Koennecke v. Koennecke

• Jurisdiction: Oregon
• Parties: Joann Phillips KOENNECKE, Appellant, v. Glenn F. KOENNECKE, Respondent.
• Citation: Koennecke v. Koennecke, 397 P.2d 203, 239 Or. 274 (Or. 1964)
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 16 December 1964

Page 203

397 P.2d 203

239 Or. 274

Joann Phillips KOENNECKE, Appellant, v. Glenn F. KOENNECKE, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 2.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 7, 1964.

Decided Dec. 16, 1964.

Charles D. Burt, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Burt & Ertsgaard, Salem.

Gerald H. Robinson, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Asher, Cramer & Cornilles, Portland.

Before McALLISTER, C. J., and PERRY, O'CONNELL and DENECKE, JJ.

DENECKE, Justice.

Plaintiff wife was awarded a divorce decree in June, 1963. Among other provisions, the degree awarded wife $75,000, payable commencing December, 1963. On August 8, 1963, the trial court entered an 'Amended Decree of Divorce' reducing the amount of the degree to $50,000, payments to commence in November, 1963. On September 13, 1963, the trial court entered an 'Order Modifying Amended Decree' which reduced the amount of $25,000 with payments commencing November 1, 1963. The wife appeals from this last degree only.

The record is ambiguous whether any additional evidence was received after the August eighth degree. We will assume that none was.

The wife does not contend that the trial court could not initially have awarded a degree for $25,000. The wife challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to subsequently change the degree without additional testimony being introduced.

'It is well settled that any order or determination of a court, although it be a final judgment or degree, may be altered, modified, or reversed by the court making it, at any time during the term at which it is made. Deering [& Co.] v. Quivey, 26 Or. 556 (Deering v. Creighton) 38 Pac. 710; Ayers v. Lund, 49 Or. 303, 89 Pac. 806, 124 Am.St.Rep. 1046; Zelig v. Blue Point Oyster Co., 61 Or. 535, 113 Pac. 852, 122 Pac. 756; First Christian Church [of Medford] v. Robb, 69 Or. 283, 138 Pac. 856. The reason is based on the old common-law fiction that the whole term is considered as being but one period of time, all parts of which are ever present before the presiding judge, who makes of it but one transaction, with the condition that when it has lapsed, either by adjournment sine die or by operation of law, the whole matter has passed from the bosom of the court and beyond its control. * * *' Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Or. 654, 657, 175 P. 287 (1918).

A court in a divorce suit has this same power. Lahey v. Lahey, 109 Or. 146, 219 P. 807 (1923); Miller v. Miller, 228 Or....