Kolb v. Swann
| Decision Date | 15 March 1888 |
| Citation | 13 A. 379,68 Md. 516 |
| Parties | KOLB v. SWANN. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore city.
Appellant Augustus Kolb, bargained to lease certain land of appellee Thomas A. Swann, but, having some doubt as to appellee's title, refused to complete the bargain, and brings the matter up on appeal.
George R. Willis, for appellant.
Frank Gosnell, for appellee.
In the case of Church v. Trimble, decided by this court at the April term, 1887, [1] the question, and indeed the only question, involved, was the title of that church to a lot of about two acres of land sold to it by Robert Oliver for a grave-yard. The land was purchased in 1820, and used as a burying-ground for some 60 years or more, and until, the city of Baltimore having opened streets through the lot, it could no longer be used for that purpose. The church then proceeded to divide this land into small lots, and sell it for building purposes. The Trimbles, the appellants in the case referred to, purchased one or more of these building lots; but having some doubts whether the African Church had a good and merchantable title to what, for the sake of brevity, we may term the grave-yard lot, brought the question to this court upon a case stated. The question, and the only question involved, in that suit, was whether the African Church had a good fee-simple title to the whole of that grave-yard lot. The church held the whole grave-yard lot under the same conveyance and by the same title, so that a decision that the church held the title to any part of the grave-yard lot necessarily implied a title to the whole. No pretense was made that any part of the lot was held under any different title or claim than that which applied to the whole. On the contrary, it was shown in that case that the title to the whole lot was an indivisible one, arising from the same source, and depending upon the identical same title papers. Upon the case so brought before this court, we held, by an equally divided court, that the African Church had a good and merchantable title to the lot it had sold to the Trimbles, and in so deciding we necessarily decided that the African Church had a good and merchantable title to the whole of the grave-yard lot. Some time subsequent to that decision, Swann, the appellee, became the purchaser of one of the building lots carved out of the grave-yard lot, and bargained to lease the same to the appellant, Kolb; but Kolb, still having some doubts as to the title of the church, (owing, we suppose, to the fact that the former decision was made by an equally divided court, and without an opinion being filed,) refused to comply with his bargain, and therefore the matter has been again brought before this court. The facts in this case are precisely the same as in Trimble's Case, except that in Trimble's Case the question was presented between the church and its immediate grantee, and in this the question comes up between a grantee of one of the building lots and his lesse. But the question is precisely the same, as there is no dispute or difficulty about the mesne conveyances from the church to the plaintiff in this case. That part of the grave-yard lot that was the subject of controversy in Trimble's Case is not the same part that is involved in this case, but each is a part of the original grave-yard.
It is apparent from this statement that this court having within a year decided that the African Church had a good and merchantable title to the whole of this grave-yard lot, that the question which first presents itself is whether we should now re-examine that decision. We may concede, for the sake of the argument, that, technically and strictly speaking, this suit is not res judicata, because the parties are different, and the present parties should not be held conclusively bound by the decision in that case, in which they had no opportunity to be heard. We may also concede that the judgment in that case is not what may properly be termed a judgment in rem, and binding on the world. We may also further concede the power of the court to reverse its own decision. But, notwithstanding all this, we think that both sound reason and the authority of adjudged cases will amply justify us in a refusal to reopen this question of the title of the grave-yard.
As the difficulty seems to have arisen in the mind of the appellee because Trimble's Case was decided by an equally divided court, we will first dispose of that question. The binding force and effect of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and of...
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