Kopprasch v. Stone
| Decision Date | 08 September 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 48,48 |
| Parties | William A. KOPPRASCH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ethol W. STONE, Administrator of the Estate of Belle Haight, Deceased; Ora H. Fox; Harold Haight; and Howard Haight, Defendants and Appellees. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Leo W. Hoffman, Allegan, for defendant and appellant.
Ethol W. Stone, Harry Pell, Allegan, for defendants and appellees.
Before the Entire Bench.
This is a suit in equity for the specific performance of an alleged oral contract between plaintiff and Belle Haight, who died on the 4th of November, 1951. The defendants are the administrator of the estate of Miss Haight and her heirs. The plaintiff is a physician. His bill of complaint alleged that the agreement between himself and Miss Haight provided in substance that he would act as her physician without charge for the balance of her life and perform such other services in her behalf as she might require, and that in return therefor Miss Haight agreed to leave him either by will or deed or property of which she might be the owner at the time of her death. The pleading further averred that plaintiff performed his part of the agreement but that on the death of Miss Haight no will or other legal paper designed to carry out the agreement on her part was found.
Defendants by answer denied the material averments of the bill of complaint, and alleged that any such agreement as the bill of complaint set forth was, and is, contrary to public policy. The answer denied that plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought. Following the hearing the trial court entered a decree dismissing the bill of complaint, and plaintiff has appealed.
On the trial in circuit court several witnesses for plaintiff testified with reference to statements made to them by Miss Haight to the effect that she had an agreement with plaintiff whereby she was to leave him all her property at her death in return for his services as her physician, past and prospective, and his looking after other matters in her behalf. The record indicates that most of plaintiff's witnesses were at the time of the trial, or previously had been, plaintiff's patients. Their testimony generally suggests that they entertained friendly feelings toward him.
Some months before her death Miss Haight had a serious illness, referred to by some of the witnesses as a 'stroke.' As a result she was unable for a time to carry on the business of conducting a small store of which she was the owner. However, she improved sufficiently to permit her to return to her place of business and to continue its operation. The record is not clear as to the amount of attention that she was able to give thereto, and as to the length of time that she was able to continue it. Most of the conversations with her to which plaintiff's witnesses testified apparently took place after she had suffered the so-called stroke. She was at the time of her death in November, 1951, 79 years of age.
On behalf of defendants testimony was introduced for the purpose of rebutting plaintiff's claim that Miss Haight for a period of time prior to her death did not feel kindly toward her relatives. Proof was also introduced as to statements made by her tending to indicate that she had in mind disposing of her property other than for the sole benefit of plaintiff. It may be noted further in this connection that one of plaintiff's witnesses testified to a conversation with Miss Haight in which the latter made statements indicating that she was considering rendering financial assistance toward the construction of a hospital, in which inferentially plaintiff would be interested. Another witness claimed merely that the statement made to her was that plaintiff would profit on Miss Haight's death. Apparently Miss Haight did not state to this witness that any agreement existed between herself and plaintiff, but emphasized that plaintiff was very good to her and that she 'was going to do a great deal for him.'
Following the death of Miss Haight probate proceedings were instituted, an administrator of her estate was appointed, and claims were filed. The property in the estate was inventoried at approximately $16,000. Among other claims was one by plaintiff for medical services in the sum of $1,642 and for other services valued at $482. It thus appears that, notwithstanding his claimed agreement with Miss Haight, plaintiff kept an itemized account of all services rendered by him to her, including a charge for each service.
In order to be entitled to the relief sought the burden rests on plaintiff of establishing by clear and satisfactory proof the making of the contract as claimed by him. There is no direct proof as to any conversation between the parties. Plaintiff's case rests wholly on the testimony of certain witnesses as to alleged admissions against interest made by Miss Haight in casual conversations. It does not appear that any attempt was made, by either of the parties, to reduce the alleged oral agreement to writing to the end that definite proof as to such agreement and the terms thereof would be afforded.
This Court has in prior decisions repeatedly held that testimony of the character here involved must be scanned with suspicion and carefully weighed. Commenting on an analogous situation in In re Cramer's Estate, 296 Mich. 44, 48, 295 N.W. 553, 555, it was said:
Likewise, the following comment in Rehn v. Booth, 299 Mich. 311, 314, 300 N.W. 100, 101, is significant:
'Fragmentary remakes, claimed by third persons to have been made by the deceased, have little probative value, inasmuch as death has closed the lips claimed to have uttered them and thus cut off all refutation or explanation.'
In Sheardy v. Baker, 323 Mich. 364, 35 N.W.2d 283, 285, in affirming a decree denying relief under proofs somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar, the Court summarized the rules previously recognized for the weighing of testimony of the nature here involved. Among other prior decisions there referred to was Kerns v. Kerns, 303 Mich. 23, 5 N.W.2d 552, in which this Court, in affirming a decree denying specific performance of an alleged oral agreement to leave certain property to the plaintiff, said, in part:
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