Koehler v. State

• Decision Date: 17 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 767-83,767-83
• Citation: 679 S.W.2d 6
• Parties: Jesse Joe KOEHLER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 6

679 S.W.2d 6

Jesse Joe KOEHLER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 767-83.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc.

Oct. 17, 1984.

Fred J. Manning, San Antonio, for appellant; David K. Chapman, San Antonio, of Counsel.

Bill M. White, Dist. Atty., and Ron Mata, Lawrence J. Souza and Charles B. Tennison, Asst. Dist. Attys., San Antonio, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

TEAGUE, Judge.

The record reflects that Jesse Joe Koehler, the appellant, was convicted by a jury of committing the offense of murder. Punishment was also assessed by the jury at life imprisonment in the penitentiary. On appeal, appellant asserted that the trial judge had erred when he refused to allow his trial counsel, Hon. Julietta Marquez, the opportunity to cross-examine Verna Blackwell, ¹ a State's witness, about certain "incidents" that had occurred in the past between him and Blackwell, which appellant claims would have established that the reason Blackwell testified against him as she did was because she had malice, ill feeling, ill will, bias, prejudice, or animus towards him.

The San Antonio Court of Appeals refused to review appellant's contention after it concluded that the record did not establish the nature of Blackwell's excluded testimony. Koehler v. State, 653 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1983). We find that we must disagree with that conclusion. Our examination of the record reflects that appellant clearly perfected his error. Therefore, we will set aside the holding, consider the issue, and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

The record before us reflects that prior to the cross-examination of Blackwell by Ms. Marquez, but outside the presence of the jury, the following transpired between counsel for appellant, the prosecuting attorney, and the trial judge:

MR. MATA (the prosecuting attorney): Judge, Ms. Marquez (defense counsel) now has the witness [Blackwell] on cross examination and from the first trial I know that Ms. Marquez will try to get into specific acts of misconduct. I would like to have a hearing in front of the court regarding exactly what Ms. Marquez--

THE COURT: That's why we are here. Let's have the hearing. What is it that you want to ask this lady?

MS. MARQUEZ (defense counsel): Judge, incidents where she had attacked Mr. Koehler [the appellant] in public, throwing drinks at him and tried to attack girls that have been in his company at clubs and different things of that nature and I want to show motive and prejudice.

THE COURT: You don't mind her telling about him if you want to show her character?

MS. MARQUEZ: We have not put his reputation in issue. We are saying she is testifying because she has a motive, she is prejudiced, attacked him on numerous occasions and attacked other women he has been with.

THE COURT: She [Blackwell] is going to have the right to tell about him [the appellant], what he has done to her and other women that she knows about. It works both ways. I understand you have a right, but she [Blackwell] has a right to know about certain things he has done. Besides, that is not material. That would be subject to introduction anyway, what she has done to the people.

MR. MATA: That's our position, what--involvement between her and other people has no relevancy.

MS. MARQUEZ: It does insofar as it shows her animosity and prejudice, Your Honor.

MR. MATA: Against other people, but not against the defendant.

THE COURT: It may show what she has done against other people. What has she done against him?

MS. MARQUEZ: She has attacked him publicly.

THE WITNESS: Not half as much as he has attacked me.

MS. MARQUEZ: I am not talking to the witness. I am talking to the Court. She has thrown drinks, chairs in public at him.

THE COURT: She will have to tell him why she did it. She did it because he did it and we will have an open thing and it will be all up to him.

MR. MATA: I am sorry to interrupt. This is what happened in the first trial.

THE COURT: This is the first trial. What happened in the first trial has no bearing in this case and I don't think it is proper and I will rule it out. Let's have a fifteen minute recess. ²

Thereafter, appellant's counsel cross-examined Blackwell. However, due to the trial judge's ruling, counsel did not cross-examine Blackwell about any "incidents" that had occurred in the past which had involved Blackwell and appellant, such as Blackwell "attacking appellant in public, throwing drinks at him and trying to attack girls that had been in his company and different things of that nature..."

In Harris v. State, 642 S.W.2d 471, 479-480 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), this Court expressly pointed out that "an appellant is not restricted to any one method in showing any fact which would tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive and animus on the part of a witness against him... And finally, lest it be forgotten that the error committed in the first instance was the denial of an opportunity to propound questions in the presence of the jury, we quote from Spain v. State, 585 S.W.2d 705, 710 (Tex.Cr.App.1979): 'Just as Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931), held that a defendant is not required to show what facts the cross-examination would have revealed in order to establish prejudice, the appellant in the present case [was] not required to show that his cross-examination would have affirmatively established the facts sought.' "

We find in this instance that the holding of the court of appeals, that "In the absence of a formal or informal bill of exception or a transcription of the court reporter's notes showing the nature of any excluded testimony and objections and exceptions made, no error [was] preserved for review," conflicts with what this Court stated in Harris v. State, supra. We believe that counsel's offer of proof was the equivalent to a promise that if she was permitted to do so, she would have cross-examined Blackwell on such subjects as Blackwell attacking "Mr. Koehler in public, throwing drinks at him and [that Blackwell had] tried to attack girls that had been in his company and different things of that nature..."

We point out that the situation at bar is not the same as that where a defendant desires to elicit certain, specific responses from State's witness, but is precluded from doing so by the trial court. In that instance, it is incumbent upon the defendant to either call the witness to the stand and have him testify and answer the specific questions counsel desires to have answered, see Simmons v. State, 548 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Bolden v. State, 489 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), or the defendant must make an offer of proof of the questions he would have asked and the answers he might have received had he been permitted to question the witness in the presence of the jury. See Cook v. State, 646 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Also see Art. 40.09, Sec. 6(d)(1), V.A.C.C.P.

Thus, the case at bar does not involve the issue of a trial judge refusing to permit a witness to answer specific questions. Instead, the issue before us concerns whether counsel for appellant was denied the opportunity to question the State's witness Blackwell in the presence of the jury about certain subject matters that might have shown that she had malice, ill feeling, ill will, bias, prejudice, or animus towards appellant.

As this Court pointed out in Harris v. State, supra, in order for a defendant to perfect this type error for appellate review purposes he is not required to show that his cross-examination would have affirmatively established the facts sought; he must merely establish what subject matter he desired to examine the witness about during the cross-examination. Of course, any question asked of a witness on cross-examination, which might have a tendency to affect the witness' credibility, is always a proper question. Harris v. State, supra.

It is now self-evident in these United States that one of the great constitutional rights an accused has is the right to confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses in a public forum. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). Thus, "[g]reat latitude should be allowed the accused in showing any fact which would tend to establish ill-feeling, bias, motive and animus upon the part of any witness testifying against him," Blair v. State, 511 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), also see Wood v. State, 486 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), when the purpose of the cross-examination is to bring out facts which will give to the jury the attitude, motive and interest which might affect the credibility of the witness, Jackson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Unquestionably, "[t]he motives which operate upon the mind of a witness when he testifies are never regarded as immaterial or collateral matters." Blair v. State, supra, at 279. Furthermore, "[e]vidence to show bias or interest of a witness in a cause covers a wide range and the field of external circumstances from which probable bias or interest may be inferred is infinite. The rule encompasses all facts and circumstances which, when tested by human experience, tend to show that a witness may shade his testimony for the purpose of helping to establish one side of the cause only." Jackson v. State, supra, at 868. Also see Harris v State, 642 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Steve v. State, 614 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Hooper v. State, 494 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Wood v. State, 486 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Blake v. State, 365 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.Cr.App.1963); Barr v. State, 128 Tex.Cr.R. 652, 83 S.W.2d 998, 999 (1935); Kissenger v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 182, 70 S.W.2d 740 (1934); and O'Neal v. State, 57 Tex.Cr.R. 249, 122 S.W. 386 (1909).

We also point out that the right of cross-examination by the accused or his counsel of a...