Kolstad v American Dental Ass'n

• Citation: 144 L.Ed.2d 494,527 U.S. 526,119 S.Ct. 2118
• Decision Date: 22 June 1999
• Docket Number: 98208
• Parties: 139 F.3d 958, vacated and remanded. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES208 CAROLE KOLSTAD, PETITIONER v. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

527 U.S. 526

119 S.Ct. 2118

144 L.Ed.2d 494

139 F.3d 958, vacated and remanded

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 98 208

CAROLE KOLSTAD, PETITIONER v AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[June 22, 1999]

Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), 105 Stat. 1071, punitive damages are available in claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Punitive damages are limited, however, to cases in which the employer has engaged in intentional discrimination and has done so "with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Rev. Stat. §1977, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). We here consider the circumstances under which punitive damages may be awarded in an action under Title VII.

I

A

In September 1992, Jack O'Donnell announced that he would be retiring as the Director of Legislation and Legislative Policy and Director of the Council on Government Affairs and Federal Dental Services for respondent, American Dental Association (respondent or Association). Petitioner, Carole Kolstad, was employed with O'Donnell in respondent's Washington, D. C., office, where she was serving as respondent's Director of Federal Agency Relations. When she learned of O'Donnell's retirement, she expressed an interest in filling his position. Also interested in replacing O'Donnell was Tom Spangler, another employee in respondent's Washington office. At this time, Spangler was serving as the Association's Legislative Counsel, a position that involved him in respondent's legislative lobbying efforts. Both petitioner and Spangler had worked directly with O'Donnell, and both had received "distinguished" performance ratings by the acting head of the Washington office, Leonard Wheat.

Both petitioner and Spangler formally applied for O'Donnell's position, and Wheat requested that Dr. William Allen, then serving as respondent's Executive Director in the Association's Chicago office, make the ultimate promotion decision. After interviewing both petitioner and Spangler, Wheat recommended that Allen select Spangler for O'Donnell's post. Allen notified petitioner in December 1992 that he had, in fact, selected Spangler to serve as O'Donnell's replacement. Petitioner's challenge to this employment decision forms the basis of the instant action.

B

After first exhausting her avenues for relief before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, petitioner filed suit against the Association in Federal District Court, alleging that respondent's decision to promote Spangler was an act of employment discrimination proscribed under Title VII. In petitioner's view, the entire selection process was a sham. Tr. 8 (Oct. 26, 1995) (closing argument for plaintiff's counsel). Counsel for petitioner urged the jury to conclude that Allen's stated reasons for selecting Spangler were pretext for gender discrimination, id., at 19, 24, and that Spangler had been chosen for the position before the formal selection process began, id., at 19. Among the evidence offered in support of this view, there was testimony to the effect that Allen modified the description of O'Donnell's post to track aspects of the job description used to hire Spangler. See id., at 132 136 (Oct. 19, 1995) (testimony of Cindy Simms); id., at 48 51 (Oct. 20, 1995) (testimony of Leonard Wheat). In petitioner's view, this "preselection" procedure suggested an intent by the Association to discriminate on the basis of sex. Id., at 24. Petitioner also introduced testimony at trial that Wheat told sexually offensive jokes and that he had referred to certain prominent professional women in derogatory terms. See id., at 120 124 (Oct. 18, 1995) (testimony of Carole Kolstad). Moreover, Wheat allegedly refused to meet with petitioner for several weeks regarding her interest in O'Donnell's position. See id., at 112 113. Petitioner testified, in fact, that she had historically experienced difficulty gaining access to meet with Wheat. See id., at 114 115. Allen, for his part, testified that he conducted informal meetings regarding O'Donnell's position with both petitioner and Spangler, see id., at 148 (Oct. 23, 1995), although petitioner stated that Allen did not discuss the position with her, see id., at 127 128 (Oct. 18, 1995).

The District Court denied petitioner's request for a jury instruction on punitive damages. The jury concluded that respondent had discriminated against petitioner on the basis of sex and awarded her backpay totaling $52,718. App. 109 110. Although the District Court subsequently denied respondent's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability, the court made clear that it had not been persuaded that respondent had selected Spangler over petitioner on the basis of sex, and the court denied petitioner's requests for reinstatement and for attorney's fees. 912 F. Supp. 13, 15 (DC 1996).

Petitioner appealed from the District Court's decisions denying her requested jury instruction on punitive damages and her request for reinstatement and attorney's fees. Respondent cross-appealed from the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. In a split decision, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court's decision denying petitioner's request for an instruction on punitive damages. 108 F.3d 1431, 1435 (1997). In so doing, the court rejected respondent's claim that punitive damages are available under Title VII only in " 'extraordinarily egregious cases.' " Id., at 1437. The panel reasoned that, "because 'the state of mind necessary to trigger liability for the wrong is at least as culpable as that required to make punitive damages applicable,' " id., at 1438 (quoting Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 (CA1 1987)), the fact that the jury could reasonably have found intentional discrimination meant that the jury should have been permitted to consider punitive damages. The court noted, however, that not all cases involving intentional discrimination would support a punitive damages award. 108 F.3d, at 1438. Such an award might be improper, the panel reasoned, in instances where the employer justifiably believes that intentional discrimination is permitted or where an employee engages in discrimination outside the scope of that employee's authority. Id., at 1438 1439. Here, the court concluded, respondent "neither attempted to justify the use of sex in its promotion decision nor disavowed the actions of its agents." Id., at 1439.

The Court of Appeals subsequently agreed to rehear the case en banc, limited to the punitive damages question. In a divided opinion, the court affirmed the decision of the District Court. 139 F.3d 958 (1998). The en banc majority concluded that, "before the question of punitive damages can go to the jury, the evidence of the defendant's culpability must exceed what is needed to show intentional discrimination." Id., at 961. Based on the 1991 Act's structure and legislative history, the court determined, specifically, that a defendant must be shown to have engaged in some "egregious" misconduct before the jury is permitted to consider a request for punitive damages. Id., at 965. Although the court declined to set out the "egregiousness" requirement in any detail, it concluded that petitioner failed to make the requisite showing in the instant case. Judge Randolph concurred, relying chiefly on §1981a's structure as evidence of a congressional intent to "limi[t] punitive damages to exceptional cases." Id., at 970. Judge Tatel wrote in dissent for five judges, who agreed generally with the panel majority.

We granted certiorari, 525 U.S. ___ (1998), to resolve a conflict among the Federal Courts of Appeals concerning the circumstances under which a jury may consider a request for punitive damages under §1981a(b)(1). Compare 139 F.3d 958 (CADC 1998) (case below), with Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219 220 (CA2 1997) (rejecting contention that punitive damages require showing of "extraordinarily egregious" conduct).

II

A

Prior to 1991, only equitable relief, primarily backpay, was available to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs; the statute provided no authority for an award of punitive or compensatory damages. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 252 253 (1994). With the passage of the 1991 Act, Congress provided for additional remedies, including punitive damages, for certain classes of Title VII and ADA violations.

The 1991 Act limits compensatory and punitive damages awards, however, to cases of "intentional discrimination" that is, cases that do not rely on the "disparate impact" theory of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). Section 1981a(b)(1) further qualifies the availability of punitive awards:

"A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." (Emphasis added.)

The very structure of §1981a suggests a congressional intent to authorize punitive awards in only a subset of cases involving intentional discrimination. Section 1981a(a)(1) limits compensatory and punitive awards to instances of intentional discrimination, while §1981a(b)(1) requires plaintiffs to make an additional "demonstrat[ion]" of their eligibility for punitive damages. Congress plainly sought to impose two standards of...