search for new employment. Approximately four and one-half months later, however, petitioner left the District for eleven days to attend to her hospitalized sister in North Carolina. During those eleven days, she made no "in-person" work-search contact, nor did she make telephone calls or write letters in search of employment. Rather, she relied upon her pending applications for employment before numerous federal agencies and offices and the fact that her husband (a medical student) remained in the District to receive mail and telephone calls upon which petitioner might have been required to act. Additionally, she made three attempts to contact prospective employers by telephone during the reporting period for which she was found ineligible for benefits (but before leaving the District). She asserted — and here argues — that these circumstances were sufficient to show availability for work or, alternatively, to constitute "good cause" for not being available for work.2
The claims examiner found only that petitioner "was scheduled to report concerning her benefit claim on 3/22/[77], but failed to do so because she was out of town" and that "[w]hile away from the area, [she] was unable to search for full-time employment." He concluded that
[t]he fact that [her] employment applications were considered by prospective employers during the period in issue is insufficient to comply with the work search requirement. The claimant [has failed to evidence] an active search for full-time work [or] exhibit an attachment to the labor market.
The Board affirmed the appeals examiner's findings and conclusions and added the following as its rationale for denying benefits:
The term actually seeking work means that an individual be exercising and put ting forth such effort to obtain employment as the circumstances of the situation would justly demand of a person with a sincere desire to secure employment.
In considering whether a person is available for work, probably the most important fact to be ascertained is the claimant's state of mind. If a person really wants to work, really prefers working for wages to living on benefits and so conducts herself so that her acts show such an intention actually exists, then it can be said that the person is available for work. It is undisputed that in this case the claimant was out of the area for the principal part of the reporting period and unable to search for full time employment.
The findings of the Board are binding upon this court if supported by substantial evidence in the record. D.C. Code 1973, § 46-311(f); id. § 1-1510. It is undisputed that petitioner was away from the District during eleven of the fourteen days of the reporting period and that she made no new effort during these eleven days to secure employment. There is no support in the record, however, for the appeals examiner's finding, affirmed by the Board, that petitioner did not report as scheduled on March 22, the day she left for North Carolina. The only evidence on this point was petitioner's testimony before the appeals examiner:
Well, I came down here [the unemployment compensation offices] early and I got permission to sign that morning, but I was required to stand in the line. I was not allowed to go to the front of the line or whatever. I was required to stand in line which resulted in my missing my reserved flight [to North Carolina]. So I decided then to drive because I would be there almost as quickly. . . .3
Nor is the implication by the Board, whether a finding or a conclusion, that petitioner did not have the requisite "state of mind" to be available for work supported either in the record or in the law. There is no direct evidence of petitioner's preference for "living on benefits," nor any evidence from which the Board could have drawn that inference. If such a preference is subjective, then it is irrelevant; by no law or logic may the Board grant benefits to a claimant who has a "sincere desire to obtain employment" but does nothing about it, and neither may it deny benefits to one who sincerely prefers not to work but makes every effort to find employment despite his disinclination. If, on the other hand, this preference is one to be found only by viewing the claimant's search for new employment and other such objective indicia, then it is synonymous with the definition of "available for work": "genuinely attached to the labor market and . . . making adequate contacts for work as the facts, exigencies, and circumstances in each individual case so warrant." Woodward & Lothrop, Inc. v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 155, 157, 392 F.2d 479, 481 (1968).
Review of administrative decisions requires that the facts flow rationally from the evidence and the conclusions rationally from the facts. D.C.Code 1973, §§ 1 -1509(e), -1510; A.L. W., Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 338 A.2d 428, 430 (1975). Where, as here, a potentially crucial finding is without support in the evidence and where, as here, the "most important" connection between fact and conclusion, the claimant's state of mind, is either irrelevant or superfluous, the Board's ultimate conclusion — that petitioner was not available for work — cannot be sustained. A.L.W., Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, supra; Dietrich v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 293 A.2d 470, 473 (1972), aff'd after remand, 320 A.2d 282 (1974); Citizens Association of Georgetown, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C.App., 288 A.2d 666 (1972).
The remaining findings of the Board — i. e., that petitioner was away from...
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Thomas v. Dist. of Col. Dept. of Labor
...See Citizens Association of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, D.C.App., 402 A.2d 36, 41-42 (1979); Kober v. Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 384 A.2d 633, 636 (1978). Additionally, we are to defer to an agency's interpretation or construction of a statute which it is charged ......
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...632 (5th Cir.1969); Estate of Lockwood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 350 F.2d 712, 718 (1965); Kober v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, 384 A.2d 633, 635 (D.C.1977). Dr. Buckley's notes in the record indicate instead that Drummond should see Dr. Danielson the following day.......
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...to D.C.Code 1973, § 46-809(d). Although "good cause" for the failure to report has not been defined, see Kober v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 384 A.2d 633 (1978), petitioner suggests that it should be defined as "what the reasonable and prudent individual in the labo......