Kocse v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1978
• Citation: 159 N.J.Super. 340,387 A.2d 1259
• Parties: Randolph H. KOCSE, Plaintiff, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Virginia McNulty, Giocchino T. Caci,a/k/a Jack T. Caci, Angela Caci and Jacqueline Caci, an infant by her guardianad litem, Angela Caci, Defendants. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Third-party Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Marc Caci, an infant by his guardian ad litem, AngelaCaci, Michael Fiore, general administrator and administrator ad prosequendum ofthe estate of Francesco Fiore, deceased, and Michael Fiore, generaladministrator andadministrator ad prosequendum of the estate of Louise Fiore, deceased,Third-party Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 340

159 N.J.Super. 340

387 A.2d 1259

Randolph H. KOCSE, Plaintiff, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Virginia McNulty,

Giocchino T. Caci,a/k/a Jack T. Caci, Angela Caci

and Jacqueline Caci, an infant by her

guardianad litem, Angela Caci,

Defendants.

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Third-party Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Marc Caci, an infant by his guardian

ad litem, AngelaCaci, Michael Fiore, general administrator

and administrator ad prosequendum ofthe estate of Francesco

Fiore, deceased, and Michael Fiore, generaladministrator

andadministrator ad prosequendum of the estate of Louise

Fiore, deceased,Third-party Defendants.

Superior Court of New Jersey,Law Division.

May 1, 1978.

Frank R. Cinquina, Newark, for defendant and third-party plaintiff Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (Schwartz & Andolino, Newark, attorneys).

W. Stephen Leary, Morristown, for third-party defendant Allstate Ins. Co. (Leary & D'Ambrosio, Morristown, attorneys).

TROAST, J. D. C. (temporarily assigned).

On this motion for summary judgment defendant Allstate Insurance Company seeks to be relieved from its obligation to defend its insured, Randolph H. Kocse. Allstate contends that as a result of making settlement payments of its policy limits it is discharged from its duty to defend. There is no reported case in this State which is controlling on the issue before the court, and as between the other jurisdictions there is a sharp division as to the rule to be applied. Annotation "Liability Insurer Duty to Defend," 27 A.L.R.3d 1057.

The nature of this litigation and the facts giving rise to this controversy are set forth in an opinion reported at 152 N.J.Super. 371, 377 A.2d 1234 (Law Div.1977). On a prior motion in this case it was determined that Liberty Mutual Insurance Company was obligated to afford insurance coverage to Kocse as an excess insurance carrier. Liberty has appealed that decision and takes the position that it is not obligated to assume the defense, but it represents that it will assume the defense at its own cost and expense if the coverage question is decided adversely to Liberty by a court of last resort. Liberty contends that Allstate as primary carrier is obligated to continue with the defense of the insured and is not entitled to shift the obligation to defend to the excess carrier. Consequently, the court must determine whether Allstate as primary carrier is obligated to continue with Kocse's defense pending determination of Liberty's appeal, and if it is determined prior to the end of litigation against Kocse that there is no excess coverage, whether Allstate must continue to represent Kocse.

On this motion the court is called upon to construe the applicable provision of the insuring agreement which reads as follows:

Allstate will defend, at its own expense and with counsel of its choice, any lawsuit, even if groundless, false or fraudulent, against any insured for such damages which are payable under the terms of this Part, but may make such settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.

Allstate argues that its obligation to defend its insured is limited to suits involving claims which are payable under its policy. Allstate contends that since it has paid the policy limit there are no longer claims against Kocse which it is obligated to pay, and therefore it is discharged from further performance of its obligation to defend.

In support of its position that its duty to defend is dependent upon a continuing obligation to pay claims against its insured Allstate cites Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (Sup.Ct.1939). In Lumbermen's the court held the insurer's obligation to defend was a dependent promise, stating:

* * * it seems to us that the primary obligation imposed upon the insurer was to pay the insured's legal liability for damages on account of the contingencies specified, and that the other provisions were depending thereon and designed to implement that primary obligation. (8 A.2d at 752)

In Lumbermen's the insurer defended its insured through trial and exhausted the policy limits satisfying one of the judgments against the insured. Under these circumstances the New Hampshire court said:

Having elected to defend rather than to settle, the insurer's duty is to defend in good faith and with due diligence and in such a way as to protect the rights of the insured, but, having done so up to judgment and then having paid that judgment and incidental expenses to the full limit of its obligation, we are of the opinion that it thereafter has no duty of defense. (8 A.2d at 752, emphasis supplied)

There are a number of decisions in other jurisdictions in addition to Lumbermen's which support Allstate's position: Denham v. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7 Cir. 1948), cert. den. 335 U.S. 871, 69 S.Ct. 167, 93 L.Ed. 415 (1948); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F.Supp. 860 (S.D.Ind.1964); Traveler's Indem. Co. v. New England Box Co., 102 N.H. 380, 157 A.2d 765 (Sup.Ct.1960); National Union Ins. Co. of Washington D. C., v. Phoenix Assur. Co. of New York, 301 A.2d 222 (D.C.App.1973); General Cas. Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (7 Cir. 1964); Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co. v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 252 S.C. 428, 166 S.E.2d 762 (Sup.Ct.1969); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp., 219 Ga. 6, 131 S.E.2d 534 (Sup.Ct.1963), rev'g 107 Ga.App 167, 129 S.E.2d 162 (App.Ct.1962); Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill.App.2d 235, 194 N.E.2d 489 (App.Ct.1963); cf. Prince v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 143 N.W.2d 708 (N.D.Sup.Ct.1966).

Other states have construed the insurer's obligation to defend as an independent duty which is not discharged on payment of the policy limit. In American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup.Ct.1954), the claims against the insured exceeded $2,000,000 and the limit of liability under the policy was $300,000. The court found the duty to defend continued after payment of the policy limits, stating:

We are urged to find that the plaintiff, in the event that its coverage limit is exhausted, will not be required to continue the defense of any action then pending or any new actions thereafter commenced. Research fails to disclose any decision in this state precisely in point. Presumably such contention is based upon the premise that the payment of total indemnification terminates the policy. This might be so if the agreement to defend were a stipulation subordinate to and dependent upon the agreement to indemnify. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750, 753, 126 A.L.R. 894. We are not unmindful of the determination in the McCarthy case, supra. The dissent, however, held that the majority disregarded the language of the contract and construed the promise of the company to defend " . . . not as an undertaking for the benefit of the assured, but as a...