Kocenda v. Archdiocese of Detroit, Docket No. 150075

• Decision Date: 19 April 1994
• Docket Number: Docket No. 150075
• Citation: 516 N.W.2d 132,204 Mich.App. 659
• Parties: , 91 Ed. Law Rep. 321 Diane KOCENDA and Rosemary Szymofelnik, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF DETROIT, St. Francis Cabrini Parish, St. Francis Cabrini High School, Reverend Gary C. Bueche, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, and Carl Weiss, Defendant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 132

516 N.W.2d 132

204 Mich.App. 659, 91 Ed. Law Rep. 321

Diane KOCENDA and Rosemary Szymofelnik Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF DETROIT, St. Francis Cabrini Parish, St Francis Cabrini High School, Reverend Gary C Bueche, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants and Carl Weiss, Defendant.

Docket No. 150075.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 1, 1994, at Detroit.

Decided April 19, 1994, at 9:40 a.m.

Released for Publication June 10, 1994.

Dib & Fagan, P.C. by Barry S. Fagan and Keitha Cowen, Detroit, for plaintiffs.

Bodman, Longley & Dahling by James J. Walsh and Karen L. Piper, Detroit, for defendants.

Before REILLY, P.J., and RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN and BOSMAN, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a circuit court order limiting damages for their wrongful discharge claims against defendants. Defendants cross appeal the denial of their motion for summary disposition of the claims. We affirm.

Plaintiff Rosemary Szymofelnik, a member of the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth until 1989, was employed by defendant St. Francis Cabrini High School in 1972 under a contract with the parish for her services. In 1980, Szymofelnik was given the position of principal. Throughout her engagement at the school, Szymofelnik was employed under a series of eleven-month contracts. Szymofelnik was discharged by defendant Father Gary Bueche, pastor of defendant St. Francis Cabrini Parish and, allegedly, an agent of the defendant Archdiocese of Detroit, on March 7, 1989, before the end of the term of her then current contract.

In 1982, plaintiff Diane Kocenda was employed as a guidance counselor at St. Francis Cabrini High School for an eleven-month term under a written contract. Kocenda and St. Francis Cabrini entered into successive eleven-month contracts until the last employment contract of July 1988. Kocenda was also discharged from employment on March 7, 1989, by Father Bueche.

Plaintiffs filed a circuit court action on May 19, 1989, alleging wrongful discharge and promissory estoppel with respect to Kocenda (count I); breach of third-party beneficiary contract with respect to Szymofelnik (count II); wrongful discharge and promissory estoppel with respect to Szymofelnik (count III); defamation of Szymofelnik by Father Bueche (count IV); invasion of privacy (false light) against defendant Carl Weiss (count V); invasion of privacy (false light), against Father Bueche (count VI); violation of the Employee Right to Know Act, M.C.L. § 423.501 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.62(1) et seq. (count VII); and tortious interference with a contractual and business relationship against Weiss (count VIII).

Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the First Amendment, that plaintiffs were at-will employees under the terms of their contracts, and that the remaining claims failed as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion with respect to counts VII and VIII, but denied it with respect to the other counts.

On May 15, 1991, defendants filed a motion to limit the damages plaintiffs could recover on the claims of wrongful discharge and promissory estoppel under the eleven-month employment contracts. The motion was granted. At the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for clarification/rehearing, the trial court explained that it granted defendants' motion because future damages could not be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty, the contract was for a definite period of time and was not automatically renewable, and it was "clear that it was an at-will situation." Plaintiffs' motion for a rehearing was denied. An order was entered limiting the plaintiffs' damages under counts I and III to their respective salaries through June 30, 1989, the end of their term of employment under the employment contracts. Subsequently, the trial court indicated that the same reasoning applied to count II.

On November 8, 1991, without admitting liability, defendants tendered to plaintiffs the maximum allowable damages as ruled by the trial court. On December 20, 1991, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims of wrongful discharge, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract, arguing that there was no longer any litigable controversy concerning those claims because plaintiffs could not accomplish more if they went to trial. On January 10, 1992, the trial court heard arguments and granted defendants' motion by praecipe order.

On February 24, 1992, the trial court entered a stipulation and order whereby the parties agreed to dismiss counts IV, V, and VI with prejudice and without costs, to dismiss Carl Weiss as a defendant, and to waive mediation sanctions. The parties further agreed to the following:

In light of the Court's decision to grant Summary Disposition as to Counts I, II and III of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs are permitted to accept the salaries due each Plaintiff through the end of the term of their contracts without in any way waiving their right to appeal any and all of the underlying orders and the Order Granting Summary Disposition as to Remaining Counts which shall be deemed final as of the date [of] entry of this order.

Also on that date, in a formal order, the trial court dismissed counts I, II, and III and, given that the remaining counts were dismissed by stipulation or order, ruled that the entire case was dismissed and that all previously entered orders were deemed to be final.

Plaintiffs argue two theories to support their claim that the trial court erred in refusing to allow consequential damages with respect to their contract claims. First, plaintiffs claim that their inability to obtain employment and the resulting loss of future income was a direct and foreseeable consequence of the wrongful termination of their contracts midyear. Second, plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly revisited the issues whether the contracts provided for termination only for "just cause" and whether plaintiffs were entitled to automatic renewal of their contracts absent just cause. Having reviewed the record, we are convinced that the trial court did not err.

Both of the plaintiffs' contracts contained the following language, except that the word "teacher" was inserted in Kocenda's contract in place of the word "principal."

1. Unless terminated as hereinafter provided, this AGREEMENT and PRINCIPAL'S employment with SCHOOL shall terminate without further obligation on the part either of PRINCIPAL or of SCHOOL at the end of the SCHOOL YEAR, a[n] 11 month period commencing August 1, 1988 and ending June 30, 1989. PRINCIPAL understands, acknowledges and agrees, that he/she has no right to have this AGREEMENT extended or renewed by SCHOOL or to have SCHOOL offer employment to him/her for any other school year that SCHOOL is under no obligation whatsoever to extend or to renew this AGREEMENT or to offer employment to him/her for any other school year, and that SCHOOL may elect not to extend or renew this AGREEMENT or not to offer employment to him/her for any other school year. SCHOOL understands, acknowledges and agrees that ...