Konfrst v. Stehlik

Decision Date20 June 2014
Docket NumberNo. 1–13–2113.,1–13–2113.
Citation13 N.E.3d 278
PartiesFrank H. KONFRST, Independent Executor of the Estate of Beverly J. Czerwinski, Deceased, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Cynthia STEHLIK, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

John R. Krafcisin, of Chicago, for appellant.

Zapolis & Associates, P.C. (Robert J. Zapolis, of counsel), for appellee.

OPINION

Justice PALMER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This case involves a citation proceeding brought by plaintiff Frank Konfrst, independent executor of the estate of Beverly J. Czerwinski (the decedent), against defendant Cynthia Stehlik, the decedent's niece, to recover the proceeds from a checking account and a money market account. Defendant withdrew the funds from both accounts after the decedent's death and plaintiff brought this action to recover those funds on the ground that they belonged to the decedent's estate. Defendant responded that the funds belonged to her because the decedent and defendant held the accounts in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that the accounts failed to comply with the requirements of the Illinois Joint Tenancy Act (the Act) (765 ILCS 1005/2 (West 2010) ) and that the decedent did not intend to make a gift of a joint tenancy interest in either account but, instead, placed the defendant's name on the accounts for convenience only so that defendant could assist the decedent in paying her expenses. A bench trial was held on the issues.

¶ 2 The following facts are not in dispute. On July 27, 2002, the decedent's husband passed away. The decedent passed away on February 7, 2010. The decedent was survived by one brother, Frank Konfrst, her brother's daughter, Ti Brook Barnes, and one sister in California. The decedent was married only once and had no children. Defendant is the niece of the decedent's late husband and had been living next door to the decedent at all relevant times. From at least 2003 through the date of her death, decedent had a checking account and a money market account at Charter One Bank. It is undisputed that decedent was of sound mind and good health when she created these accounts sometime in 2003. From at least 2003 through the date of her death, all of the decedent's daily living expenses were paid through the accounts. From 2003 through the date of the decedent's death, the balance of the accounts was never less than $80,000. From the time defendant's name was added to the accounts to the time of the decedent's death, defendant never contributed money to either account. From the time the decedent's name was placed on the accounts to the time the decedent was terminally ill in a hospital or hospice, defendant never used the money in the accounts for herself and only made transactions on the accounts as specified by, and on behalf of, decedent. During this same period, all mail for regarding the accounts was sent to the decedent's home. Near the end of the decedent's life, defendant changed the address for the bank statements from the decedent's residence, at one side of a duplex, to her own residence on the other side of the duplex so that confidential information would not be seen by others while the decedent was receiving in-home care. From the time defendant's name was placed on the accounts to the time of the decedent's death, defendant never claimed as income any of the interest from the accounts on her federal or state taxes but, instead, all such interest income was claimed on the decedent's federal and state taxes. From 2003 to the date of the decedent's death, defendant was a tenant of the decedent and had been paying rent. On April 8, 2009, decedent was fully mentally competent and aware that the accounts at Charter One Bank contained funds in excess of $225,000. On the day after the decedent's death, defendant withdrew $255,235.57, the then balance of the money market account. Approximately one week later, defendant withdrew $8,836.36, the then balance on the checking account.

¶ 3 At trial, Barnes testified that within two months of the death of the decedent's husband, the decedent asked Barnes if she would be willing to be named on a Charter One Bank account with the decedent to pay bills “in an emergency.” Barnes declined for reasons such as the absence of Charter One Bank branches in Arizona where she lived.

¶ 4 Defendant testified at trial that she lived next door to the decedent, in one-half of the decedent's duplex in Illinois, throughout her life. Defendant and her mother drove the decedent shopping, to doctor's appointments, and anywhere she needed to go, as the decedent did not drive. In late 2002, at the request of the decedent, defendant drove the decedent to Charter One Bank near their homes in Cicero, Illinois. Decedent opened a joint checking account and a joint money market account with defendant. Defendant testified that she and the decedent signed the necessary papers to open a joint money market account and a joint checking account. Defendant testified that she made approximately 10 or 15 transactions on the checking account to pay the decedent's expenses. When defendant was shown an example signature card form at trial which contained the joint tenancy with right of survivorship language on it for the money market account, she testified that she signed something similar as part of the account paperwork. Defendant's counsel also submitted into evidence a deposit account application form with both parties' signatures, both parties' contact information, and the money market account number, but the form was not dated.

¶ 5 Under cross-examination, defendant testified that the decedent also opened a third account between herself and Frank Konfrst the same day the checking and money market accounts were created. Defendant testified that while she and the decedent were at the bank that day, the decedent told her that this third account was “theirs,” referring to the decedent's brother and sister. The decedent also told defendant that the joint money market account and checking account were defendant's when the decedent “croaked.” Defendant testified that she felt the account was owned jointly, but that the money was her aunt's so long as her aunt was alive.

¶ 6 Henry Moheka, a representative from Charter One Bank, was called to testify by defendant. Moheka testified that a signature card would need to be signed by both parties in order to open a joint money market account, as was opened here. He could not speak to the signing of this form for this particular account opened in 2003, as he joined the bank some years after the money market account was created. Running a search through the Charter One Bank records, he could not find records or signature cards for any accounts opened by the decedent. Under questioning by the trial court, Moheka testified that he conducted a search that would have directed him to the signature cards for any accounts that were currently closed and that he could not locate any records. Moheka agreed with the trial court's statement that “somewhere there should have been some records” “at some time” but that Moheka could not locate those records. It is undisputed that Charter One Bank does not maintain records older six years old in its files and that therefore any original signature cards signed by parties creating joint tenancies more than six years ago have been destroyed.

¶ 7 Plaintiff introduced into evidence a handwritten note from the decedent that stated “I leave $50,000 to my niece Cynthia Stehlik 3833 South 58th Court Cicero, IL 60805” that was allegedly signed by the decedent and dated April 8, 2009. Defendant authenticated the note as being signed by and in the decedent's handwriting.

¶ 8 The trial court held that defendant had proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the money market account and the checking account complied with the Joint Tenancy Act. Regarding whether the accounts were created for “convenience” and thus not true joint tenancies with right of survivorship, the trial court held that plaintiff failed to prove a lack of donative intent on the decedent's part in regard to the money market account. Thus, the money market account was held to be a true joint tenancy with right of survivorship and defendant was entitled to the funds from that account. The court also held that plaintiff had proved the decedent intended the checking account to be a convenience account and that the funds from that account belonged to the estate. Plaintiff now appeals.

¶ 9 The only issue on appeal is the trial court's ruling regarding the money market account. The court's ruling regarding the checking account is not in dispute.

¶ 10 Plaintiff contends that the trial court's ruling as to the money market account is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Plaintiff first argues that defendant failed to prove that the money market account complied with the Act. Second, plaintiff argues that even if the account complied with the Act, the account was actually a “convenience account” such that defendant is not entitled to the funds. Defendant counters that the trial court's ruling should be upheld because the money market account complied with the Act and because plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of donative intent on the part of the decedent.

¶ 11 A trial court's finding that certain property belongs to a particular party will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Estate of Weisberg, 62 Ill.App.3d 578, 588, 19 Ill.Dec. 277, 378 N.E.2d 1152 (1978). A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545 ¶ 28, 352 Ill.Dec. 802, 954 N.E.2d 885. A finding may also be considered as against the manifest weight of the evidence if the...

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