KOH SYSTEMS v. DOES

• Decision Date: 26 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-AA-260.,95-AA-260.
• Citation: 683 A.2d 446
• Parties: KOH SYSTEMS, et al., Petitioners, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent, and Paul G. Meinke, Intervenor.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

683 A.2d 446

KOH SYSTEMS, et al., Petitioners, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent, and Paul G. Meinke, Intervenor.

No. 95-AA-260.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted September 10, 1996.

Decided September 26, 1996.

Scott D. Austin, Washington, DC, was on the brief for petitioners.

Charles F.C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, with whom Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, filed a statement in lieu of brief for respondent.

John G. Nalls, Rockville, MD, was on the brief for intervenor/respondent.

Before FERREN, TERRY, and REID, Associate Judges.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

KOH Systems and Royal Insurance Company, petitioners, contend on appeal that the Acting Director ("Director") of the Department of Employment Services ("DOES") erred in overruling the hearing examiner's decision that the applicable statute of limitations, D.C.Code § 36-314(a) (1993 Repl.), barred intervenor Paul G. Meinke's workers' compensation claim. The examiner concluded, and the Director disagreed, that Meinke's claim had been untimely filed because he had been aware more than a year before filing his claim that his injuries were work-related. We conclude that the Director did not err in ruling that the record failed to support a finding that Meinke's was aware of the cause of his injury in January 1991, when the examiner imputed that awareness to him. However, we must remand the case for a ruling on an issue the Director overlooked: whether Meinke's claim was untimely on the alternative statutory ground that, "by the exercise of reasonable diligence," Meinke "should have been aware" more than a year before filing his claim that his injuries were work-related. Id.

I.

On October 1, 1989, Paul G. Meinke began working at KOH Systems as a computer technician. His work principally involved the maintenance and repair of computers, printers, and fax machines; he also was engaged in computer programming and data entry. In January 1991, Meinke began to experience numbness and tingling sensations in his right hand and fingers while at work. Although at first these symptoms were not severe, they persisted over time and gradually became worse. Meinke nonetheless continued to work while often taking breaks to alleviate the pain. Even though Meinke gradually began to suspect that he was suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome, he did not seek medical attention primarily because he was averse to surgery involving his wrists.

On February 23, 1992, Meinke suffered injuries to his shoulder, back, and hands in an automobile accident. He sought medical treatment for those injuries from Dr. Joseph Y. Lin on March 4, 1992. Because of persistent numbness and tingling in Meinke's hands and wrists, he returned to Dr. Lin on July 10, 1992. Nerve conduction studies and an EMG revealed that Meinke suffered from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Meinke informed KOH Systems of his injuries, and on July 22, 1992, KOH filed its "First Report of Injury or Occupational Disease" with DOES, KOH also hired Dr. Robert O. Gordon to conduct an independent examination of Meinke.

Meinke returned to Dr. Lin on September 9, 1992 because of progressively worse pain in his hands and wrists. Dr. Lin informed Meinke that his injuries were work-related and that surgery would be necessary to correct the condition. On November 17, 1992, Meinke filed for benefits under the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979, D.C.Code §§ 36-301 to 36-345 (1993 Repl.), seeking an award for the costs associated with surgery on his wrists and for temporary total disability benefits during the course of his recovery. KOH Systems defended on the ground that Meinke's injuries were not causally related to his employment and that his claim had not been filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations specified in D.C.Code § 36-314(a).

After a hearing on September 7, 1993, the hearing examiner concluded — based on Meinke's testimony and on the medical reports of Dr. Lin — that Meinke suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome and that his work at KOH Systems was the source of his condition. The examiner also determined, however, that Meinke's claim had been untimely filed because Meinke had been "aware of his condition of carpal tunnel syndrome and its relation to his work activities as of January 1991," more than a year before filing his claim, "as was evident from his testimony at the hearing." The hearing examiner's conclusion, therefore, was based exclusively on Meinke's own testimony that he had had a "suspicion" when he began experiencing symptoms in January 1991 that his injury was work-related.¹

On February 15, 1995, the Director overruled the hearing examiner, concluding that there was "no evidence in the record that Meinke knew his injury was work related until September 9, 1992," when Dr. Lin so informed him. The Director accordingly concluded that Meinke's claim had been timely filed under D.C.Code § 36-314(a), and he remanded the case to the hearing examiner to address the merits of Meinke's claim. On March 10, 1995, petitioners filed a timely petition for review of the remand order.

II.

A.

Our standard of review is set forth under the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, D.C.Code § 1-1510(a) (1992 Repl.), which empowers this court, among other things, to set aside agency findings and conclusions "unsupported by substantial evidence," id. § 1-1510(a)(3)(E), or "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," id. § 1-1510(a)(3)(A). See Santos v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 536 A.2d 1085, 1088 (D.C.1988). In DOES appeals, our review is constrained to some extent by the roles assignable, respectively, to the hearing examiner and to the Director. Initially, the examiner investigates and rules on the case (sometimes with, sometimes without, a hearing), makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a compensation order granting or denying the claim. See Dell v. Dep't of Employment Servs., 499 A.2d 102, 105-06 (D.C.1985). The Director then reviews the compensation order by applying the law to the facts. See id. at 105. Pursuant to applicable regulations, "`the Director shall affirm the compensation order if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record.'" Id. (quoting DOES Rule 3626.4 (published at 29 D.C.Reg. 5565 (1982))). The Director accordingly is bound by the examiner's findings of fact if supported by substantial record evidence. See Santos, 536 A.2d at 1088; Dell, 499 A.2d at 107. The Director reviews the examiner's conclusions of law de novo, however, since the Director has ultimate responsibility within the agency for interpreting the statute the agency administers. See Harris v. District of Columbia Office of Worker's Compensation, 660 A.2d 404, 407 (D.C.1995) (noting that examiner's interpretation of statute is entitled to less deference than Director's); St. Clair v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 658 A.2d 1040, 1042-44 (D.C.1995) (per curiam) (sustaining Director's rejection of hearing examiner's interpretation of statute).

This court in turn reviews the Director's decision. Among other things, we consider whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, see D.C.Code §§ 1-1509(e), 1-1510(a)(3)(E), making sure that the Director has accorded proper deference to the examiner's fact-finding role. See Santos, 536 A.2d at 1088. In contrast, we review the Director's legal conclusions de novo, keeping in mind, however, that when the statutory language is not entirely clear, we ordinarily defer to the Director's interpretation of the governing statute and the agency's own regulations. See Daniel v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 673 A.2d 205, 207 (D.C.1996); Harris, 660 A.2d at 407; Gunty v. Department of Employment Servs., 524 A.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. 1987). Nonetheless, this court has the last word on the law because, ultimately, "the substantial evidence issue is an issue of law" and "the reviewing court has the greater expertise." Dell, 499 A.2d at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Director's interpretation, therefore, is not entitled to controlling weight if it "conflicts with the statute, is inconsistent with the governing regulation, or otherwise is contrary to established legal doctrine." Gunty, 524 A.2d at 1196 (citations omitted).

This case requires us to focus first on the facts and then on the language of the statute. We must determine (1) whether the Director correctly concluded that the hearing examiner's compensation order lacked substantial evidentiary support in the record, and (2) whether the Director otherwise lawfully applied the statute in remanding the case to the examiner for a ruling on the merits of Meinke's claim.

B.

D.C.Code § 36-314(a) requires the employee to file a workers' compensation claim within one year of the injury. The limitation period is triggered once the employee becomes "aware, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been aware," that the injury is work-related.² Our first inquiry, therefore, is whether substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's decision that Meinke had been aware, more than a year before filing his claim, that his injuries were work-related. See George Hyman Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 498 A.2d 563, 565-66 (D.C.1985). "`Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Dell, 499 A.2d at 108 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). The Director is bound to accept the examiner's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence "even though he or she may have reached a contrary result based on an independent review of the record." Id.

We agree with the Director that...