Komosa v. Monsanto Chemical Co.
Decision Date | 10 November 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 46658,46658 |
Citation | 317 S.W.2d 396 |
Parties | John J. KOMOSA, Employee, Respondent, v. MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY, Employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Insurer, Appellants. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Evans & Dixon, John R. Dixon, St. Louis, Gerald A. Rimmel, St. Louis, for appellants.
Paul H. Koenig, St. Louis, and William B. Quinn, St. Louis, for respondent.
This is an appeal by the employer, Monsanto Chemical Company, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, from a judgment of the Circuit Court overruling a motion to quash an execution issued to enforce collection of an award for permanent partial disability in a workmen's compensation case. The appeal was transferred from the St. Louis Court of Appeals after the rendition of the opinion reported in Mo.App., 305 S.W.2d 506. The questions presented relate to the allowance of interest on the award. The essential facts are not in dispute.
On July 17, 1950, the employee received an accidental injury to his back arising out of and in the course of his employment. He continued to work and lost no wages, but was furnished with medical service by the employer. On April 21, 1953, the employee filed a claim for compensation alleging there had been no temporary disability to date and the exact nature of any permanent injury was undetermined and claiming compensation 'As per Act.' The answer of the employer and insurer stated the nature and extent of the injury was to be determined.
The trial of the claim began on February 4, 1954, before a referee of the Division of Workmen's Compensation. On February 17, 1954, an award was rendered in favor of the employee for compensation as follows: 'For Permanent Partial Disability the sum of $25.00 per week for 85 1/3 weeks. * * * said payments to begin as of July 18, 1950, and to be payable and to be subject to modification and review as provided in said Law.' In his findings of fact, the referee stated the 'amount of compensation payable' to be $2,133.33.
The employee filed an application for review with the Industrial Commission of Missouri claiming the award to be inadequate. The employer and insurer filed an answer to the application requesting the Commission to reduce the award. On April 15, 1954, the Industrial Commission affirmed the award and on employee's application struck from the record the answer of the employer and insurer as not being timely filed. The employee then appealed to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, which Court on June 13, 1955, entered its judgment approving and confirming the findings of the Industrial Commission. In due time the employee appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which rendered its opinion on February 21, 1956, affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court. See Komosa v. Monsanto Chemical Company, Mo.App., 287 S.W.2d 374.
On April 5, 1956, the employee's attorney filed with the clerk of the Circuit Court his affidavit setting out the amount claimed to be due on the award with interest and requested that execution be issued. The affidavit stated that: 'On the initial period of 85-1/3 weeks from 7-17-50 to 3-7-52 there is due interest in the amount of $106.59 for the weekly amounts due for the varying periods of from 1 to 85 weeks.' Interest on the aggregate sum of $2,133.33 was claimed after March 7, 1952, the date when the last weekly installment matured according to the terms of the award. The total amount claimed with interest as of April 4, 1956, was $2,761.76.
The employer and insurer filed their joint motion to quash the writ of execution and garnishment issued in aid thereof, alleging in substance that no interest was due either before of after the award was made and that the judgment had been paid. The motion to quash was overruled on July 23, 1956, and in due course the employer and insurer took this appeal. Further evidence will be stated in the course of the opinion, and reference is made to the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals for a more detailed statement. Mo.App., 305 S.W.2d 506.
The employee contends that he is entitled to interest at six per cent on each installment of compensation from the respective maturity dates as designated by the award until paid, relying on these provisions of section 287.160 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.
The interest claimed falls generally into three categories. First, the period between the maturity date of the first installment and the date of the award. Second, the time during which the employee's appeals were pending; and, third, the time subsequent to the affirmance of the award by the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
The second period mentioned is most readily disposed of. Counsel for the employee quite properly conceded in oral argument that the employee was not entitled to interest on the award during the time his appeals to the Industrial Commission, the Circuit Court, and the St. Louis Court of Appeals were pending. The law is well settled that where a judgment creditor appeals on the grounds of inadequacy from a recovery in his favor, and the judgment is affirmed, he is not entitled to interest pending the appeal. State ex rel. Southern Real Estate & Financial Co. v. City of St. Louis, 234 Mo.App. 209, 115 S.W.2d 513, 515; In re Thomasson's Estate, Mo., 192 S.W.2d 867, 869; 47 C.J.S. Interest Sec. 59, p. 69.
This construction applies equally to the general and special interest statutes and is justified in these circumstances because the judgment creditor by his own act delays and prolongs the proceedings and renders satisfaction of the judgment impossible. State ex rel. Southern Real Estate & Financial Co., supra.
We have further concluded that the trial court erred in failing to quash the execution to the extent that it included interest prior to the rendition of the award on February 17, 1954.
The award provided that the weekly payments should begin 'as of July 18, 1950,' which was the day after the employee was injured, and should continue for 85 1/3 weeks. The award purported to do two things. It determined the total amount of compensation for permanent partial disability to which the employee was entitled in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 287.190. The number of weeks of benefits allowed was the yardstick by which the total amount of permanent partial compensation was measured. It also designated the time 'as of' which the installments of compensation were 'to begin * * * and be payable.'
Ordering the compensation payable retroactively had the effect of maturing all the installments so they would not be subject to modification (Sec. 287.470), and the employee would receive the compensation allowed in a lump sum without commutation (Sec. 287.530). The employee also contends that the order fixing the date 'as of,' which the various installments accrued, had the effect of fixing the time 'when due' within the meaning of Sec. 287.160 so as to start the running of interest.
Clearly the provisions of Sec. 287.160 set out above require the payment of interest on installments of compensation from the time they become due. But the precise question with which we are concerned is whether the Act fixes the time when compensation for this sort of permanent partial disability becomes due within the meaning of Sec. 287.160. The provision that 'compensation shall be payable as wages were paid prior to the injury' does not do so, because the time during which the compensation was ordered to be payable does not, and could not, coincide with the duration of the disability as in the case of temporary disability. The disability was permanent, but the compensation ran for only 85 1/3 weeks. In this case the payment dates were fixed by the referee in making the award and not as the necessary result of inflexible provisions of the Act.
The appellants contend there is no statutory authority for the Industrial Commission to make payments of permanent partial disability due retroactively and cite Soars v. Soars-Lovelace, Inc., 346 Mo. 710, loc. cit. 719, 142 S.W.2d 866, 871, which holds that the Industrial Commission has only the authority conferred on it by statute. However, that question is not before us other than as it relates to liability for interest under the facts of this case, and our decision is strictly limited to the question presented.
The words 'when due,' as used in Sec. 287.160, are similar in principle to 'on all money due upon any judgment or order of any court from the day of rendering the same,' as used in the general statute, Sec. 408.040. Yet, we have seen that interest is not invariably paid from the date of judgment, as witness the situation just discussed where the judgment creditor by his appeal prevents satisfaction of the judgment. See also the words 'due and payable' in Sec. 408.020 relating generally to money owed on contracts and accounts. In has been said the 'word 'due' in the statute means the 'time for payment." Kennard v. Wiggins, 353 Mo. 681, 183 S.W.2d 870, 872. See also Boyle v. Crimm, 363 Mo. 731, 253 S.W.2d 149, 157, and Swanson v. Spencer, 177 Mo.App. 124, 163 S.W. 285, 286. The underlying purpose of these statutes are the same; that is, to furnish an incentive for prompt payment of monetary obligations and to compensate the creditor for the debtor's failure to do so.
15 Am.Jur. 579, Damages Sec. 161, states: ...
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