Koehne v. Price.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1949
• Docket Number: No. 826.,826.
• Citation: 68 A.2d 806
• Parties: KOEHNE v. PRICE.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

68 A.2d 806

KOEHNE

v.PRICE.

No. 826.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued Aug. 3, 1949.

Decided Oct. 13, 1949.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 8, 1949.

Action by Robert L. Price, formerly trading as Bob's Transfer Company, against Ira Chase Koehne, on a Maryland justice of the peace judgment. The Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division, rendered a judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.

The Court, Clagett, A. J., held that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit and that the evidence sustained finding of jurisdiction of the Maryland justice of the peace, and affirmed the judgment.

Ira Chase Koehne, Washington, D. C., pro se.

Edmund L. Browning, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges, and MYERS, Associate Judge, The Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation. ¹

CLAGETT, Associate Judge.

This appeal involves the important question of the faith and credit to be given in the District of Columbia courts to a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace of Prince George's County, Maryland, recorded in the circuit court of that county, and exemplified as so recorded by a triple certificate of the judge and clerk of the circuit court in accordance with the federal statute enacted pursuant to Section 1, Article IV of the federal Constitution.

In the present suit, brought in the Municipal Court, there was admitted in evidence over objection of defendant a copy of the docket entries by the justice of the peace as exemplified from the copy on file in the circuit court and also another copy signed personally by the justice of the peace and bearing his personal seal. (The court itself has no seal.) The docket entries so proved are set out in the margin. ² Such docket entries showed that plaintiff had on October 17, 1938, recovered a judgment against defendant in an action of debt and that the summons in the case had been issued to a constable and returned as having been served personally.

Plaintiff-appellee, in addition to introducing the two copies of the docket entries, testified at the trial below that he had appeared in person at the trial before the justice of the peace but defendant did not appear; that he had established his case by proof; that the justice personally filled out, signed and sealed, and delivered to plaintiff the transcript of the docket received in evidence. Plaintiff also testified that the judgment had not been paid. Defendant then moved for a directed finding upon his pleas of (1) nul tiel record and (2) that the purported judgment was not a lawful and enforceable judgment in Maryland and suit thereon was barred here. This motion, as well as a motion to strike plaintiff's exhibits, was denied. Defendant then answered, again pleading nul tiel record, and also attacking the purported judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of his person in the justice court; that the action was barred by the District of Columbia statute of limitations; that such a judgment of another state similarly exemplified would not support an action in Maryland, and that the judgment could not be recovered upon in Maryland. It was stipulated that all applicable Maryland statutes be considered as offered in evidence and that no execution had ever been issued in Maryland on the judgment.

Defendant testified that he had not heard of the judgment until after he had been served with a Municipal Court summons in the present action. He also testified that for many years his voting domicile had been in Indiana but that at the time of the alleged service of process and judgment he had resided on a farm near Laurel, Prince George's County, Maryland; that about September 17, 1938, a man called at his Laurel residence and told him that the ‘justice of the peace, down the road, wants to see you’; that he had asked such man if he was a constable or any person authorized to serve a summons and the man replied, ‘No’; that he had not seen the man before nor since; that he had told the man he had a telephone listed in his name and that the justice of the peace could use it conveniently in talking with him; that he never telephoned the justice; that there had been a dispute between plaintiff and himself about a bill for moving plaintiff's goods to Laurel from Silver Spring, Maryland, but that plaintiff had never told him or indicated that he had a judgment against him.

Plaintiff testified in rebuttal that he had rendered moving services for defendant and had made several demands for payment but had never been paid. He also testified that none of the continuances of the case before the justice of the peace had been at his request but that each one had been preceded by a telephone call to the justice. (On objection of defendant plaintiff was prevented from testifying what the justice of the peace had told him about these telephone calls.) He further testified that he had seen defendant after the judgment had been obtained and informed defendant of the judgment and that defendant had promised to pay the debt as soon as he could. Plaintiff also testified that on a subsequent occasion the defendant had promised to pay as soon as he could collect some fees he was expecting.

On the issue of whether personal service in the justice of the peace action had actually been made upon defendant ³ the trial court included a note in its statement of proceedings and evidence on appeal as follows:

‘In connection with the issue concerning service of summons referred to in numbered paragraph (2) of the above quoted memorandum, the Court considered, inter alia, the legal principles applicable to the instant case concerning the inferences and presumptions arising from the recitals contained in a certified transcript of a foreign judgment and concerning also the service of process in the State of Maryland (See Adkins v. Selbyville Mfg. Co. , 107 A. 181); and further, in connection with defendant's testimony as to his conversation about September 17, 1938, with the man who told him the justice of the peace wanted to see him, etc., the Court concluded, as matter of fact, that defendant's memory, due to his age ⁴ and the lapse of time since the Maryland case, was not accurate, and that his recital of said conversation was not complete, and that service actually had been made upon him in the manner permitted by the Maryland law, and that his testimony did not overcome the presumption of service arising from the recitals contained in the certified transcript of the Maryland proceedings.’

Defendant's assignments of errors are embraced in objections to rulings by the trial court on various preliminary motions and thus are somewhat difficult to follow, but, reduced to their essentials, the following questions appear to be presented by the appeal: (1) Did the District of Columbia statute of limitations bar the present suit on the Maryland judgment? (2) Is a judgment of a Maryland justice of the peace, if obtained in accordance with Maryland law and properly proved, enforceable in the District of Columbia? (3) What weight if any is to be given to an entry in the docket of a Maryland justice of the peace showing personal service of process on defendant?

Underlying a discussion of these issues is defendant's reliance upon the principle that if the present suit had been brought in Maryland upon a judgment of a justice of the peace obtained in another state and the judgment was sought to be proved as this judgment was proved a judgment could not have been obtained in Maryland. In support of this position plaintiff relies upon certain Maryland decisions such as Coane v. Girard Trust Co., 182 Md. 577, 35 A.2d 449, and Picking v. Local Loan Co., 185 Md. 253, 44 A.2d 462, 162 A.L.R. 678, which in turn depend upon Maryland laws of evidence. This position shows a misconception of the meaning of the full faith and credit provision of the federal Constitution. Full faith and credit depends not upon the faith and credit which Maryland gives to the judgments of other states but rather upon the effectiveness of Maryland's own judgments in that state. Questions of evidence and all other questions of procedure are to be determined by the law of the forum which in this case, of course, is the District of Columbia.

1. We are clear that the trial court was correct in ruling that the present suit, which was commenced October 22, 1943, was not barred by the local statute of limitations, Code 1940, 12-203, which provides that an action upon a judgment rendered in another state shall be barred here if by the laws of such other state ‘such action would there be barred and the judgment or decree be incapable of being otherwise enforced there.’ As already indicated, the judgment sued upon was entered October 17, 1938. It was docketed May 6, 1943, in the Prince George's County Circuit Court in accordance with Maryland law. Article 26, section 21, Flack's Annotated Code of Maryland, provides that on all judgments of justices of the peace recorded in the clerk's office of any court of law an execution or attachment may issue out of such court or by the clerk thereof, at any time within 12 years from the date of the judgment or decree, or the said judgment or decree may be otherwise proceeded with within 12 years from its date, ‘provided, that at any time before the expiration of twelve years from the date of any such judgment or decree, * * * the plaintiff shall have the right to have a writ of scire facias to renew or revive the same.’ Under Article 52, section 59, of the Maryland Code, judgments rendered by justices of the peace may be revived at any time within 12 years of their date by scire facias. In support of his position on this point defendant relies upon old Maryland cases such as Weikel v. Cate, 1882, 58 Md. 105, construing old Maryland law to the effect that executions were required to be issued on judgments within three years after...