Kolz v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 01 June 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-1894,77-1894
• Citation: 576 F.2d 747
• Parties: 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8636 Marlene KOLZ et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 747

576 F.2d 747

17 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8636

Marlene KOLZ et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO et al Defendants-Appellees.

No. 77-1894.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 19, 1978.

Decided June 1, 1978.

Solomon Gutstein, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Richard E. Girard, Board of Ed., City of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., Craig M. Crenshaw, Jr., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.

Before SWYGERT, Circuit Judge, MOORE, Senior Circuit Judge, ¹ and BAUER, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The sole issue is whether the district court erred in denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs are a group of Chicago public school teachers who have been transferred from one public school to another pursuant to a faculty and staff integration plan adopted by the Board of Education of the City of Chicago.

On July 9, 1969, the Department of Justice informed the Board that the faculty and staff of the Chicago public schools must be integrated. Under a plan adopted by the Board on May 25, 1977, over 2,000 teachers were notified on June 16, 1977 that they were being transferred and reassigned to different schools within the system beginning September 1977. Teachers who wished to appeal their transfers could do so either to a Hardship Committee or to an Error and Program Needs Committee. Nearly one-half of the appeals filed were granted.

One month after the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, they filed a motion for injunctive relief. That same day the district court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order, finding no constitutional right was involved and that the Board had statutory authority to transfer the teachers. Two weeks later the court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, noting that the plaintiffs had failed to establish deprivation of significant constitutional rights, that is, that there is no constitutional right to a teaching position in a particular location. The plaintiffs appeal from that denial of injunctive relief.

The decision to grant or deny interlocutory injunctive relief is one of judicial discretion. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). Therefore, the only issue before this court is whether the district court abused its discretion. For preliminary injunctive relief, the movant must establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, irreparable injury, the lack of serious adverse effects on others, and sufficient public interest. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1069 (7th Cir. 1976), modified on other grounds,548 F.2d 715 (1977) (en banc ). Although no one of these factors is determinative, if a court finds that under applicable law there is no probability of success on the merits and no irreparable injury, it is unnecessary for the court to consider the other factors.

Without deciding the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the district judge concluded that a preliminary injunction should not be...