Kohler v. Kohler, 8812.
Decision Date | 30 June 1939 |
Docket Number | No. 8812.,8812. |
Citation | 104 F.2d 38 |
Parties | KOHLER v. KOHLER et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
T. H. MacDonald, of Helena, Mont. for appellant.
Wellington D. Rankin and Arthur P. Acher, both of Helena, Mont. (H. W. Pitkin and John G. Bowes, both of Des Moines, Iowa, of counsel), for appellee Yeomen Mut. Life Ins. Co.
Paul W. Smith, David R. Smith, and J. Miller Smith, Jr., all of Helena, Mont., for appellee Clara Kohler.
Before DENMAN, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
In the District Court of the United States for the District of Montana, Yeomen Mutual Life Insurance Company, an Iowa corporation (hereafter called insurer), brought an interpleader suit against Clara Kohler, a citizen of Montana (hereafter called appellee), and Daisy S. Kohler, a citizen of Washington (hereafter called appellant), under § 24(26) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(26). From a decree in favor of insurer and appellee, this appeal is prosecuted.
Prior to May 1, 1932, insurer was a fraternal beneficiary association1 called the Brotherhood of American Yeomen. Its lodges were called homesteads. One of its homesteads (No. 546) was at Helena, Montana. On July 26, 1923, insurer issued to James Victor Kohler (hereafter called decedent), a member of Homestead No. 546, a benefit certificate (No. 177,490) wherein appellant, the then wife of decedent, was designated as his beneficiary. The certificate provided that, upon receipt of satisfactory proof of decedent's death, insurer would pay his beneficiary a death benefit of $2,000. By the certificate, insurer's by-laws were declared to be a part of the contract between insurer and decedent. The bylaws provided:
On February 20, 1929, decedent and appellant were divorced by decree of a State court of Montana, admittedly a court of competent jurisdiction. Theretofore, on the same date, decedent and appellant had made a contract for the settlement of their property rights. The divorce decree mentioned the contract and stated that the settlement effected thereby appeared to the court to be just and equitable. The contract provided, among other things: "That decedent agrees that he will pay the premium on a certain policy of life insurance in the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) in which appellant is beneficiary and she shall remain the beneficiary, said policy of insurance being known as a Yeomen Beneficiary certificate." The certificate referred to was the one here involved. It was then, and remained thereafter, in appellant's possession.
Decedent was married to appellee on March 11, 1929. On September 9, 1930, he made a new contract with appellant and, in connection therewith, paid appellant $1,000 in cash and gave her his promissory note for $3,000 payable in monthly installments of $50 each, commencing October 9, 1930. The trial court found that, by this contract, appellant, in consideration of said cash payment and promissory note, agreed, among other things, that she would give up and deliver to decedent the above mentioned certificate, and would renounce any right which she then had or claimed to have therein or thereunder. Appellant, if she made any such agreement, never complied with it. The certificate remained, thereafter as theretofore, in her possession.
On August 26, 1931, decedent executed and delivered to insurer an application for change of beneficiary, wherein he notified insurer that he thereby revoked the designation of appellant as his beneficiary, appointed appellee as such beneficiary, and requested insurer to acknowledge such change. Not having the certificate in his possession, decedent could not and did not return it to insurer, as provided in § 113 of the bylaws. On March 5, 1932, decedent executed and filed with insurer a sworn statement that the certificate was out of his possession, and requested insurer to issue him a duplicate certificate, as provided in § 115. This request was complied with on March 10, 1932. The change of beneficiary from appellant to appellee was acknowledged by insurer and by it endorsed on the duplicate certificate on March 11, 1932.
On May 1, 1932, insurer, by amending its articles of incorporation and otherwise complying with statutory requirements,2 transformed itself into a legal reserve level premium life insurance company,...
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