Komjathy v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 86-1444

• Decision Date: 13 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1444,86-1444
• Citation: 832 F.2d 1294
• Parties: David S. KOMJATHY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1294

832 F.2d 1294

266 U.S.App.D.C. 56

David S. KOMJATHY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, et al., Respondents.

No. 86-1444.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Nov. 13, 1987.

Lawrence B. Smith, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for petitioner.

Peter J. Lynch and Vicki S. Leemon, F.A.A., Washington, D.C., were on the brief for respondents.

Before WALD, Chief Judge and ROBINSON and D.H. GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

By order dated April 4, 1984, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") suspended appellant David S. Komjathy's airman certificate, which had a private pilot rating, for 180 days, based upon alleged violations of several provisions of the Federal Aviation Regulations ("FARs"). Pursuant to 49 App. U.S.C. Sec. 1429(a) (1982), Komjathy appealed the order to the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB" or "Board"), appellee here. An administrative law judge ("ALJ") of the NTSB affirmed the order of suspension; when Komjathy appealed to the full Board, the latter affirmed the order of suspension and the decision of the ALJ. Komjathy filed a timely petition for review in this court.

In his petition for review, Komjathy emphasizes that he is raising "strictly legal issues" and that "the facts have no direct relevance [to those issues]." Petitioner's Brief at 5. Consequently, the only issues before the court are the legal challenges raised by Komjathy, notwithstanding the sparring between the parties as to the facts underlying the legal dispute. Having reviewed each of petitioner's legal challenges, we find them to be wholly without merit.

I.

We first address petitioner's standing to raise several of his challenges. Article III of the Constitution restricts this court's authority: we may consider cases only if the party invoking the court's authority shows that he or she has suffered injury, whether past or future, that the injury is traceable to the action of the defending party, and that a favorable ruling by the court is likely to remedy the harm. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).

While Komjathy has standing to challenge the FAA's authority to suspend airman's certificates, since that was the sanction imposed on him, he cannot here raise his claims against the agency's use of civil penalties as sanctions for violation of FARs, because he plainly cannot show that he has suffered injury, either actual or potential, from the agency's use of civil penalties. Similarly, he cannot, in the present suit, ask this court to review the propriety of the FAA's choosing between certificate suspension and a civil penalty as a sanction, because even a favorable ruling on that point--a holding that the FAA was barred from considering any alternative sanction to the certificate suspension imposed on Komjathy--plainly would not redress any injury to him. Consequently, we dismiss petitioner's challenges to the policies and regulations governing the use of civil penalties and the choice between that sanction and certificate suspension.

II.

As noted above, Komjathy has standing to challenge the FAA's suspension of airman certificates and we now turn to consider his claim in that regard. He charges that there is no statutory authority for the FAA's policy of suspending airman certificates as a sanction, and that the FAA failed to promulgate that policy through proper rulemaking procedures and to publish that policy either in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. Those alleged agency failures, according to Komjathy, constitute violations of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. Secs. 553, 558, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner's allegations lack merit and are easily refuted by examination of the statutory language and well-settled case law.

There is a clear statutory basis for the FAA's policy of suspending airman certificates as a sanction for violation of FARs. The Federal Aviation Act provides the Administrator of the FAA broad discretion to suspend airman certificates upon a determination that the safety and the public interest so require. 49 App. U.S.C. Sec. 1429(a). It is settled that that authority may be used for the purpose of suspending an airman certificate as a disciplinary sanction for violation of FARs. See, e.g., Go Leasing, Inc. v. NTSB, 800 F.2d 1514, 1519-21 (9th Cir.1986); Pangburn v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 311 F.2d 349, 354-56 (1st Cir.1962).

The legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act, reviewed in Pangburn, 311 F.2d at 355, provides clear evidence of congressional intent to allow the continued practice of imposing certificate suspension as a disciplinary measure for deterrent purposes. As the Supreme Court has written with regard to a similar statutory scheme, Congress plainly intended in its broad grant to give the head of the agency, authority to employ the statutory sanction as in the agency chief's judgment best serves to deter violations. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 187-88, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 1458-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 142 (1973) (Packers and Stockyards Act). See also Barnum v. NTSB, 595 F.2d 869, 871-72 (D.C.Cir.1979) (FAA Administrator has great discretion in carrying out the statutory provisions).

Petitioner's challenge to the regulation implementing Sec. 1429(a), 14 C.F.R. Sec. 13.19, has no more merit than his statutory claim. That regulation, insofar as it relates to the challenged policy of suspension of airman certificates for the protection of the public interest and the safety of air commerce, does no more than repeat, virtually verbatim, the statutory grant of authority in 49 App. U.S.C. Sec. 1429(a) for the ordering of such suspensions.

The fact that the regulation merely reiterates the statutory language precludes any serious argument that the regulation affects the agency or holders of airman certificates in such a way as to require notice-and-comment procedures pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553. The regulation does not restrict the agency's statutory discretion in any way. Cf. Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. Federal Communications Commission, 800 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C.Cir.1986) (notice-and-comment procedures required where agency statement, however labelled, has the effect of a binding norm). Nor could the reprinting of the statutory language in a regulation have affected Komjathy's rights and interests. Cf. National Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v. Schweiker, 690 F.2d 932, 950 (D.C.Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205, 103 S.Ct. 1193, 75 L.Ed.2d 438 (1983)...