Koontz v. Association of Classified Employees, AFL-CI

• Decision Date: 08 November 1983
• Docket Number: No. 31,AFL-CI,L,31
• Parties: , 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3415, 14 Ed. Law Rep. 535 Harriett KOONTZ et al. v. ASSOCIATION OF CLASSIFIED EMPLOYEES, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,ocal # 2250, Inc.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 521

297 Md. 521

467 A.2d 753, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3415,

14 Ed. Law Rep. 535

Harriett KOONTZ et al. v. ASSOCIATION OF CLASSIFIED EMPLOYEES, American Federation of

State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO,

Local # 2250, Inc.

No. 31.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 8, 1983.

Robert J. Greenleaf, Chevy Chase, for appellants.

Barbara Kraft, Washington, D.C. (Kirschner, Weinberg, Dempsey, Walters & Willig, Washington, D.C. and Harriet Cooperman, Baltimore, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.

RODOWSKY, Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants are members of an employee organization which represents the noncertificated employees of the Board of Education of Prince George's County (the Board). On June 10, 1982 the employee organization held an assemblage of certain of its members for the purpose of voting for or against changes in the existing multi-year agreement between the employee organization and the Board. These changes were proposed because the county fiscal authorities had not appropriated sufficient monies fully to fund the existing agreement for the 1983 fiscal year. In the trial court the Appellants, contending that notice of the meeting was defective, unsuccessfully sought an affirmative injunction requiring a properly noticed meeting to be held. Because under Md.Code (1978 & 1982 Cum.Supp.), Subtitle 5, "Organizations of Noncertificated Employees," of Title 6, "Teachers and Other Personnel," of the Education Article, the contract changes became effective, whether or not they were ratified at a duly noticed meeting of the employee organization, we shall dismiss the appeal as moot.

In Prince George's County noncertificated employees of the Board, with exceptions not here relevant, are represented by an employee organization "on all matters that relate to salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions," as permitted by § 6-503(a) of the Education Article. ¹ That employee organization is the Appellee, Association of Classified Employees, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local # 2250, Inc. (Union). A negotiated contract between the Board and the Union, as permitted by § 6-510, was entered into for the period August 1, 1981 through June 30, 1984 (the Contract). Under the Contract covered employees were to receive a cost of living increase beginning July 1, 1982 and, effective January 1, 1983 were to receive an additional increase of $.18 per hour. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1982 and ending June 30, 1983 Prince George's County did not appropriate the full amount requested by the Board. ² The amount actually appropriated to the Board for fiscal 1983 would have been known by June 1, 1982. See Charter, Prince George's County, Maryland, Article VIII, § 814, Prince George's County, Md. Code Part I (1979, 1981 Supp.). As its response to the cuts made in its budget, the Board initially proposed reductions in force (RIFs) of employees represented by the Union which would have displaced approximately 255 individuals (105 demoted, 150 RIFed). The RIFs were scheduled to take effect on June 15, 1982, at the close of the school year. In order to avoid displacements, the Union requested negotiations with the Board. After a number of meetings, the negotiators reached agreement on Contract modifications on the evening of June 8, 1982. The proposed modifications eliminated the need for RIFs and demotions. In their place the wage increases scheduled for July 1982 and January 1983 were to be delayed until April 1983 and a mandatory three-day furlough without pay was to be instituted. If additional monies were later authorized, they were to be applied retroactively to the scheduled pay raises.

At a meeting of the executive board of the Union held on June 8, 1982 it was unanimously resolved to proceed to agreement with the Board on the above-described modifications and to report the modifications to the Union membership at a special meeting to be held June 10, 1982. In the past, when the Union membership voted on contract ratification, it was the practice to vote by mail. This ordinarily required 30 days from mailing to final tallying of the votes. The Union's executive board was of the view that it had a duty to inform the Union members of the proposed modifications and to afford them an opportunity to ratify, but it was also of the view that the membership vote should be taken before June 15. For these reasons mail balloting was not used and, instead, a general membership meeting was called. Notice of this meeting was given by written bulletins sent through the interoffice mail system to all of the 220 work stations staffed by Union employees. Through the cooperation of the Board, the meeting was also announced on June 9 and 10 over the public address systems at all locations. In addition, Union stewards at each work station were instructed by telephone to disseminate notice by word of mouth. Over 700 members attended the June 10 meeting. Four hundred and fifty voted in favor of the modifications and 144 voted against them. On June 14 the Board met and voted unanimously to ratify the modifications.

The Union is a Maryland nonstock corporation. Neither its charter nor its by-laws address the subject of notice for a regular or special meeting of members. ³ On June 18, 1982 the Appellants, Harriett Koontz (Koontz), Brenda Lowery and Mary Vane, brought this action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland. They alleged that notice as given by the Union for the June 10 membership meeting was governed exclusively by Md. Code (1975), § 2-504 of the Corporations and Associations Article (C & A), as made applicable to nonstock corporations by C & A § 5-201, and that these provisions had not been complied with. ⁴ Indeed, Koontz testified that she had no actual knowledge of the meeting until after it had been held. Appellants' prayers for specific relief asked the trial court to "determine that the Special Meeting, and the vote at that meeting ... are null and void" and that the trial court "order a new Special Meeting be held upon timely written notice to union members for the purpose of considering the proposal to modify the union's contract with the Board ...."

The Union filed an answer to the complaint and to a show cause order which was served with it. At an August 20, 1982 hearing in open court pursuant to the show cause order the Union filed written objections to the requested relief in a paper headed, "Motion to Dismiss ...." Exhibits were introduced and testimony taken. By an opinion and order of October 19, 1982 the trial court decreed "that the Motion to Dismiss filed by [the Union] be and the same is hereby granted, and judgment is hereby entered in favor of [the Union]." This disposition of the case was based on an application of the equitable doctrine of comparative hardship and consequently was directed primarily to the claim for injunctive relief.

Appellants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari on our own motion prior to consideration of the matter by the intermediate appellate court. Prior to argument in this Court, the Union moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. We deferred action on that motion until after argument on the merits. The motion to dismiss will be granted, but for a reason which varies somewhat from those advanced by the Union. ⁵

Because the shortage of funds to carry out the salary increases called for by the Contract resulted from the decision of the fiscal authorities of Prince George's County in appropriating for fiscal 1983 less than the Board's budget requests, the controlling law is § 6-511 which provides:

If the fiscal authority does not approve enough funds to implement the negotiated agreement, the public school employer shall renegotiate the funds allocated for these purposes by the fiscal authority with the employee organization before the public school employer makes a final determination in accordance with the timetable and procedure established by the State Board.

Under this section the Board makes the "final determination." We discussed this provision in Montgomery County Council of Supporting Services Employees, Inc. v. Board of Education, 277 Md. 343, 354 A.2d 781 (1976). That case arose under § 6-511's predecessor which contained no differences material to the issue at hand. See Md.Code (1957, 1975 Repl.Vol.), Art. 77, § 160A(j)(1). Like the case at bar, Montgomery Co. Council was precipitated by the failure of county fiscal authorities to appropriate the amount necessary fully to fund salary increases both for teachers and for supporting personnel as called for by existing collective bargaining agreements. The collective bargaining representative of the noncertificated employees challenged the method by which the Montgomery County Board of Education determined to apply the available funds. There we said that "the School Board has been given the statutory duty to make the final determination in these matters" and cited to the predecessor statute. Id. at 351, 354 A.2d at 785. Indeed, the Contract between the Board and the Union in this case recognizes in ARTICLE I that "nothing hereafter mentioned or agreed to shall be so construed as to substitute the legal obligations vested in the Board in accordance with law."

Under § 6-511, as applied to the facts of the instant case, it becomes altogether immaterial whether notice complying with the corporation laws was properly given for the June 10 general membership meeting of the Union, or whether a vote taken at that meeting was valid or void, or whether the Union membership ratified or did not ratify the modifications agreed to, or proposed to their respective principals by, the negotiators on June 8, 1982. The Board made the final determination under § 6-511 and effectively did so on June 14, 1982.

It is not necessary for us to determine in this...