Kopacz v. Day Kimball Hospital of Windham County, Inc.

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: DRANGINIS, J.
• Citation: Kopacz v. Day Kimball Hospital of Windham County, Inc., 64 Conn. App. 263, 779 A.2d 862 (Conn. App. 2001)
• Decision Date: 17 July 2001
• Docket Number: (AC 19279)
• Parties: AMY BETH KOPACZ v. DAY KIMBALL HOSPITAL OF WINDHAM COUNTY, INC.

64 Conn. App. 263

779 A.2d 862

AMY BETH KOPACZ v. DAY KIMBALL HOSPITAL OF WINDHAM COUNTY, INC.

(AC 19279)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 17, 2001.

Officially released July 17, 2001.

Lavery, C. J., and Dranginis and Dupont, Js. James E. Mattern, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas M. DeLillo, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Hugh F. Murray III, with whom, on the brief, was C. Elaine Blackwood, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

DRANGINIS, J.

The plaintiff, Amy Beth Kopacz, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Day Kimball Hospital of Windham County, Inc., doing business as Day Kimball Hospital (Day Kimball), in connection with the termination of her employment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly found that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are necessary for our resolution of the plaintiffs appeal. The plaintiff was employed by Day Kimball as a full-time, X ray technician-radiographer. In March, 1994, the plaintiff sustained back injuries that arose out of and in the course of her employment, thereby entitling her to workers' compensation benefits. See General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. As a result of her injuries, she was unable to return to work on a regular basis until November, 1994.¹ In March, 1995, the plaintiff reinjured her back, again entitling her to workers' compensation benefits. This time, she was given an alternative, part-time position in another department at Day Kimball. Day Kimball hired a per diem employee to fill the plaintiffs previous position.² From March, 1995, until March, 1996, the plaintiff did not perform any work in the radiology department. On or about March 20, 1996, the defendant terminated the plaintiffs employment, effective March 15, 1996, and hired the per diem employee on a full-time basis.

In May, 1996, the plaintiff underwent surgery for her injuries and was directed by her physicians to remain out of work. On November 1, 1996, her physician cleared her to return to work as an X ray technician-radiographer on a full-time basis. The plaintiff informed the defendant of her status; however, the defendant refused to reinstate her. Day Kimball eventually hired the plaintiff as a per diem radiographer in January, 1997, and she remains so employed.

The plaintiff filed this action on December 24, 1996, alleging (1) that the defendant's termination of her employment was wrongful and its refusal to reinstate her was discriminatory in violation of General Statutes § 31-290a, which prohibits private employers from using retaliatory measures against employees who file claims for workers' compensation benefits,³ (2) breach of an express or implied in fact contract, and (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The defendant claimed that its reasons for the plaintiffs termination were nondiscriminatory: A full year had passed since the plaintiff was able to perform the functions of her regular position; the plaintiff could provide no indication that she would be able to return to work in the near future; the per diem employee who had been performing in the plaintiffs former position indicated that she might leave if the defendant could not offer her a full-time position; and budgetary practices prevented the defendant from hiring an additional full-time employee.

On October 24, 1997, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 8, 1999, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition. The defendant filed its response on January 11, 1999. After hearing oral argument on the motion, the court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on January 15, 1999.

"Our review of a trial court's rendering of summary judgment takes place within certain defined parameters. This court has held that [o]n appeal ... the burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate that the trial court's decision to grant the movant's summary judgment motion was clearly erroneous.... It is appropriate to render summary judgment only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment should be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... In passing on the defendant's motion for summary judgment the trial court was limited to deciding whether an issue of fact existed, but it could not try that issue if it did exist....

"In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... Simply, the granting of summary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Raboin v. North American Industries, Inc., 57 Conn. App. 535, 537-38, 749 A.2d 89, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 910, 759 A.2d 505 (2000).

"Because the trial court rendered judgment for the [defendant] as a matter of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether [the trial court's] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.... On appeal, however, the burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate that the trial court's decision to grant the movant's summary judgment motion was clearly erroneous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kroll v. Steere, 60 Conn. App. 376, 380-81, 759 A.2d 541, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 909, 763 A.2d 1035 (2000).

"The burden of proof in actions involving § 31-290a is stated in Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 53, 578 A.2d 1054 (1990), and Chiaia v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 24 Conn. App. 362, 366, 588 A.2d 652, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 907, 593 A.2d 133 (1991). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.... In order to meet this burden, the plaintiff must present evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.... If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.... If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.... The plaintiff then must satisfy [the] burden of persuading the factfinder that [the plaintiff] was the victim of discrimination either directly by persuading the court [or jury] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.... Chiaia reiterates the Ford outline for the burden of proof in § 31-290a (a) cases." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chernovitz v. Preston Trucking Co., 52 Conn. App. 570, 572-73, 729 A.2d 222 (1999).

In Chiaia v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, 24 Conn. App. 369, this court affirmed the decision of the trial court, which determined that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof under § 31-290a where their employer had discharged them solely as a result of the neutral application of a reasonable absence control policy. We held that "§ 31-290a, like its counterpart in other workers' compensation schemes, does not require an employer to retain an employee unable to perform his or her work simply because that inability resulted from a work related injury or illness. See, e.g., Hines v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 736 F. Sup. 675, 678 (D.S.C. 1990); Fergerstrom v. Datapoint Corporation, 680 F. Sup. 1456 (D. Hawaii 1988); Smith v. Electrical System Division of Bristol Corporation, 557 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. App. 1990); Rowland v. Val-Agri, Inc., 13 Kan. App. 2d 149, 766 P.2d 819 (1988); Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 575 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. App. 1978); Galante v. Sandoz, Inc., 192 N.J. Super. 403, 410, 470 A.2d 45 (1983), affd, 196 N.J. Super. 568, 483 A.2d 829 ([App. Div.] 1984) [appeal dismissed, 103 N.J. 492, 511 A.2d 665 (1986)]; Duncan v. New York State Developmental Center, 63 N.Y.2d 128, 470 N.E.2d 820 (1984). Businesses would suffer significant losses if they were prevented from filling employment vacancies after the lapse of a reasonable period of time. See Duncan v. New York State Developmental Center, supra, 135." Chiaia v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, 366-67. We also found, in Erisoty v. Merrow Machine Co., 34 Conn. App. 708, 712-13, 643 A.2d 898, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 908, 648 A.2d 151 (1994), that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim under § 31-290a where she was discharged solely as a result of her employer's inability to accommodate her medical condition, there being no available, long-term position suited to her work restrictions and qualifications.

In this case, the plaintiff first claims that the court improperly found that she did not present evidence from which the trier of fact could find that the defendant had discriminatory intent, as is required to state a prima facie case under § 31-290a. Specifically, she argues that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the record demonstrates that the defendant (1) knew that the plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim, (2) knew that the plaintiff would be able to return to work within six to eight months of her second surgery, (3) decided to hire the per diem employee to replace the plaintiff when the per diem employee demanded full-time employment, even though the plaintiff was a senior member of the department with an exemplary employment record and (4) discharged the plaintiff because she had filed a claim for and was receiving workers' compensation benefits. The plaintiff claims that the record...