Kogucki v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. Of Greater Chicago
| Decision Date | 17 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 08 C 0983.,08 C 0983. |
| Citation | 698 F.Supp.2d 1026 |
| Parties | Elizabeth KOGUCKI, Plaintiff,v.METROPOLITAN WATER RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Gregory John Bueche, Law Offices of Gregory J. Bueche, Warrenville, IL, for Plaintiff.
Lisa Ann Goldberg, Frederick M. Feldman, James Bernard Murray, Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Elizabeth Kogucki is an engineer for the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago (“District”). One day, while searching for some information she needed for a work project in her supervisor's computer files, she stumbled across something she wasn't expecting-a play. She read it, and found it lewd. She was offended by the way it depicted women and sex. She complained and asked to be transferred to another supervisor, got her wish, then changed her mind. A couple of years later, there was an open season on promotions, and Ms. Kogucki wanted one. She took a test and went through interviews. When she asked about her prospects, she was told she didn't have any because of her complaints. Over the next three years, eight people were promoted- she was not among them. Ultimately, she sued under Title VII, claiming the District had retaliated against her for her complaints. The District has moved for summary judgment.
The Seventh Circuit has said on more man one occasion that its formulae for resolving Title VII summary judgment motions is confusing. There is the direct method of proof, employing either direct or circumstantial evidence Caskey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 535 F.3d 585, 594 n. 3 (7th Cir.2008) Rudin v. Lincoln Land Community College, 420 F.3d 712, 720 n. 3 (7th Cir.2005) (). Indeed, several of its own cases “arguably conflate the direct method with direct evidence.” Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2003). And while circumstantial evidence is not direct, the court has said it “must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer's action.” Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir.2008) (emphasis supplied, quotations omitted); Rhodes v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir.2004); Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir.2003).
The court's line of cases likening circumstantial evidence to a “convincing mosaic,” Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.1994), has fostered its own line of difficulties. In Sylvester v. SOS Children's Villages Illinois, Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 903-04 (7th Cir.2006), the court lamented that
Then there are the cases covering stray remarks, derogatory comments, and epithets. While there is little confusion about the difference between a stray remark and a near-admission, there is something for everyone in the voluminous jurisprudence regarding timing of remarks, decisionmakers, etc., and that, as shall be seen, has played a significant role in this motion for summary judgment.
As always, the facts underlying this summary judgment proceeding are drawn from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 submissions. Local Rule 56.1 requires a party seeking summary judgment to include with its motion “a statement of material facts as to which the ... party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the ... party to a judgment as a matter of law.” Local Rule 56.1(a)(3); Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir.2008). The party opposing summary judgment must then respond to the movant's statement of proposed material facts; that response must contain both “a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement,” Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B), and a separate statement “consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment.” Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C); Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 643. District courts are “ ‘entitled to expect strict compliance’ ” with Rule 56.1, and do not abuse their discretion when they opt to disregard facts presented in a manner that does follow the Rule's instructions. Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 643; Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir.2004).
The District has violated the Rule by filing a statement of facts consisting of eighty-eight numbered paragraphs, without the required leave of court. Local Rule 56.1(a). That would be reason enough to deny its motion. But, as district courts have discretion to enforce their local rules and to excuse transgressions Little v. Cox's Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir.1995), the motion will be resolved on its merits.
Elizabeth Kogucki began her tenure with the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District or Greater Chicago in September of 1989 as an engineering draftsman II. ( Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts (“Def. St.”), ¶ 2; Plaintiff's Response (“Pl. Res.”), ¶ 2). She was promoted in 1994, in 1997, and in 2000, when she was made senior civil engineer, the position she currently holds. ( Def. St., ¶ 3; Pl. Res., ¶ 3). In late 2003, Ms. Kogucki worked at the District's Calumet plant, while her direct supervisor, Tom Kunetz, worked at the downtown Chicago office. ( Def. St., ¶ 8; Pl. Res., ¶ 8).
On September 22, 2003, Mr. Kunetz brought a diskette to the office that included a play he had written, in order to print it out on the office computer. ( Def. St., ¶ 4; Pl. Res., ¶ 4). But after he printed it out, he left it in a computer folder with his name on it. ( Def. St., ¶ 4; Pl. Res., ¶ 4). The play contained sexually explicit scenes and off-color language. ( Def. St., ¶ 4; Pl. Res., ¶ 4). Worried that one of his colleagues might have accessed it, a few days later, Mr. Kunetz went to his supervisor, Osoth Jamjun, and disclosed what he had done. ( Def. St., ¶ 5; Pl. Res., ¶ 5). Mr. Jamjun told him his unauthorized use of the computer was a violation of work rules, and that he may be subject to disciplinary action. ( Def. St., ¶ 5; Pl. Res., ¶ 5).
As Mr. Kunetz feared, one of his colleagues did stumble across the play. Ms. Kogucki was working on a contract, and needed certain specifications for it. (Kogucki Deposition, at 12). She thought she might find a similar contract in Mr. Kunetz's computer folder. ( Id.). The folders were shared folders and used by everyone for purposes like that (Kogucki Deposition, at 14-15,26). She clicked on his folder, then clicked on a subfolder, but does not recall the name of it. (Kogucki Deposition, at 12). She thought it might have included a number, which would have been the middle digits of a contract (Kogucki Deposition, at 17). She clicked on that folder, and the play appeared on the screen. (Kogucki Deposition, at 19). She started to read it; she claimed she still thought it might be what she was looking for. (Kogucki Deposition, at 25). She couldn't say how much she read before she realized otherwise. (Kogucki Deposition, at 25).
At her deposition, she said she read the entire play at that sitting. (Kogucki Deposition, at 38). But, a bit later in her testimony, she backpedaled:
... now when I think about it, I could have given you the wrong answer. That I could have but not necessarily. I think there was a time when I started reading it and I couldn't even finish it because I didn't like what I read. So I don't know. I don't recall.
(Kogucki Deposition, at 39). She admitted having read the entire play when she printed it out. (Kogucki Deposition, at 38). That was a week after she had found it. (Kogucki Deposition, at 25-26, 35). By that time, having read the play at least once and perhaps twice over a week's period, she decided to make a complaint about it, because she felt offended and the material “was against the District directives.” (Kogucki Deposition, at 35). She said the play was offensive and created a hostile work environment “because of the way women and sex with women is described, because of the body parts, women body parts that are described.” (Kogucki Deposition, at 40).
Ms. Kogucki complained to Mr. Jamjun on October 2, 2003. ( Def. St., ¶ 6; Pl. Res., ¶ 8). She asked for a transfer. ( Id.). She didn't feel comfortable working with Mr. Kunetz because ( Id.; Kogucki Deposition, at 47). Mr. Jamjun asked Ms. Kogucki if she wanted to file a sexual harassment complaint, and she yes. ( Def. St., ¶ 9; Pl. Res., ¶ 9). Mr. Jamjun passed this along to Frances Wilkins, the District's EEO investigator. ( Id.). Ms. Wilkins met with Ms. Kogucki that same day and, according to Ms. Kogucki, said that Mr. Kunetz had done nothing wrong because he didn't place the play on Ms. Kogucki's directory. ( Def. St., ¶ 11; Pl. Res., ¶ 11).
The next day, October 3, 2003, Mr. Jamjun wrote Ms. Kogucki an e-mail stating that if she had not changed her mind about transferring, that she would be transferred to the Infrastructure and Budget Division. ( Def. St., ¶ 12; Pl. Res., ¶ 12). Although she had requested a transfer just the day before, Ms. Kogucki e-mailed back this response:
Since it is clear that I have done nothing wrong and was in fact trying to do the right thing, I should not be the one burdened with changing job location and complicating my personal life. Because of this, at this time, I will decline any transfer offers to the positions that would inconvenience my personal...
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