Kohler v. Railroad Co.
| Decision Date | 26 May 1890 |
| Parties | JAMES A. KOHLER v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
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Before PAXSON, C. J., STERRETT, GREEN, CLARK, WILLIAMS and MITCHELL, JJ.
APPEAL BY PLAINTIFF FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF HUNTINGDON COUNTY.
No. 50 January Term 1890, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 58 September Term 1888, C. P.
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Mr. George B. Orlady (with him Mr. L. S. Geissinger), for the appellant:
1. While the motion for a nonsuit was not granted, the trial was ended with like effect as if it had been. Such a motion is in effect a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence, and every reasonable inference of fact which a jury might draw in the plaintiff's favor must be drawn by the court. When material facts are disputed or even in doubt, or inferences of fact are to be drawn from the testimony, it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine what the facts are: Fisher v. Railroad Co., 131 Pa. 292; Corbalis v. Newberry Tp., 132 Pa. 9; Sidney Sch. Fur. Co. v. Warsaw Sch. D., 122 Pa. 494; Abraham v. Mitchell, 112 Pa. 230; McNeal v. Railway Co., 131 Pa. 184. The court should not adopt the statement of a single witness for the plaintiff, in seeming conflict with the testimony of his other witnesses, as the measure of his whole case, but should permit the jury to determine what weight to give to each witness in view of his intelligence, means of knowledge and manner of testifying, and in the light of the testimony of the other witnesses as to the same facts: Penna. R. Co. v. Fortney, 90 Pa. 323.
2. What constitutes negligence when the standard shifts, not according to any certain rule, depends upon the facts and circumstances developed by the testimony, and must be submitted to the jury. Judges should not ignore this time-honored rule, but should be careful not to usurp the province of the jury and determine questions of fact: Delaware etc. R. Co. v. Jones, 128 Pa. 308. The relation of carrier and passenger had commenced when the plaintiff walked across the north track: Patterson's Ry. Acc. Law, 213. The defendant was as much required to furnish him a safe means of going to the car, as it is to provide a safe roadbed and cars and competent conductors and agents, after a passenger has boarded a train. Acting on the presumption of his safety in the observance of the defendant's own rules, which prohibited the use of the north track by trains at that time, Kohler, after stopping, looking and listening, walked directly to the proper place to take his train.
3. It was not necessary for him to stop, look and listen after he started across the track: Penna. R. Co. v. Garvey, 108 Pa.
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369. Whether he was prudent or reckless, was for the determination of the jury, on a consideration of all the circumstances: Schum v. Railroad Co., 107 Pa. 8; Penna. R. Co. v. Coon, 111 Pa. 430; Penna. R. Co. v. Lyons, 129 Pa. 113; Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Kane, 5 Cent. R. 909. Whether the...
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