Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 13 February 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 88-0714.
• Citation: 702 F. Supp. 532
• Parties: Michael J. KOLBECK v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Tait Design and Machine, and Charles N. Tait.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

702 F. Supp. 532

Michael J. KOLBECK v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Tait Design and Machine, and Charles N. Tait.

Civ. A. No. 88-0714.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

December 20, 1988.

As Amended February 13, 1989.

Larry E. Coben, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Edward A. Gray, Philadelphia, Pa., Stephen J. Brogan, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

Donald Camhi, Philadelphia, Pa., for Tait Design and Machine and Charles N. Tait.

OPINION AND ORDER

HUYETT, District Judge.

Defendant General Motors Corporation ("GM") moves for partial summary judgment in this action which arises out of an automobile accident.

Plaintiff Michael J. Kolbeck ("Kolbeck") was a passenger in a 1980 Pontiac Grand Prix that collided on October 29, 1985 with an automobile operated by defendant Charles N. Tait ("Tait") which was owned by defendant Tait Design and Machine Company ("Tait Design"). On January 29, 1988, based on diversity of citizenship, GM removed this action from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The action seeks recovery for injuries plaintiff sustained in the accident. The complaint states two counts against the defendants. Count I alleges, inter alia, that GM is liable for failing to design the Pontiac with adequate occupant restraint systems, specifically "passive restraint systems," such as airbags, in addition to seat belts. Complaint at ¶ 14(c), (f) and (i). Count II alleges that defendant Tait, acting as agent for defendant Tait Design, is liable for failing to safely operate the vehicle. Defendants Tait and Tait Design are not involved in the instant summary judgment motion.

GM, in its partial summary judgment motion, contends that federal law, specifically the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1426 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986 & West Supp.1988) hereinafter, Safety Act, and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1979) hereinafter, FMVSS 208, preempt any claim based on Pennsylvania common law for GM's failure to include a passive restraint system in the 1980 Pontiac. The question of whether the Safety Act and FMVSS 208 preempt common law claims is the subject of numerous court decisions and a substantial divergence of opinion among the courts that faced the question.¹ The instant action is the first to raise the question in the Third Circuit. Because of the novelty of this controlling legal question, and the divergence of opinion among the courts, I shall certify this question for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).

I.

The facts are simply stated. Plaintiff's vehicle, a 1980 Pontiac Grand Prix, collided with an auto driven by Charles Tait on October 29, 1985. Tait allegedly ran a red light and broadsided the Pontiac in which Kolbeck was a passenger. The force of the collision threw Kolbeck forward, and he struck a portion of the Pontiac's interior. As a result of this "second collision," Kolbeck sustained severe injuries. He is now a quadraplegic. The medical reports of the incident state that Kolbeck was not wearing the seat belts the auto was equipped with at the time of the accident. The Pontiac contained a three point lap and shoulder safety belt occupant restraint system.

GM moves for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's claims that the Pontiac was defectively designed because it was equipped with seat belts and not with a passive restraint system such as airbags, an energy absorbing interior, or automatic seat belts. Plaintiff asserts that the Pontiac was unreasonably dangerous as designed and that there were safer design alternatives available. Essentially, Kolbeck argues that compliance with FMVSS 208 is only "some evidence of due care" in designing the car. GM, on the other hand, contends that the seat belt system in the Pontiac was in full compliance with federal law. Thus, it claims that plaintiff's defective design theory is expressly or impliedly preempted by federal law.

II.

In 1966, Congress enacted the Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1426. According to the Congressional Declaration of Purpose, the purpose of the Safety Act is "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982). To fulfill this purpose Congress determined "it was necessary to establish motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and equipment ... and to undertake and support necessary safety research and development. ..." Id. The legislation was designed to, inter alia, provide motor vehicle safety standards that were "uniform throughout the country." S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1966, p. 2709.

Two specific provisions of the Safety Act are most relevant to GM's motion. Section 1392(d) provides that whenever the Secretary of Transportation² establishes a federal standard, the Safety Act expressly preempts state safety standards concerning "the same aspect of performance ... not identical to the Federal standard."³ The Act also provides a savings clause that states compliance with a federal standard "does not exempt any person from liability under the common law." 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c).⁴

The Department of Transportation first adopted FMVSS 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1979),⁵ the occupant restraint standard, in 1967. FMVSS 208 has a "complex and convoluted" legislative history. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34-38, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2862-64, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (summarizing FMVSS 208 history including 60 rulemaking notices, and the imposition, amendment, rescission, reimposition, re-rescission of the regulation); Public Citizen v. Steed, 851 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C.Cir.1988); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474 (D.C.Cir.), cert. den. sub nom., New York v. Dole, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1616, 94 L.Ed.2d 800 (1987).

The regulation itself is also complex. It provides for three restraint systems for an automobile. The "First Option" provides that a car may be equipped with a "complete passive restraint system ... that requires no action by the vehicle occupants." This system is designed to protect occupants from front and lateral crashes. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.2.1. The "Second Option" permits cars with a lap belt protection system and a belt warning system, such as a buzzer or light. The buzzer or light, which is activated immediately after ignition, reminds the occupant to "fasten your seat belt." Under this option, the manufacturer is required to include a passive restraint system to protect from frontal crashes. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.2.2. The "Third Option" provides for a lap and shoulder belt with a belt warning system. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.2.3.

The purpose of the regulation is

to reduce the number of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity of injuries, by specifying vehicle crashworthiness requirements in terms of forces and accelerations measured on ... dummies in test crashes, and by specifying equipment requirements for active and passive restraint systems.

49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S2.

III.

In general, there are three ways in which a state law may be preempted by federal law. First, Congress may expressly preempt state law by including specific language in a statute. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). Second, Congress may preempt by the use of language which although not expressly preemptive, "evidences a Congressional intent to completely occupy a regulatory field." Baird, 654 F.Supp. at 29; see Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982). Lastly, where the statutory language does not totally preempt state law, federal law preempts state law if the state law actually conflicts with federal law. See Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469, 104 S.Ct. 2518, 2523, 81 L.Ed.2d 399 (1984); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490-92, 107 S.Ct. 805, 811, 93 L.Ed.2d 883 (1987).

Where preemption is claimed because of a state law conflict with Congressional action, federal law preempts the conflicting state law where compliance with both the state and federal regulations is a physical impossibility, see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217-18, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941); see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1310, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). Overriding any preemption analysis is the presumption that the federal law does not displace existing state law. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2129, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3rd Cir.1986) cert. den., 479 U.S. 1043, 107 S.Ct. 907, 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987); Baird v. General Motors, 654 F.Supp. 28, 29 (N.D.Ohio 1986).

GM does not suggest that Congressional regulation occupies the entire field of motor vehicle safety.⁶ It argues, as other auto manufacturers have elsewhere, that plaintiff's passive restraint claim is preempted both expressly and because the purported law on which the claim is based "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishments of Congress' full purposes."

A.

GM urges that 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) expressly preempts plaintiff's claims. That statute provides in part:

No State or political subdivision of a state shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to

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