Kofahl v. Randall's Food & Drugs, Inc., 10-02-00053-CV.
Decision Date | 27 October 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 10-02-00053-CV.,10-02-00053-CV. |
Citation | 151 S.W.3d 679 |
Parties | Alice and Lloyd KOFAHL, Appellants, v. RANDALL'S FOOD & DRUGS, INC., formerly d/b/a Tom Thumb Food & Drugs, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Keith R. Verges, Figari, Davenport & Graves, L.L.P., Dallas, for appellants.
Lance C. Travis, Jeffrey W. Shell, Burford & Ryburn, L.L.P., Dallas, for appellee.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
Alice and Lloyd Kofahl filed this slip-and-fall case against Randall's Food & Drugs, formerly dba Tom Thumb Food & Drugs, after Alice slipped in an unidentified liquid on the grocery's floor, fell, and broke her hip. The trial court granted Randall's no-evidence summary judgment motion which alleges that the Kofahls can produce no evidence that Randall's had actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled liquid.
The Kofahls contend in four issues that the court erred by granting the summary judgment because: (1) Randall's can be held liable under "the Corbin rule" due to inadequate safety policies and procedures regardless of whether it had actual or constructive knowledge of the spill; (2) Randall's "created unreasonably dangerous premises" by failing to have adequate policies and procedures; (3) they presented more than a scintilla of evidence that the spill had been on the floor long enough to charge Randall's with constructive knowledge; and (4) they should not be required to prove actual or constructive knowledge under the facts of this case. The Kofahls contend in an additional issue that the court should have permitted further discovery regarding Randall's policies and procedures.
Randall's contends in a cross-issue that, regardless of the merits of Alice's claim, the judgment must be affirmed as to Lloyd because the Kofahls have not presented a separate issue challenging the judgment with respect to Lloyd's claim.
Because the Kofahls presented more than a scintilla of evidence that the liquid had been on the floor long enough to give Randall's constructive knowledge of its presence and because Randall's did not present an "independent ground" for summary judgment on Lloyd's claim, we will reverse and remand.
The Kofahls contend in their third issue that they presented more than a scintilla of evidence that the liquid had been on the floor long enough to charge Randall's with constructive knowledge of its presence. Under settled premises liability law, if the premises owner did not place the substance in question on the floor and did not have actual knowledge of its presence, the plaintiff must establish that "it is more likely than not that [the substance was on the floor] long enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex.2002).
Alice provided deposition testimony that the edges of the "large" puddle of liquid she slipped in were "very tacky and gummy" as if the puddle was "starting to dry up." Although our research has not disclosed any recent cases addressing this type of evidence, it has been held that this type of testimony will support a finding that a liquid on the floor has been there for a sufficient length of time to charge the premises owner with constructive knowledge of its presence.1 See Kroger Stores, Inc. v. Hernandez, 549 S.W.2d 16, 16-17 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); Furr's, Inc. v. McCaslin, 335 S.W.2d 284, 286-87 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1960, no writ); Furr's, Inc. v. Bolton, 333 S.W.2d 688, 689-90 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1960, no writ). Even those these decisions are not recent, more recent decisions of the Supreme Court seem to affirm their continuing validity. See e.g. Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 817 ( ); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex.1998) ( ).
Randall's cites a number of cases to support its contention that Alice's testimony constitutes no more than a mere scintilla of evidence to establish constructive knowledge. See Richardson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 963 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Harkless, 601 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Robledo v. Kroger Co., 597 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Franklin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 514 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Arellano, 492 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Unlike the Kofahls, the plaintiffs in most of the cases cited by Randall's presented evidence of a liquid on the floor but failed to present any evidence that the liquid had begun to dry. See Richardson, 963 S.W.2d at 164-65 & n. 1; Harkless, 601 S.W.2d at 537-38; Robledo, 597 S.W.2d at 560. In some of the cases cited, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the liquid was dirty or had shopping cart tracks running through it. See Harkless, 601 S.W.2d at 537-38; Robledo, 597 S.W.2d at 560. However, this type of evidence has consistently been considered inadequate to establish constructive knowledge. See Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d at 937; Harkless, 601 S.W.2d at 537-38; Robledo, 597 S.W.2d at 560-61.
In Franklin, the plaintiff testified that she slipped in a "dry syrupy looking substance." 504 S.W.2d at 517. The court concluded that this testimony was inadequate to establish constructive knowledge because it did not account for the fact that the substance may have been "dry" and "syrupy" when it spilled. Id. (citing Bolton, 333 S.W.2d at 690). Here however, Alice testified that the liquid in which she slipped and fell was drying around the edges, not that it was the same consistency throughout. See Bolton, 333 S.W.2d at 690.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the authorities relied on by Randall's do not apply to the facts of this case. Thus, we hold that the Kofahls presented more than a scintilla of evidence to show constructive knowledge. See Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex.2003) ( ).
Accordingly, we sustain the Kofahls' third issue.
Randall's contends in its sole cross-issue that, notwithstanding our disposition of the Kofahls' third issue, we must affirm the judgment as to Lloyd's claim for loss of consortium because the Kofahls have not presented a separate issue on...
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