Koistra v. Cnty. of San Diego

• Decision Date: 19 October 2017
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 16cv2539-GPC(AGS)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: TRINA KOISTRA; and LARRY FORD, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; PLUTARCO VAIL; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

TRINA KOISTRA; and LARRY FORD, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; PLUTARCO VAIL;and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

CASE NO. 16cv2539-GPC(AGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

October 19, 2017

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

[Dkt. No. 34.]

Before the Court is Defendants County of San Diego and Plutarco Vail's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' first amended complaint ("FAC"). (Dkt. No. 34.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition, and Defendants filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 36, 38.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

Background

Around January 8, 2016, Plaintiff Trina Koistra ("Koistra") went to a nail salon in El Cajon, California. (Dkt. No. 26, FAC ¶ 15.) She was waiting for a friend to pick her up and bring her home; however, her ride never showed up. (Id. ¶ 16.) By chance, she saw a friend near the nail salon who told her he could get her a ride home. (Id. ¶ 17.) The friend called a friend, named Fay¹, who agreed to drive her home. (Id. ¶ 18.) Koistra got home close to 9 p.m. (Id. ¶ 20.) Since it was late, Fay asked if he could sleep on the couch, and she agreed. (Id. ¶ 21.) Koistra's boyfriend, Plaintiff Larry Ford ("Ford") and mother were home. (Id.) An hour or two later, a helicopter was hovering over the house and dozens of San Diego Sheriff's Department deputies were outside with an arrest warrant for Fay. (Id. ¶ 22.) Ford went to the front door, was placed in handcuffs and taken down the street. (Id. ¶ 23.) Fay hid under a bed and Koistra went into the closet of her mother's room. (Id.) Kostra's mother does not hear well and was watching television in her room with the volume on very loud. (Id. ¶ 24.) Defendant Deputy Vail and other deputies entered the home, found Fay and arrested him. (Id. ¶ 25.) Deputy Vail and other deputies continued searching the home and opened the closet door where Koistra was located. (Id. ¶ 26.) When the door opened, Koistra put her hands up. (Id. ¶ 27.) Deputy Vail had a canine, named Hank, who immediately bit Trina's finger and the injury went down to her bone. (Id. ¶ 28.) She then covered her face and began screaming. (Id. ¶ 29.) The canine then bit down on her arm and began pulling her out of the closet and the dog did not release its bite until she was out of the closet. (Id. ¶ 30.) Koistra continued to scream when Deputy Vail told the canine to go after her again. (Id. ¶ 31.) This time, the canine bit down on the front of Koistra's face and one of the dog's teeth punctured through her cheeks. (Id.) The dog then broke her jaw. (Id.) At that point, Koistra urinated on herself and passed out. (Id.) Deputy Vail and other deputies took Koistra into custody. (Id. ¶ 32.)

The original complaint was filed on October 12, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1.) After the Court granted Plaintiffs' ex parte application to amend the complaint, (Dkt. No. 25), on August 16, 2017, Plaintiffs Koistra and Ford filed an amended complaint against the County of San Diego and Deputy Plutarco Vail. (Dkt. No. 26.) The FAC alleges eleven causes of action and include the following:

1. First Cause of Action - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment;

2. Second Cause of Action - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment;

3. Third Cause of Action - Monell² liability for the County's failure to train and supervise;

4. Fourth Cause of Action - Monell liability for the County's policies, procedure, customs, and practices;

5. Fifth Cause of Action - violation of California Civil Code section 52.1;

6. Sixth Cause of Action - false arrest/false imprisonment;

7. Seventh Cause of Action - battery;

8. Eighth Cause of Action - assault;

9. Ninth Cause of Action - intentional infliction of emotional distress;

10. Tenth Cause of Action - negligence; and

11. Eleventh Cause of Action - negligent infliction of emotional distress.

(Dkt. No. 26.)

Discussion

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants filed a request for judicial notice of state court criminal documents including an appearance on a warrant against Koistra dated January 21, 2016, a felony complaint against Fay filed on January 19, 2016, a plea of guilty by Fay filed on February 27, 2017, and Koistra's probation hearing/sentencing held on July 31, 2013. (Dkt. No. 34-2.) Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a Court may consider exhibits attached to the complaint, matters subject to judicial notice, or documents necessarily relied on by the complaint whose authenticity no party questions. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007); Lee v. City of Los Angeles,250 F.3d 668, 688-689 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) ( "A court may, however, consider certain materials-documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice-without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.").

The state court documents are not attached to the FAC or incorporated by reference in the FAC. Thus, the Court considers whether the documents are subject to judicial notice. Courts may only take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are "not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

"On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, when a court takes judicial notice of another court's opinion, it may do so 'not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity.'" Lee, 250 F.3d at 690 (quoting Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426-27 (3rd Cir. 1999)); Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998) ("A court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings."); In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (same). Facts or findings made by a state court contained in other court orders or documents may not be judicially noticed for the truth of the matters asserted. Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101, 1117 n.14 (9th Cir. 2005) (declining to take judicial notice of findings made in another state court proceeding "because [defendants were] offering the factual findings contained in the order for the purpose of proving the truth of the factual findings contained therein[ ]").

In Lee, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint taking judicial notice of the truth of disputed factual matters by relyingon the contents of the Waiver of Extradition form and the transcript of an extradition hearing. Lee, 250 F.3d 668 at 689-90.

Caselaw dictates that the Court may take judicial notice of the existence of the state court documents but cannot take judicial notice of the truth of the facts contained in the state court documents. Based on their arguments, Defendants seek to have the Court consider the truth of facts contained in the state court documents. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants' request for judicial notice of the truth of the facts contained in the state court filings.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(b)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 8(a)(2), the plaintiff is required only to set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.2009) (quotations omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009).

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, "leave to amend should be granted 'unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.'" DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Deso...