Konopasek v. State
| Decision Date | 05 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 25S03–1012–CR–669.,25S03–1012–CR–669. |
| Parties | Joshua KONOPASEK, Appellant (Defendant below),v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
946 N.E.2d 23
Joshua KONOPASEK, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 25S03–1012–CR–669.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 5, 2011.
[946 N.E.2d 24]
T. Andrew Perkins, Rochester, IN, Attorney for Appellant.Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Wade James Hornbacher, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
At a bench trial, the defendant made a relevance objection when the State elicited testimony on the length of the defendant's suspended sentence for a prior crime. We hold, under the facts of this case, that the length of the defendant's suspended sentence was both relevant and admissible. We also reaffirm the limitation on the judicial-temperance presumption, as stated in Fletcher v. State, 264 Ind. 132, 340 N.E.2d 771 (1976).
[946 N.E.2d 25]
Facts and Procedural History
In June 2008, a group of people, including Joshua Konopasek and Mitchell Green, gathered for a party at a house in Rochester, Indiana. At some point, Green wore Konopasek's sunglasses and continued to wear them on his head throughout the night. Several hours later, Green prepared to leave while still in possession of the sunglasses. As Green walked through the door, Konopasek shoved him from behind. Green fell to the ground outside, and Konopasek stood over Green and said, “You wanna take my sh**?” He then stomped on Green's head, which broke Green's jaw and rendered Green unconscious.
The State charged Konopasek with battery causing serious bodily injury. At the bench trial, the State presented witnesses implicating Konopasek. Konopasek took the stand in his own defense and recounted the incident differently. He claimed that after he confronted Green about the sunglasses, Green pushed him first. Konopasek also contended that although he shoved Green, he was not responsible for Green's injuries. The facts of the case were highly controverted.
On direct examination, Konopasek's attorney elicited testimony from Konopasek regarding his probationary status. On cross-examination, the State further inquired into Konopasek's probation, and defense counsel objected that the inquiry was not relevant to the case. The trial court overruled the objection.
The trial court found Konopasek guilty as charged and subsequently sentenced him to eight years with six years suspended and credit for time served.
Konopasek appealed, arguing that (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of battery causing serious bodily injury; (2) there was insufficient evidence to disprove his self-defense claim; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion when admitting evidence elicited by the State regarding Konopasek's probation. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and found sufficient evidence to support the conviction and disprove the self-defense claim. Konopasek v. State, 934 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). The Court of Appeals then found that the trial court should not have admitted the evidence in question but concluded the error was harmless. Id. at 766. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Konopasek did not overcome the judicial-temperance presumption—the presumption that in a bench trial the judge will disregard inadmissible and irrelevant evidence. Id. at 767. Konopasek sought transfer.
We granted transfer (1) to address the admissibility of the evidence in question and (2) to reaffirm Fletcher v. State, 264 Ind. 132, 340 N.E.2d 771 (1976), as it relates to the judicial-temperance presumption. We summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on the remaining issues. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).
Konopasek argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence elicited by the State regarding his probation. The Court of Appeals decided the evidence was inadmissible but ultimately found harmless error. Konopasek, 934 N.E.2d at 766. For the reasons explained below, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence was relevant and admissible.
On direct examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from Konopasek about the days immediately following the incident:
Q: Were you, in fact, on probation at the time?
[946 N.E.2d 26]
A: Yes, sir, I was.
Q: And did you meet with your probation officer?
A: Yes, sir, I did.
Q: And did you tell him about Mitch Green pushing you at Ryan Eaton's house?
A: Absolutely.
Q: [D]id your probation officer do a drug screen on you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you pass it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: [L]ater that afternoon, did you go over to the police station and give a statement to the police?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So without the police contacting you, you went over to the police department and gave a statement in regards to this incident that we're here today for?
A: Yes, sir.
A: You didn't have to be summonsed or prompted or have the sheriff come talk to you; you went there?
Q: Yes, sir. My probation officer strongly suggested that I make my statement.
On cross-examination, the State further inquired into Konopasek's probation:
Q: [Y]ou testified you're on probation, right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Okay. And you testified that Todd Hudkins is your probation officer?
A: That's correct.
Q: Okay. And when you went to your probation meeting a day after you had continued it to the next day, he gave you a drug screen? Right?
A: That's correct.
Q: And he gave you a drug screen because you're on probation for a meth case out of Circuit Court?
A: That's correct.
Q: Okay. And you've got quite a bit of time hanging over your head?
Before the defendant answered, the following colloquy took place:
[Defense counsel]: Objection to that, Your Honor. It's not relevant to today's proceeding.
[State]: Judge, I think he's opened the door for that in the nature of the questions he's asked his client.
[Defense counsel]: I don't know that it depends—he's admitted he's on probation. I don't know that it depends on how much time he's got hanging over his head.
The Court: Yeah, I think the door has been opened to this line of questioning. I'll, I'll allow it. I'll overrule it. Go ahead.
A: I have five years left, sir.
Q: Okay. And I'm not gonna beat the issue to death, but you—there's been a petition filed based on this charge, right?
A: That's correct.
Q: I mean you're, you're pending a review of probation with those five years potentially being unsuspended as a result of this charge?
A: That's correct.
Before deciding whether the State's elicited testimony regarding Konopasek's probation is admissible, we address two threshold issues. First, we determine to what admission of evidence Konopasek directed his objection. Second, we determine
[946 N.E.2d 27]
what ground or grounds Konopasek advanced at trial for that objection.
“Failure to object to the admission of evidence at trial normally results in waiver and precludes appellate review unless its admission constitutes fundamental error.” 1 Cutter v. State, 725 N.E.2d 401, 406 (Ind.2000). Furthermore, an objection to one question does not serve as an objection to another distinct question. Craig v. Citizens Trust Co., 217 Ind. 434, 449–50, 26 N.E.2d 1006, 1012 (1940). Konopasek objected to the following question: “[Y]ou've got quite a bit of time hanging over your head?” Konopasek failed to object to any other question regarding his probation.2 Thus this Court will review the admission of Konopasek's testimony on the length of his suspended sentence but not the admission of other testimony related to his probation.
Furthermore, a defendant may not argue one ground for an objection to the admission of evidence at trial and then raise new grounds on appeal. Gill v. State, 730 N.E.2d 709, 711 (Ind.2000). This ensures that a trial judge is fully alerted to the legal issue being raised.3 See Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686, 692 (Ind.1997). At trial, Konopasek objected to the State's question on relevance grounds. On appeal, Konopasek raises additional arguments,4 which we consolidate and rephrase as follows: Konopasek's testimony on direct did not open the door to impermissible character evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), and the trial court abused its discretion when admitting Konopasek's testimony about the length of his suspended sentence. Because the 404(b) objection was not made part of the trial record, it is waived. Jackson v. State, 712 N.E.2d 986, 988 (Ind.1999). Consequently, this Court will consider only the relevancy of the testimony in question.
Indiana Evidence Rule 401 provides a liberal standard for relevancy, and we review a trial court's ruling on relevance for an abuse of discretion. Id. Relevant...
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