Koike v. Starbucks Corp.
| Decision Date | 10 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. C 06-3215 VRW.,C 06-3215 VRW. |
| Citation | 602 F.Supp.2d 1158 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | Roya KOIKE and Adam Odnert, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Page 1158
v.
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, Defendant.
Page 1159
Gregory N. Karasik, Robert Ira Spiro, Spiro Moss Barness LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Martin A. Shellist, Shellist Lazarz, LLP, Robert Randolph Debes, Jr., Debes Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Catherine A. Conway, Mark Royce Curiel, Gregory William Knopp, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Joel M. Cohn, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
VAUGHN R. WALKER, Chief Judge.
On December 15, 2008, Shaun Nguyen moved to intervene under FRCP 24 for the limited purpose of appealing Doc. # 127, the order denying class certification in the above-captioned case. Doc. # 135. If the court grants his motion, Nguyen further requests ten days from the date of this order to file his notice of appeal. Doc. # 135 at 1. Defendant Starbucks Corporation ("Starbucks") opposes Nguyen's motion to intervene. Doc. # 140.
This case began as a putative class action against Starbucks based on alleged violations of various wage and hour provisions of the California Labor Code. Doc. #25. Plaintiffs Roya Koike and Adam Odnert, as putative class representatives and former Starbucks assistant managers, alleged that Starbucks encouraged assistant managers at retail outlets not to work more than forty hours per week, effectively requiring them to perform some tasks off-the-clock, so that Starbucks would not have to pay them overtime wages. Id. at 6-10. Starbucks moved for summary judgment on Odnert's claims on October 18, 2007, Doc. # 65, which the court granted because Odnert failed to show that Starbucks had actual or constructive knowledge that he had worked off-theclock. Doc. #127 at 11. In the same order, the court denied class certification because individual questions predominated over common issues. Id. at 16. Koike's individual claims continued after the denial of class certification. Id. at 22.
On November 6, 2008, the parties notified the court that they had settled the case. Doc. # 132. As part of the settlement, Koike and Odnert agreed not to appeal the denial of class certification. Doc. # 134 at 2. On December 4, 2008, the court entered judgment in Starbucks's favor on Odnert's claims, and Koike agreed to dismiss her claims with prejudice. Id.
Nguyen explains his membership in the putative class in his declaration, Doc.
Page 1160
# 136. Nguyen was employed as an assistant manager at various Starbucks retail locations in California from February 2005 through June 2008. Id. at 111. Nguyen is thus a member of the putative class, which consists of
all persons who worked for Starbucks as an Assistant Store Manager in California since September 30, 2002 who do not currently work for Starbucks, excluding those employees of Starbucks who filed a consent to be a party plaintiff in the case of Falcon v. Starbucks Corporation, Case No H-05-0792 presently pending in the United States District Court, Southern District of Texas.
Doc. # 73 at 1. Aside from his status as a putative class member, Nguyen had not been involved in the court's proceedings until he filed his motion to intervene on December 15, 2008. Doc. #135. Nguyen's counsel is the same as Koike's and Odnert's. Compare Doc. # 135 at 6 with Doc. # 134 at 3.
Nguyen seeks to intervene as of right under FRCP 24(a) or alternatively with the court's permission under FRCP 24(b). Doc. #135. FRCP 24 permits, under certain circumstances, the intervention of a non-party in ongoing litigation. As the movant, Nguyen bears the burden to demonstrate that he meets the requirements of FRCP 24. Petrol Stops Northwest v. Continental Oil Co., 647 F.2d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir.1981). In ruling on a motion to intervene, "a district court is required to accept as true the non-conclusory allegations made in support of [the] intervention motion." Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 819-20 (9th Cir.2001).
To seek intervention as of right under FRCP 24(a), Nguyen must make a four-part showing: (1) his motion is timely; (2) he has a significant protectible interest relating to class certification decision; (3) he so situated that the disposition of the action may practically impair his ability to protect his interest; and (4) his interest is not adequately represented by the parties to the action. See Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Service, 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir.1995); see also Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir.1997); Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir.1998). Generally, the court should be "guided primarily by practical and equitable considerations" and should "interpret the requirements broadly in favor of intervention." Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 409 (internal citation omitted).
First, a motion to intervene for the limited purpose of appealing a denial of class certification is timely if it is filed within the time allowed for a party to file an appeal. United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 392, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977); Alaska v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 123 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir.1997). Under FRAP 4(a)(1)(A), a party has thirty days after entry of judgment to file a notice of appeal. Nguyen's motion was timely because he filed it on December 15, 2008, fewer than thirty days after the court entered judgment on December 4, 2008.
Second, the court considers whether Nguyen has a significant protectible interest in appealing the denial of the class action. An interest is significantly protectible if (1) it is protected under some law and (2) the applicant shows a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims of Koike and Odnert. Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 409. No bright line rule determines whether the applicant has a significant interest. Southern...
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