Kollar v. United Transp. Union, 95-50774

• Decision Date: 21 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-50774,95-50774
• Citation: 83 F.3d 124
• Parties: 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2313, 131 Lab.Cas. P 11,584 Edward A. KOLLAR; George Natividad, Jr.; Dan Smith; Nickie H. Keene; Robert Berroteran; John Marcee, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION; Robert A. Cushing; E.L. Haynes, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 124

83 F.3d 124

152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2313, 131 Lab.Cas. P 11,584

Edward A. KOLLAR; George Natividad, Jr.; Dan Smith;

Nickie H. Keene; Robert Berroteran; John Marcee, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION; Robert A. Cushing; E.L.

Haynes, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-50774

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

May 21, 1996.

Raul S. Pastrana, El Paso, TX, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Kevin Charles Brodar, United Transportation Union, Cleveland, OH, Thomas A. Spieczny, El Paso, TX, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

The single issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs' common-law fraud claim against their union is preempted by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188. Because we conclude that the fraud claim is preempted, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Edward Kollar and his fellow plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs") were employed by Southern Pacific Railroad and were members of the United Transportation Union ("the Union"). The Union is a party to separate collective bargaining agreements ("CBA") with both Southern Pacific and National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") covering terms and conditions of employment, including seniority. In 1986, Amtrak entered into an agreement with the Union that permitted Southern Pacific employees to transfer to Amtrak. In March 1988, the seniority provisions of this agreement were modified by a letter agreement between the Union and Amtrak.

In June 1988, the Plaintiffs (then employees of Southern Pacific) attended an informational meeting concerning transferring to Amtrak. Plaintiffs contend that at this meeting representatives of the Union made representations to them concerning seniority for conductor positions with Amtrak. Plaintiffs applied for and received positions with Amtrak in November 1988. On December 5, 1988, a seniority roster was posted listings Plaintiffs' positions.

In July 1989, Plaintiffs discovered that they had actually received seniority designations lower than had been posted on the December roster. Amtrak informed Plaintiffs that the seniority designation was made pursuant to the letter agreement between the Union and Amtrak. Plaintiffs then approached the Union to resolve the dispute. In August 1991, Plaintiffs wrote to the Union's general counsel who informed them that only the General Chairperson could construe the agreement and that the Union would not waive any limitations defense to their complaint. On October 3, 1991, the General Chairperson replied that Amtrak's interpretation of the agreement was correct.

On July 12, 1993, Plaintiffs sued the Union and its representatives in Texas state court alleging only a fraud claim. The Union removed the case to federal district court based upon a federal question under the RLA. Subsequently, the Union moved for summary judgment on limitations grounds. Plaintiffs moved to remand the case arguing that their state law fraud claim was not preempted by the RLA. Following a hearing on both motions, the district court granted the Union summary judgment on limitations and therefore found the remand motion moot. ¹ Plaintiffs appeal contending their fraud claim is not preempted and, therefore, the district court erred in failing to remand.

DISCUSSION

The denial of a motion to remand an action removed from state to federal court is a question of federal jurisdiction subject to de novo review. Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir.1995). Likewise, preemption is a question of law reviewed de novo. Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop., 34 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1994). Thus we apply de novo review to this appeal.

As we have recently noted, one of the goals of the RLA is to provide prompt and orderly settlement of disputes arising out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of a CBA covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 44 F.3d 278, 280-81 (5th Cir.1995). As a general rule, disputes arising out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of a CBA are preempted by the RLA's mandatory arbitration provisions. Id. at 280. The preemptive power of the RLA extends to Under Texas law a claim for fraud requires that: 1) a material representation was made; 2) the representation was false; 3) the speaker knew the representation was false or made it recklessly; 4) the speaker made the representation with the intent that it should be acted upon by the party; 5) the party acted in reliance upon the representation; and 6) the party suffered injury. Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 723 (Tex.1990). The gravamen of Plaintiffs' fraud claim is that the Union made false and misleading statements concerning Plaintiffs' seniority rights to induce them to transfer from Southern Pacific to Amtrak. Plaintiffs contend that under Hirras, their fraud claim is not preempted because "the CBA contains no provision related to the issue at hand-fraud." Plaintiffs' reliance on Hirras, however, is...