Kofod v. Town of East Hampton

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: Before O'BRIEN
• Citation: Kofod v. Town of East Hampton, 641 N.Y.S.2d 361, 226 A.D.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
• Decision Date: 22 April 1996
• Parties: Elaine KOFOD, Respondent, v. TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, Appellant.

Page 361

641 N.Y.S.2d 361

226 A.D.2d 589

Elaine KOFOD, Respondent, v. TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

April 22, 1996.

Gary N. Weintraub, Huntington, for appellant.

Before O'BRIEN, J.P., and RITTER, PIZZUTO and ALTMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.), dated September 18, 1995, which denied its motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

We agree with the defendant's contentions that Town Law § 65-a(1) applies to this case because a public parking lot is a highway within the meaning of the statute (see, Stratton v. City of Beacon, 91 A.D.2d 1018, 1019, 457 N.Y.S.2d 893; see also, Zigman v. Town of Hempstead, 120 A.D.2d 520, 501 N.Y.S.2d 718), and that prior written notice of the allegedly defective condition was therefore a condition precedent to maintaining this action (see, Town Law § 65-a[1] ) absent proof that the defendant created the condition. However, the plaintiff's amended verified complaint sufficiently alleges the existence of such prior written notice. The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant affirmatively created the defective condition which caused her injuries (see, Humes v. Town of Hempstead, 166 A.D.2d 503, 504, 560 N.Y.S.2d 785). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's ...