Koepplin v. Zortman Min., Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-646,93-646 |
| Citation | 267 Mont. 53,881 P.2d 1306 |
| Parties | , 129 Lab.Cas. P 57,803, 9 IER Cases 1636 Ronald C. KOEPPLIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ZORTMAN MINING, INC., a Montana Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Jerrold L. Nye, Nye & Meyer, Billings, for appellant.
Steven J. Lehman, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Thomas E. Hattersley, III, Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman, Helena, for respondent.
Plaintiff Ronald C. Koepplin appeals the Memorandum Opinion and Order of the District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District, Phillips County, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
The sole issue for review is whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on Koepplin's claims for wrongful discharge, invasion of privacy and malice.
Ronald C. Koepplin (Koepplin) worked for Zortman Mining, Inc. (Zortman) from October 1991 until his termination on February 17, 1993, when Zortman discharged Koepplin from his job as a haul truck driver. Koepplin had worked at the Zortman mine in other capacities dating back to 1986 when the mine was under other ownership.
Frank Green (Green) supervised Koepplin. In January of 1993, Green noticed there was tension and discord among crew members. Upon inquiry of crew members, Green was told that Koepplin had been verbally deriding and "downgrading" co-employees, intimidating them and throwing items on the lunch bus. On February 14, 1993, a female crew member reported to Green that she had experienced numerous incidents of egregious sexual harassment from Koepplin. Green transcribed the employee's oral statement onto an Employer Personal File Entry form on February 14, 1993 and called Mine Superintendent Clayton Krall (Krall) because of the seriousness of the complaint.
On February 15, 1993, Zortman management employees Green, Krall, George Lytle (Lytle), and Jim Geyer (Geyer) began to investigate the complaints against Koepplin. Their investigation included interviews with persons who had witnessed Koepplin's treatment of the female employee. These interviews indicated that there were more problems with Koepplin's conduct than the sexual harassment incidents.
As a result of the interviews, Koepplin was called into Lytle's office later that day to meet with Geyer, Krall and Lytle so that he could tell his side of the story involving the female employee and also his side of an incident involving a scuffle with another male employee. Koepplin denied the sexual harassment and termed the scuffle "calisthenics." Krall advised Koepplin in detail regarding the complaint from the female employee; Koepplin denied the sexual harassment. At the conclusion of the meeting, Koepplin was suspended pending further investigation of the complaint and was asked to return the morning of February 17, 1993 for another meeting with management. Koepplin was told specifically not to threaten or Despite being told not to threaten or intimidate investigators, Koepplin made telephone calls to his supervisor (Green) and the three other mine managers (Krall, Lytle and Geyer) after 10:00 p.m. that same evening. Krall, Lytle and Geyer all testified they felt threatened by Koepplin's calls to them. Geyer testified that from the tone of voice and the words used, he felt threatened and believed that Koepplin was trying to intimidate him. Geyer immediately reported the threat to the Phillips County Sheriff.
intimidate anyone involved in the investigation.
The next day, after discovering Koepplin had similarly called other mine managers, Geyer provided the sheriff with information about these calls also. Geyer specifically reported Koepplin's intent to take Lytle on a "trip to hell." Koepplin testified in his deposition as follows:
[By Mr. Hattersley] ... As you left the meeting from George's office, when George, Jim, Clayton and you were there. You know what meeting I'm talking about, right, when they told you you were suspended. You know what meeting I'm talking about.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You were also told that you were not to threaten or intimidate anyone involved in the investigation; isn't that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Clearly told that, right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who told you that?
A. Jim Geyer.
. . . . .
Q. Then you called George Lytle, didn't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you said to George, "Do you have a suitcase?"
A. I asked him.
Q. You asked him if he had a suitcase?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why did you ask if he had a suitcase? What was your purpose in asking that?
A. Because he was going to need it.
Q. Why did you think he was going to need it? Did you tell him he was going to need it?
A. I asked him.
Q. You asked him if he had a suitcase?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you said the reason you asked is because you felt he was going to need it, right?
A. Best get 'er packed.
Q. And that's what you said to him, right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why in your mind did you think that he needed a suitcase?
A. Because I do believe George Lytle is a lot of my problems here in this situation.
Q. But why would he need a suitcase if he's part of your problem in your view?
A. At one time earlier, I called George Lytle a court jester.
Q. But why did you think he was going to need a suitcase packed and why did you tell him that? In your mind, why did you tell him those things?
A. Because he's going to need it.
Q. Why was he going to need it from your standpoint?
A. For his little trip.
Q. What was his little trip going to be?
A. To hell.
Q. And that's what you told him, right?
A. Yes, sir.
Lytle, Krall and Geyer all felt that Koepplin's calls to them were threatening and intimidating Zortman's personnel policy provided for different "levels" of discipline, including termination if warranted by the serious nature of the circumstances involved. Because of Koepplin's most recent threats to management and his prior behavior as reported by co-employees and as noted in his personnel file, Zortman managers decided to terminate Koepplin's employment at the prearranged meeting on February 17, 1993.
and all hung up on Koepplin. Koepplin testified he called the managers because he was concerned about his job and that he was not angry nor did he intend to threaten or intimidate anyone. Koepplin had also acted in a threatening and excitable manner during the meeting the previous day, according to testimony by management employees. The investigation conducted by mine management elicited information from other employees that [267 Mont. 58] they, too, were concerned with their safety and the safety of others because of Koepplin's threats
Sheriff Eugene Peigneux was asked to be present at the meeting in order to keep the peace should Koepplin become violent. Sheriff Peigneux testified that he decided to frisk Koepplin when he arrived for the meeting. He further testified that this was his own independent decision based on his professional training and experience and that Zortman had not requested this be done. Koepplin testified that his feelings were not hurt by this conduct and that after he was frisked, he got a cup of coffee and asked the sheriff and the two deputies if they cared for a cup also. Sheriff Peigneux also decided to have one of his deputies patrol the Zortman area during his regular shift for the next few days in order to keep an eye on Koepplin.
After his termination, Koepplin brought this action for wrongful discharge, invasion of privacy and malice. Further facts are provided throughout this opinion.
Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on Koepplin's claims for wrongful discharge, invasion of privacy and malice?
Our standard of review for an appeal of a district court's summary judgment decision is the same as that used by the district court under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Morton v. M-W-M, Inc. (1994), 263 Mont. 245, 249, 868 P.2d 576, 578. Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden to show the Court that it has met the standards set forth in Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Morton, 868 P.2d at 579. If the moving party has met this burden of proof, the nonmoving party has the burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists or that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Morton, 868 P.2d at 579. When raising the allegations that disputed issues of fact exist, the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to respond by affidavits or other sworn testimony containing material facts that raise genuine issues; conclusory or speculative statements will not suffice. Morton, 868 P.2d at 579.
Under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (the Act), an employee who has completed the employer's probationary period has a valid ground for maintaining a cause of action against the employer if the employee's discharge was not for "good cause." Section 39-2-904(2), MCA. The Act defines "good cause" as "reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason." Section 39-2-903(5), MCA.
The issue in this case is whether Koepplin was properly terminated for disruption of the employer's operation or other legitimate business reason. A "legitimate business reason" is defined as "a reason that is neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and it must have some logical relationship to the needs of the business." Kestell v. Heritage Health Care Corp. (1993), 259 Mont. 518, 525, 858 P.2d 3, 7. The District Koepplin's threat that he was going to send a supervisor on a trip to hell was shocking and outrageous, and no employer under Montana...
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