Koloedey v. MUTUAL BENEFICIAL ASS'N, ETC.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 80-90.
• Citation: 526 F. Supp. 1158
• Parties: Nora G. KOLOEDEY, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. MUTUAL BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION OF RAIL TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES, INC., Defendant/Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

526 F. Supp. 1158

Nora G. KOLOEDEY, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. MUTUAL BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION OF RAIL TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES, INC., Defendant/Respondent.

Civ. A. No. 80-90.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

November 24, 1981.

Bettina C. Ferguson, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff/petitioner, Nora G. Koloedey.

Thomas Stephen Neuberger, Wilmington, Del., and Sandra A. Girifalco, of Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant/respondent, Mutual Beneficial Ass'n of Rail Transportation Employees, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LATCHUM, Chief Judge.

Nora G. Koloedey has petitioned this Court for review of a decision of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (the "Board") dismissing petitioner's grievance against respondent, the Mutual Beneficial Association of Rail Transportation Employees, Inc. ("MBA"), on the ground that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the underlying controversy. Under 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i), the Board is empowered to resolve disputes between "carriers" and their "employees" as those terms are defined in the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151. The petitioner argues that the Board erroneously concluded that the MBA was not a "carrier" within the meaning of the Act and that Ms. Koloedey, correspondingly, was not an "employee" of a carrier, and urges the Court to set aside these findings and remand the case to the Board for a determination on the merits. Because there are no material facts in dispute, the parties have now filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Court concludes, for the reasons discussed below, that the decision of the Board is final and binding upon the parties and that the Court is not at liberty to disturb that judgment.

The Railway Labor Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the National Railroad Adjustment Board to decide so-called "minor disputes" between employees and carriers arising out of grievances or the interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements.^* 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i); Brotherhood of Maintenance, etc. v. St. Johnsbury, etc., 512 F.Supp. 1079, 1083 (D.Vt.1981). By statute, all findings and orders of the Board are final and binding on the parties, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m), and a district court may set aside an award only on three narrow grounds: (1) failure of the Board to comply with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act; (2) failure of the Board's order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the Board's jurisdiction; or (3) fraud or corruption by a member of the Board making the order. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q). In addition, some courts have crafted a fourth alternative ground for review of a Board decision: (4) lack of due process in the Board proceedings. See O'Neill v. Public Law Board No. 550, 581 F.2d 692, 694 (C.A. 7, 1978); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Delaware and Hudson Railway Co., 499 F.Supp. 967, 971 (E.D.Pa.1980). The scope of judicial review of Board decisions has been characterized by many courts as "among the narrowest known to the law." United Steelworkers of America v. Union R. Co., 648 F.2d 905, 910 (C.A. 3, 1981); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 626 F.2d 715, 717 (C.A. 9, 1980); Diamond v. Terminal Railway Alabama State Docks, 421 F.2d 228, 233 (C.A. 5, 1970).

Petitioner essentially contends that the Board erred in determining that the MBA was not a "carrier" and that the Court should reexamine this question for itself. The Court has no authority, however, to relitigate issues presented to and resolved by the Board, see Merchants Despatch, etc. v. System Fed., etc., 447 F.Supp. 799, 802 (N.D.Ill.1978), and petitioner has failed to show that any of the limited exceptions permitting judicial review are available here. Goclowski v. Penn Central Trans. Co., 516 F.Supp. 1276, 1279 (W.D.Pa. 1981); Young v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 420 F.Supp. 386, 389 (N.D.Cal.1976).

This conclusion is compelled by Union Pacific R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 99 S.Ct. 399, 58 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978), a closely analogous case in which the Supreme Court rejected a similar attempt to obtain judicial reexamination of a jurisdictional issue decided by the Board. In that case, a railroad employee filed an action in state court against his employer alleging wrongful discharge and denial of a fair hearing. While this suit was pending, the Supreme Court ruled in another case that a railroad employee claiming a violation of a collective bargaining agreement must submit his dispute to the National Railroad Adjustment Board under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. The employee thereafter abandoned his state court suit and instituted proceedings before the Board, but the Board dismissed the claim because the complainant had failed to pursue his administrative remedies within the time limits prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 89, 99 S.Ct. at 399.

The employee then brought suit in federal court under 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q), arguing that the time limitations of the collective bargaining agreement were tolled during the pendency of his state court action and that the Board should be directed to hear and decide his claim on the merits. The district court found that there was no statutory basis on which to grant the relief sought and awarded summary judgment to the employer. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held, however, that the Board's failure to address the merits of the employee's claim deprived him of an opportunity to be heard, in violation of the due process clause, and remanded the case to the Board. In its ruling, the court took note of the statutory constraints placed on judicial review of Board actions, but found that "purely legal issues," which did not require the particular expertise of the Board, could appropriately be reexamined by a reviewing court. Id. at 90-91, 99 S.Ct. at 400.

In a per curiam opinion sharply critical of the Tenth Circuit's action, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court observed:

If the Court of Appeals' remand was based on its view that the Adjustment Board had failed to consider respondent's equitable tolling argument, the court was simply mistaken. The record shows that respondent tendered the tolling claim to the Adjustment Board, which considered it and explicitly rejected it. If, on the other hand, the Court of Appeals intended to reverse the Adjustment Board's rejection of respondent's equitable tolling argument, the court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction to review decisions of the Adjustment Board.

Judicial review of Adjustment Board orders is limited to three specific grounds: (1) failure of the Adjustment Board to comply with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act; (2) failure of the Adjustment Board to conform, or confine, itself to matters within the scope of its jurisdiction; and (3) fraud or corruption. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q). Only upon one or more of these bases may a court set aside an order of the Adjustment Board.... There is no suggestion of fraud or corruption here. And the Adjustment Board certainly was acting within its jurisdiction and in conformity with the requirements of the Act by determining the question of whether the time limitation of the governing collective-bargaining agreement was tolled by the filing of respondent's state-court action. Respondent does not contend otherwise. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that respondent simply failed to demonstrate the existence of any of the grounds for review set forth in § 153 First (q).

Characterizing the issue presented as one of law, as the Court of Appeals seemed to do here, does not alter the availability or scope of judicial review: The dispositive question is whether the party's objections to the Adjustment Board's decision fall within any of the three limited categories of review provided for in the Railway Labor Act. Section 153 First (q) unequivocally states that the "findings and order of the Adjustment Board shall be conclusive on the parties" and may be set aside only for the three reasons specified therein. We have time and again emphasized that this statutory language means just what it says.... The determination by the Adjustment Board that respondent had failed to file his appeal within the time limits prescribed by the governing collective-bargaining agreement is one which falls within the above-quoted language precluding judicial review.

Id. at 92-94, 99 S.Ct. at 401.

The Union Pacific case would appear to foreclose the relief requested by petitioner. As in that case, there has been no suggestion of fraud or corruption here. Similarly, the Board certainly was acting within its jurisdiction and in conformity with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act by determining the question of whether the MBA could qualify as a "carrier," as that term is defined in 45 U.S.C. § 151. Accordingly, petitioner has simply failed to demonstrate the existence of any of...